But it doesn't work that way. Some properties get associated to members of a class, while others do not.
Let's take discrimination on the basis of blood type personality theory in parts of Asia. Many people in Japan believe that one's personality is strongly affected by one's blood type. Quoting from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blood_type_personality_theory :
> Many people have been discriminated against because of their blood type. Employers ask blood types during interviews despite the warnings they have been given. Children at schools have been split up according to their blood type. The national softball team has customized training to fit each player's blood type. Companies have given work assignments according to their employee's blood type.
Yet all evidence is that there is no basis for this form of discrimination. It's pseudoscience akin to discrimination based on one's astrological sign.
So it's clear that discrimination can rise even without a meaningful prior for a given attribute.
We can also look at left- vs. right-handedness for an example of varying levels of discrimination even when the underlying genetics and thus putative justification for discrimination hasn't changed. To copy a quote from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bias_against_left-handed_peopl... :
> "I was educated in the USA in Catholic school in the 60s. My left hand was beaten until it was swollen, so I would use my right right [sic] hand" ... "I had a teacher who would smack my left hand with a yardstick every time she caught me writing with my left hand" ... "My fourth grade teacher [...] would force me to use my right hand to perform all of my school work. If she caught me using my left hand, I was hit in the head with a dictionary. It turned out that she believed left handers were connected with Satan."
Since we know that discrimination can arise without a prior, and the level of discrimination can change even the prior does not change, it's not clear that Bayesian reasoning is a good way to understand the issue.
In addition, it doesn't help understand why some factors are used to define 'similar people' while others are not. Men are far more likely to be involved in crime in the US, including domestic terrorism to white collar crime, but aren't universally discriminated against for being a member of that class. Or on the topic of white collar crime, editorials like 'Wall Street Criminals Are Still a Protected Class in America' at http://www.vice.com/read/wall-street-criminals-are-still-a-p... highlight how the Bayesian prior is outright ignored.
Thus, I'm not convinced that humans really use Bayesian reasoning as the basis for -isms.
You should check out the sentences women get for criminal convictions compared to men. You might also want to look at car insurance rates for 16-20 year olds. I've seen someone advocating that instead of teaching your small children "if you need help, go to the police", you should teach them "if you need help, go to a woman".
Men are routinely discriminated against for their higher criminality; people don't avoid women on the street or freak out if one shows up at a park without a child in tow. I was asked to leave the public library once because they thought it was weird that I was reading under the stairs.
Otherwise it's easy to point out historic biases against hiring men as, for example, nurses. Just like it's easy to find cases in the US where white people were discriminated against on the basis of their skin color ( http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/08/justice/new-york-hate-crim... ) or discriminated against for being having only US citizenship (http://consumerist.com/2013/06/24/welsh-pub-fined-for-discri... ).
Early male obstetricians (really, doctors who started researching childbirth) were not well thought of by midwives. Could you elaborate on the special sense of "universal discrimination" you're talking about?
Perhaps 'universal' isn't the precise term, but I lack a more nuanced term, and it captures the idea that many more people don't like Obama simply because he is black than those who don't like him simply because he is a man.
The examples you gave are also less universal. I agree that single males in the US face discrimination for being at or near a playground or around children in general more than women do. But that is not as universal as non-whites forced to leave so-called 'sundown towns' by sunset, or the "Tacoma Method" used to expel Chinese residents from cities in the west coast.
Going back to the OP, the recent prejudice against unaccompanied males near playgrounds is another example of how humans don't really use a Bayesian analysis.
I disagree; I think men suffer a lot of discrimination as potential criminals. I want to know what you think should be happening to men (if people were using a roughly Bayesian approach), and what you think is happening to men, and why you think it's not compatible with the idea that what people are doing can be modeled as a Bayesian approach.
We need only look at how humans do risk management. Driving is dangerous, and one of the leading causes of death. Yet people are more scared of airplane crashes, despite how flying is a less dangerous means of transportation. Or, parents are increasingly worried about the safety of their children despite the clear evidence that childhood now is safer than ever. We also see people who gamble on the lottery with the incorrect belief that there are winning streaks or lucky numbers. Thus, human responses are clearly neither Bayesian nor frequentist.
I therefore don't see why you think a Bayesian approach, or something close to a Bayesian approach, helps understand the topic.
FWIW, an analysis of the sex-based skew in the prison population would also need to look to many other factors, such as the huge increase in incarceration rates over the last few decades, the strong racial component, the different social roles of men and women in US culture, and more.
Such a model would also need to explain why, if people thought that men are inherently more dangerous then women and "suffer a lot of discrimination as potential criminals", so many more social roles which require trust or safety traditionally went disproportionately to men. Perhaps there is some confounding variable which is more significant than being a male? For example, if the prior is multi-modal, the is there a reason for the two modes?
As another hypothesis which fits the limited data you presented, supposed that men in US culture are supposed to be more trustworthy than women and as such have more power and control. If men break that trust, then they are punished more harshly then women, and for a longer time. That would explain the disproportionate distribution of men in jail, despite the the normal bias for men in the culture.
While that is certainly a form of discrimination on the basis of sex, it's not the same sort of discrimination which made black people scared for their lives in a sundown town.
Why not?
"Where did my keys go?"
They vanished into thin air is not even considered, because its prior is zero.
I must have put them somewhere else is the instant frontrunner, because I do it so often.
After much unsuccessful searching, hypotheses such as "someone is playing a joke on me" or "my wife accidentally grabbed them" might be considered -- low priors that require additional evidence.
Probably only after noticing something like a broken window would "someone broke in and stole them" be considered -- extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.
And so on...
Bayesian: Here's Bayes' theorem, a single formula that makes perfect sense! See, it's simpler, right? What, you want to use it? Something something beta distribution something something Markov chain Monte Carlo something something - okay, got it?
Good luck teaching that to undergrads. In the real world, intro stats classes are taken mostly by people with little math background, no programming background, little interest in statistics, and little innate talent for any of those things. With the frequentist approach, at least they have a fucking chance.
I do not agree that this is a feature. Quite the contrary.
But the alternative isn't just replacing bad with good, it'd be more like telling ~98% of the science majors in the country, "hey, you're too dumb to do real statistics, so please just stop trying". I can't see that realistically happening.