Your point is still valid, but perhaps we approach a time when over-reliance is better than all but the best human pilots (Sully, perhaps).
The pilots were under the misguided impression that the aircraft would automatically spool-up the engines if the aircraft became to slow. This was a safety feature that didn't engage for a obscure technical reason. Even with a manual visual approach the pilot can still use the autothrust for landing.
A more rigorously trained pilot (eg. Capt. Sully) would have aborted the approach and performed an immediate go-around if he got below the glidepath (or too slow) below a certain altitude (eg. 400ft Above Ground Level).
The rules requiring a go-around (or missed approach) apply for a fully automated approach and landing, just as much as manually flown approach and landing.
There, automation lowered both the standard for situational awareness and fundamental stick and rudder skills. Then, when a quirky corner case happened, the pilots did all manner of wrong on the problem: so much so, they amplified a condition from "mostly harmless" to fatal for all.
Vanity Fair has a nice piece on this accident that's easy to dig up. Good read.
Sure, to nearly every pilot that behavior is wacky, but it shouldn't have been a surprise for more than an instant to pilots who were "operating as designed."
It seems there's no free lunch: when skills atrophy as a natural response to helpful automation it requires advancement in some other skills, should the goal of an ever improving error (accident) rate be achieved.