> I don't think that's the correct interpretation of this document. A better title would be "Most TLS Proxies Considered Harmful", not TLS interception as a whole.
This is the usual reaction to this I see everywhere. It doesn't match with reality. Read the complete paper by Halderman et al [1].
It says pretty clearly that all existing products lower the security in one way or another: "Our grading scale focuses on the security of the TLS handshake and does not account for the additional HTTPS validation checks present in many browsers, such as HSTS, HPKP, OneCRL/CRLSets, certificate transparency validation, and OCSP must-staple. None of the products we tested supported these features."
TLS Interception that doesn't degrade security is a myth that exists only in some parallel world fantasy. It's also not very surprising. Browser vendors have extremely qualified security teams that are involved in many ways in the development of stronger TLS protections. Nothing like that can be said about any of the vendors of interception products.
[1] https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/interception-ndss17.pdf