I fully buy that there are legal, cultural, and diplomatic reasons that this could make Apple's customers less secure in the long run by setting a precedent, etc.
I guess one argument is that whatever code they write to tie the "weaponized" iOS update to a particular device could have bugs.
The kind of insecurity people are talking about is a policy concern; people will feel less secure if Apple can be compelled to exploit their capability this way.
That's a valid concern, but it's not a concern that really touches on how much more the "token IT person" knows than a layperson with little technical knowledge.
It annoys me a lot when people in technology deploy special- pleading logic like this.
It is either acceptable for Apple to bypass a security feature or it is unacceptable. Tech people seem to have a real hard time with the idea that:
A) It might be acceptable some of time time but not others
B) There are competing values at play here and even if we decide it's (un)acceptable there are some downsides to either choice.
In the hypothetical that Apple did not have the capability to defeat the 5C's passcode counter, is the FBI thwarted because of a technically secure cryptosystem or because it is the policy in the United States to allow such cryptosystems to be marketed and sold?
Policy and technology do not exist in a vacuum. Apple is obviously going to close the custom image loophole in response to this "debate"; so clearly the boundary between technology and policy is fluid. But merely taping a policy out for silicon, as Apple is going to do in the next chip, does not address any of the underlying issues. Sure, in the instant case Apple "technically can" unlock the iPhone, but that is always true: we could create a law such that all phones must be backdoored for example. Assuming Apple loses here, mark your calendar, because we'll have that battle next year when a terrorist uses the new silicon.
There is a line somewhere for what is reasonable to compel. Reasonable people can disagree about where that line is, but let's not paint "people in technology" with a broad patronizing brush of "it's not technology, it's policy, therefore your rules don't apply". Technology is merely policy that's machine-readible.
> It won't make phones less secure in any technological sense... The kind of insecurity people are talking about is a policy concern;
(My comment alleges there is no such thing as a "technological sense" as distinct from a "policy concern".)
> It annoys me a lot when people in technology deploy special- pleading logic like this.
(My comment alleges that the logic isn't special-pleading.)
I didn't intend to be read as confrontationally as perhaps I sounded. You have a minority position in this kind of environment; I take minority positions sometimes, I understand it is not always pleasant to prosecute them. If you don't want to prosecute them, I won't make you. I'm just explaining that I really did offer a good-faith rebuttal of what I understood to be your position. There may be something wrong with it, but I don't think it's off-topic.
That will have a significant impact on the future of the US tech industry, world innovation, and the advancement of the human race.
Could you elaborate on how the precedent of signing a custom IOS release for a specific target IPhone is distinctly different and cannot be interpolated to further and broader requests? For example a request for custom IOS version which the FBI can install on other target phones themselves?
The other point to consider is that if the US government can compel companies to create and sign custom binaries there are other governments (China) that I'm sure would love to play at the same game. From a security standpoint it would be best for everyone if what the FBI is currently asking was entirely impossible in the first place.
Most corporate sysadmins are BOFHs, relishing the power they wield and convinced they can do no wrong. They have nothing against electronic surveillance -- they practice it daily with gusto, they just think they're smart enough to avoid someone else doing it to them.
Hell, the whole "root" model is fundamentally authoritarian in principle, no matter how hard we try not to say it. It might have been born out of engineering necessity, but it has long generated its own cultural artefacts. It might have been balanced somewhat by historical accident (i.e. west-coast liberal culture, phreaking etc), but this balance has been eroded when the IT job market exploded and all sorts of people were onboarded.
Modern sysadmins would find nothing strange with the FBI request. They special-case their way out of ethics on a regular basis already.
Allowing a backdoor to one tool does not grant access to every criminal communication.
Therefore, the request is pointless, it does nothing to make us more secure, and every IT guy knows it. The sysadmin may not care about protecting others' privacy, but he knows this isn't a good way to catch criminals because it won't work. The criminals will just use something else that the US government, or perhaps any government, cannot compel to add a backdoor.