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Comment by usaphp | Hacker News Reader

Serious question: how is this "unlocking iPhone case", any different from what fbi and other agencies used to do for a while when they seize computers for example, or a locked safe? They also "unlocked" those devices after they got a warrant, what makes this "iPhone case" any different? If they have a warrant - and a way to unlock the device - what is the reason of all this buzz around it?

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Computers are rarely found with full-disk encryption. When Ross Ulbricht was arrested he did have his laptop encrypted, but the FBI went to great lengths to arrest him at a cafe when he had it open, on, and unlocked. Normally computer forensics just consists of making an image of the unencrypted disk. Microsoft Bitlocker defaults to asking you to save a recovery key in the cloud where it can be subpoena'd. Apple is unique in offering high-security by default devices to the general public - although the security is part of their product strategy of keeping complete control of the platform.

Safes are drillable, and there may also be "password recovery" services available from the manufacturer.

>> "security is part of [Apple's] product strategy of keeping complete control of the platform"

^^ True, which is why Apple's systems and related security measures will likely never be publicly auditable.

On the other hand, it makes exploits very valuable to the FBI where they will likely be saved for high profile cases. I can't tell if this is a good or bad thing.

It's neither good or bad, but a reflection of how complex real security is, that being perfectly secure is likely impossible, etc.

It is interesting that they have a way to unlock the device, both because it means iPhones are less secure than we thought and because it contradicts their earlier position that they needed Apple to disable security features for them to access a locked device.

The issue is not that they're trying to unlock it, but that they're trying to force the manufacturer to unlock it for them.

nobody answered your question because there is no difference.

Unlocking a safe unlocks that safe.

The proposed FBI exploit would unlock any and all iPhones.

A sufficiently powerful drill, which humans have possessed for some time, can unlock any and all safes...

I think because Apple decided, after the Snowden illegal wiretapping stories, to grandstand for PR purposes. And many tech writers took that bait.

That's really not a fair summary of the situation. Apple took a stand, rightly in my view, to dig their heels in under the request to make a permanent back door for FBI (and likely other groups) usage. There is a massive difference.

> That's really not a fair summary of the situation. Apple took a stand, rightly in my view, to dig their heels in under the request to make a permanent back door for FBI (and likely other groups) usage. There is a massive difference

This is history rewriting, the request, in his least dangerous form, was to unlock a single phone from inside Apple labs by Apple people

Incorrect -- they requested an "instrument", which carries with it all sorts of legal requirements beyond creating an in-house tool.

Source: http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=5645

They made both requests. Apple refused both requests.

I respect that view. Here's where I disagree: I think Apple taking a similar stand for the illegal wiretapping makes sense (giant open door, no court oversight), but not for this case (could be clean roomed, court oversight)

Is a company that makes safes legally required to have a master key or to create a master key even when they don't want to? The question is whether or not a 3rd party can be compelled to create something which does not exist in order to aid in the execution of a search warrant. I think it's pretty clear based on prior All Writs Act precedent[1] that Apple should not be required to produce new software code for cases like this.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_v._New_York_Tele...

I think there's a strong case for first-amendment rights in code signing even in the case of a non-ephemeral signing key. In any case, look at the use of a search warrant with Lavabit—is it clear that the All Writs act was even their strongest legal suit?

yes, perhaps Apple is doing the right thing for the wrong reason. I also think so. However, it's still the right thing and therefore i support them. Even EFF supports them.

Why do you think they're doing it for the wrong reason? Apple has demonstrated many times their commitment to user privacy, it's not like this was a PR stunt.

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