We're probably too small to be worth your time, but JIRA is offering $10/yr for up to 10 users, $10 more if you want the JIRA Agile features too.
In short: We cost a little bit more, but include features that are separate, add-on products for Jira, and generally software developers are a _lot_ happier using FogBugz. If you want to know more, just drop us a line; don't want to be too spammy here.
If a security vulnerability happens on the public Fogzbugs instance, we'd be bitten by it badly in this sort of situation. In our setup, we protect against that by exposing the JIRA webserver and git servers only inside of our private network.
It's not about perfect security, but it does greatly reduce the attack surface when the server isn't even accessible via the internet. I can't prevent anyone who wants to from signing up for the free trial of Fogzbugs and exploiting their publicly running system - even logged-in-only exploits are possible in such a case.
Not to mention the issues with downtime on these cloud providers. My provider has had 1 sizeable, noticeable outage in the last 5 years. It spanned about 20 minutes. Look at a big, popular cloud service like GitHub - they've had several in the past year alone, spanning hours at times.
I find these sorts of compromises where I'm offering my code and server configurations to a 3rd party company (where basically any admin there is free to read it, or anyone who can compromise their admins) to be rather poor. I'd rather keep the blame within my own company and be in control of our data fully rather than having to worry about whether Fogzbugs operations follows proper security precautions, I only have to worry about whether we do.
Call it paranoid if you want, but I think it's a more than reasonable precaution to not just throw your data around to anyone who asks for it. Especially data which could lead to compromise of servers and customer information. I value my customer's information much more than I value any gains from some easy to use cloud service.
Besides, a disgruntled employee of your company is far more likely to be malicious than a disgruntled employee of some random cloud services company. What would be their motivation? They probably don't care about your code at all -- but your employees -- they certainly might. Has there ever been a case of a disgruntled Github employee hacking a customer company's production code ever in the history of Github? Has there ever in the history of SMEs been a disgruntled employee that harmed his own company? All the time.
So what risk is more realistic to mitigate? The hypothetical disgruntled employee at a vendor that probably has never heard of you or employees sitting right there in the office with you?
Once you have these services running they're fairly stable and hands-off, especially if you have them firewalled off enough to not have to worry too much about remote exploits. A little bit of docker experience can do the job here, we're small enough that we don't need a fancy high availability configuration or anything, so it keeps things fairly simple.
Of course a disgruntled coworker is a bigger concern, but one which is easier to control than outsiders are. And that's not to mention the many times in the past that I've seen 3rd party companies hacked to do things like steal Bitcoin wallets via their providers. If it's an easy risk to mitigate, may as well do it.
This would basically resolve my biggest problems with it I suppose, if used fully and properly. Currently comitting with your SSH key basically resolves this issue in the same way, assuming our internal-restricted server isn't compromised of course.
I'd still be a little uncomfortable putting code on 3rd party servers and having any data there at all for stability reasons, but this does make it more viable. I'll definitely be commit signing everything I have on cloud services from now on.
Ehh...