[1] https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf (page 5)
[1] https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf (page 5)
What proof is there of this ?
Even reports I've heard from people at the White House believe the newer phones are simply not possible for Apple to compromise.
A possible mitigation against the "FBI attack" (which I don't know if Apple has implemented), while still allowing SEP firmware updates, would be to have a simple routine in ROM that the SEP always runs upon boot (before running the SEP firmware blob) to verify that as hash of the firmware blob matches the one previously recorded by the SEP. If it doesn't, it could either wipe and update the hash, or refuse to boot until the previous blob is restored. When updating the firmware normally, the SEP would simply verify the user enters their pin before updating the hash.
Or simply require pin entry (or wipe) for all DFU firmware updates, which seems like a much safer option.
""" Entering Device Firmware Upgrade (DFU) mode
Restoring a device after it enters DFU mode returns it to known good state with the certainty that only unmodified Apple-signed code is present. DFU mode can be entered manually: First connect the device to a computer using a USB cable, then hold down both the Home and Sleep/Wake buttons. After 8 seconds, release the Sleep/Wake button while continuing to hold down the Home button. Note: Nothing will be displayed on the screen when the device is in DFU mode. If the Apple logo appears, the Sleep/Wake button was held down too long. """
[1] https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
The only question is, does the existing firmware blank the store keys before flashing the new update. I didn't see any indication that it does.
Lots of people felt (IMHO with poor understandings of the situation) that it was, and that a modern iPhone would never be "hackable" by the government in this way. That turns out not to be the case, for the obvious reason that Apple needs to be able to ship modified firmware for the enclave, and that modified firmware can always contain modifications to emit the encryption keys in a way that the original security metaphor wouldn't have permitted.
Basically: people are hanging their determination that "the iPhone is secure from government snooping by technological measures" on a completely unattested fantasy design. The real device almost certainly doesn't work like that, and even Apple hasn't claimed that it does.
I'm not sure it's useful to have a battle of hypotheses and assumptions couched in the language of confidence and certainty.
But even on the technical side, my point was stronger: the fact that the enclave firmware was just updated to behave differently without wiping the data that it controls argues very (very!) strongly that the "snoop-proof" feature you believe exists... doesn't.
The fact that the enclave firmware can be seamlessly updated while in an unlocked state is not evidence that the enclave firmware can be seamlessly in a locked state.