Obviously: what they're saying is broadly true. I also agree with the other commenters here who are pointing out that this is largely a response to endpoint TLS interception, and that the point is to focus attention on tools that intercept but don't validate certificates --- CERT is not telling every Fortune 500 company and every federal agency to stop deploying BlueCoat boxes.
But the more important thing to push back on in your comment is the notion that a proclamation from CERT has any real meaning. It doesn't, even within FedGov IT.
US-CERT is explicitly calling out that many appliances and applications often are weakening security vs. the common TLS clients, by way of not properly validating certificate chains by proxy for the client and otherwise masking SSL/TLS issues from being surfaced to the end user.
I believe this is CERT trying to get software companies to get their act together on solving security-detrimental UX/UI issues vs. a blanket statement not to add TLS interception proxies to a corporate network.
This is the usual reaction to this I see everywhere. It doesn't match with reality. Read the complete paper by Halderman et al [1].
It says pretty clearly that all existing products lower the security in one way or another: "Our grading scale focuses on the security of the TLS handshake and does not account for the additional HTTPS validation checks present in many browsers, such as HSTS, HPKP, OneCRL/CRLSets, certificate transparency validation, and OCSP must-staple. None of the products we tested supported these features."
TLS Interception that doesn't degrade security is a myth that exists only in some parallel world fantasy. It's also not very surprising. Browser vendors have extremely qualified security teams that are involved in many ways in the development of stronger TLS protections. Nothing like that can be said about any of the vendors of interception products.
Other than the unavoidable weakening of having another system seeing the unencrypted data, which is inherent in using one of these systems and can never go away.
In theory, yes, apart from the obvious "more attack surface" problem. They could check for HPKP, CRLset, CT. They could even do more. (CT checking is very basic in Chrome and nonexistent in other browsers.)
However in reality? No. In the real world Bluecoat manages to break TLS 1.3 deployment, although its designers tried everything to avoid that and they have been asked by Google to test that.
It became "extra cool" to hate on reverse proxies recently while everyone hates CloudFlare (and to be clear: I've hated CloudFlare since before it was cool to hate on CloudFlare, and you should check my comment and submission history to verify if you don't believe ;P), but what people are essentially complaining about are "it encourages you to do something insecure", which I think is actually largely true only of CloudFlare, and you have to remember that the vast majority of developers who are using CloudFlare are doing so because they don't know much about network administration.
But like, think about it this way: Apache is also an SSL termination point. The code in your website is likely 99% "transform a URL into SQL, then transform the result into HTML": it is just a dumb encoder/decoder, and pretty exactly analogous to an SSL termination point. If you really believe in true end-to-end encryption, then having this webserver in the middle is a bad idea: you should route requests directly to database servers and ensure that at no point does any non-database computer have a decrypted copy of the information that will eventually be rendered to the user.
Another thing to think about: if you are heavily concerned that the CDN or reverse proxy service you are using has access to your traffic, realize that they are no different than using a hosted server. We don't even need to invoke "the cloud" for this one: unless I built the machine myself, I have no way of knowing that the server I am renting to run my database server on isn't running under a hypervisor that is allowing dumps of my decrypted memory. A reverse proxy is just another piece of rented infrastructure that someone else is in control of, and I don't see many people (though if you are, that's great, and then I'd be really happy ;P) insisting that everyone build their own computers and host them at their office, to make sure decrypted data never touches a computer owned and operated by someone else.
The risk profile is also just so fundamentally different, in no small part due to these differences of "who is in control and how is it implemented". Let's say that CDNetworks is failing to check SSL certificates correctly: how exactly are you going to attack that against my website? I mean, sure: if you are a state-level actor, that is going to be easy, but otherwise, that's going to be extremely rough. An "antivirus" filter that, as described in this alert, is failing to correctly check SSL certificates... well, that opens you up to attack by amateur attackers that are "close to you", such as a stalker or an ex-spouse or a corporate competitor. You can't just claim "well, if I abstract away all of the details, they look the same"... you have to look at why you care and verify that you didn't strip away anything required and relevant.
