Sometimes, the act of producing evidence in response to a government request involves the defendant making implicit incriminating assertions. If the government says "produce all your cooked accounting books," handing over those documents implicitly communicates the assertions that (1) certain books exist; (2) those books are doctored; and (3) you have ownership/control over them. However, say the government asks you for your bank records. When you hand them over, you're implicitly saying "I have bank records," and "these are my bank records." That's not incriminating -- even if the bank records themselves might contain incriminating evidence.
The "foregone conclusion rule," says that the act of production is non-testimonial when the incriminating facts are already known.[1] If the existence of doctored books is already known by other means, the act of producing them doesn't communicate anything to the authorities. The books themselves are obviously communicated, but the 5th amendment does not protect the underlying evidence. It protects the implied statements by the defendant about the underlying evidence.
Hence the threading the needle in the opinion. They're not asking the guy to make incriminating statements about the existence of incriminating evidence. They're asking him to turn over the incriminating evidence they already know exists.
[1] Note that the Court is not saying "we already know he's guilty so the 5th amendment doesn't apply."