There's a few thousand people using it in the US, so there isn't a huge market for it.
Medicare is a big enough consumer that it should probably be running a program where it shares risk with generic makers that are willing to produce drugs that don't cost a lot, as long as the company maintains quality. Basically, make sure that line start up and regulatory costs aren't preventing $1 pills for rare conditions coming to market.
Perhaps, but Medicare has literally no incentive to do this.
It's one thing to posit that a monopsony or oligopsony could result in driving prices down. And in a closed system, that might be what happens[0].
But at the end of the day, Medicare has no mandate to ensure sustainability of reimbursement and payment rates. Since they can't raise revenues (taxes) without Congress, they balance the budget by driving reimbursements (for service providers) down below cost. Pharmaceutical companies are actually affected by this too, but because the big-ticket items are under monopoly protection (via drug patents), unlike care delivery, Medicare still has to pay sticker price for those.
The people who end up being hurt by this, by the way, are not Medicare patients, but uninsured patients and privately-insured patients.
[0] But not always - like a monopoly, a monopsony can choose price or quantity, but not both.
To the extent that I understand it, I agree that Medicare the-thing-run-by-statute doesn't currently have much incentive to do it.
I guess I could have said something about federal programs that run huge public health providers being structured to use market based policies to reduce costs, but I'm prone to colloquialisms (i.e., the pretense that Medicare isn't limited to existing statute, it can be amended to act differently).
In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice, they aren't.
It's one thing to talk about structuring government programs so that they are obligated to serve the public interest no matter what. But actually implementing that, in a manner ensured to be robust against creeping scope, capture, and corruption, is damn-near impossible.
If I was naive to that, why would I start the sentence with that caveat?
I didn't say you were. I was expanding on the point, naming the specific challenges to the process.
The issue with Shkreli is purely exploitation of bad FDA rules, not patents. The FDA is the problem here.
The FDA insisting that drugs conform to standards of purity and activity isn't the problem here. When you talk to someone who is working in pill manufacturing you'll learn that it is a complex process. The thing must reliably disintegrate in the digestive tract, the active substance must be distributed evenly, excipients do influence bioavailability - just as with Theranos the standards exist for a reason.
The ecosystem around low-volume drugs is strange. Perhaps it would be best for the NIH to open up their own facility, just because of the bad press that Pharma Bro caused for the whole industry.
A "gentlemen's agreement" is bound to disintegrate - it's just begging for someone to defect. If regulatory mechanisms allow exploits like this they are clearly broken.
Of course it's unlikely the FDA will fix this since their incentives are just as broken. If they prevent millions of people from getting potentially lifesaving drugs they keep their jobs. But if a few photogenic babies die due to a drug that they approved, congressional inquiry incoming!
There is no need for FDA dissing here. What "photogenic babies" are you even talking about? And who are the "millions of people"? We are talking orphan drugs! Do you have any examples or nothing beyond rhetoric?
The biggest problem facing R & D in the phrmaceutical industry is that incentives for investment that the market provides are completely at odds to what is needed on the ground.
I'm discussing the fact that the FDA has incentives misaligned with the public good. If they approve X and something bad happens, they get heat from Congress and the media. If they reject something unnecessarily no one cares.
The biggest problem facing R & D in the phrmaceutical industry is that incentives for investment that the market provides are completely at odds to what is needed on the ground.
Could you explain this claim?
It really is the financing model that is opposed to the public good. People will admit it freely. And the heat that the FDA gets when something slips past them is incomparably smaller than the heat the pharmco gets. Anyone remember Vioxx and the cardiac side effects?
The FDA's incentives are aligned with the public good. There are already drugs for most conditions, and if there is anything that performs outstandingly well in clinical trials there is the fast track.
As for the natural monopoly, it's a fact that the number of manufacturers for any given drug is surprisingly small. For orphan drug the market is so small that it's inevitably just one manufacturer. The upfront costs to qualify equivalence are just a contributor.