My live seems more trivil now.
Both clients and servers can have TLS terminating things in the chains that perform arbitrary functions. All of them increase attack surfaces and risks of implementation bugs.
I can't say I haven't considered abusing PL/pgSQL to that point... ;)
I've mostly recovered from the experience, thanks, although I do have occasional flashbacks.
Those can equally happen the other way around. You might put an antivirus filter in place on your own network. Your hosting provider might set up their own reverse proxy.
> But like, think about it this way: Apache is also an SSL termination point. The code in your website is likely 99% "transform a URL into SQL, then transform the result into HTML": it is just a dumb encoder/decoder, and pretty exactly analogous to an SSL termination point. If you really believe in true end-to-end encryption, then having this webserver in the middle is a bad idea: you should route requests directly to database servers and ensure that at no point does any non-database computer have a decrypted copy of the information that will eventually be rendered to the user.
I agree with that - best to have the database and the web server on the same server, communicating via local socket or shared memory. Better still to compile the web layer and the data layer into the same unikernel. Current best practice (e.g. PCI-DSS) seems to accept having an (encrypted) network connection between distinct web and database servers, but only within a single physically secured rack. You're right that if you do the same thing with a load balancer (have it in the same physically secured rack as your web servers, encrypt connections between it and them) then it's no less secure, but I don't think people would want to be using a load balancer within a single rack anyway, since most of the point of a load balancer is availability and you want separate racks for that. Certainly a third-party reverse-proxy is a substantial weakening of security.
> I don't see many people (though if you are, that's great, and then I'd be really happy ;P) insisting that everyone build their own computers and host them at their office, to make sure decrypted data never touches a computer owned and operated by someone else.
I wouldn't go that far - AIUI PCI-DSS etc. require you have physically secured/access-controlled servers but allow you to rent space/power/cooling from a datacenter operator (though they don't get access to your rack, and possibly have to also be audited themselves).
> Let's say that CDNetworks is failing to check SSL certificates correctly: how exactly are you going to attack that against my website? I mean, sure: if you are a state-level actor, that is going to be easy, but otherwise, that's going to be extremely rough. An "antivirus" filter that, as described in this alert, is failing to correctly check SSL certificates... well, that opens you up to attack by amateur attackers that are "close to you", such as a stalker or an ex-spouse or a corporate competitor.
It's a different risk profile to be sure. Are you more worried about someone making a large-scale attack against the remote service you were connecting to, or just against the Internet in general? Or someone making a small-scale local attack? I think both can be serious; it's not just state-level actors but also large criminal rings or even political groups that would potentially have the resources to execute an attack against a particular service (e.g. a medical provider doing something politically contentious, or just anything that accepts credit cards / personal information).
Most certainly, there's no difference whatsoever (or almost so, if the reverse proxy is "smart" and has some application logic in it) if your webapp doesn't speak HTTP natively, but talks FastCGI/uWSGI/SCGI protocols instead. Which is quite common.
I mean, the actual interface (passing buffer pointers in the local process or passing same data via local UNIX sockets) shouldn't matter much, right? As long as interfaces have similar security properties and all the necessary data is passed around properly. A sufficiently privileged user can introspect both (with ltrace or tcpdump), and insufficiently privileged one can't do anything anyway.
They say pretty plainly that you need to ensure that such products provide correct certificate validation, since the client cannot do so reliably.
> In general, organizations considering the use of HTTPS inspection should carefully consider the pros and cons of such products before implementing
So I think there's at least some element of "don't do this unless you have to" in there.
But for the most part yeah, the alert seems to be more about ensuring the interception is done securely than about not doing it at all.
> No, they haven't.
The original report headline from US-CERT: "HTTPS Interception Weakens TLS Security"
That seems pretty unambiguous, regardless of your personal feelings regarding CERT or whether it speaks for the broader US government.