Oops, it was actually checking if the URL ends with 'dell.com', not startswith, but yeah. Any script on 'scriptkiddydell.com' gets full SYSTEM RCE, on a program that shows no signs of running and starts automatically. It's pretty much malware...
Oh, and they obfuscated the binary for iron-clad maximum security.
That doesn't suffice either, unless they also enforce HTTPS. Otherwise, any network you connect to can spoof DNS and load a fake dell.com page over http to break your security.
(Of course, even if they did require HTTPS, the attacker could serve up a fake dell.com HTTPS site signed with eDellRoot...)
And either way, they have no business even allowing an authentic dell.com page to execute arbitrary code on your system, either.
That would be, if it were not for...
$ dig localhost.dell.com
; <<>> DiG 9.9.5-3ubuntu0.5-Ubuntu <<>> localhost.dell.com ;; global options: +cmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 56836 ;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION: ; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4000 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;localhost.dell.com. IN A
;; ANSWER SECTION: localhost.dell.com. 462 IN A 127.0.0.1
An attacker who can either abuse an already running local webserver (like Apache configured to listen to *:80) or start up a locally running webserver (using something like python's SimpleHTTPServer) can serve their content under a Dell subdomain.
This requires some sort of local filesystem privileges or potentially RCE, but if the original commenter is correct, this can be pivoted to SYSTEM RCE.