The issue is, the person wasn't a 'hacker' in any meaningful sense of the word.
Etherium claims to be "a decentralized platform that runs smart contracts: applications that run exactly as programmed without any possibility of downtime, censorship, fraud or third party interference" (from etherium.org). That is, an Etherium program doesn't implement a written contract, it is the contract.
Despite this lofty goal, the core team saw fit to hard-fork the chain because they didn't like how a particular program was executing. The claim that the 'hacker' had 'stolen' funds from theDAO is ridiculous - you can only steal what doesn't belong to you, and ownership of theDAO's Ether is defined by the program itself!
More broadly, the hard-fork seems to imply that an Etherium contract is really made up of two contracts. One contract is the program itself, which explicitly spells out what is and not allowed. The other contract is an implicit understanding of what the program 'should' do, and exists only in the minds of the creators of the contract. The issue arises when this implicit 'contract' is used to override the real contract - flying in the face of how Etherium claims to work.
A much better solution would have been to try to address the underlying issues in Solidity - perhaps requiring future contracts to explicitly allow recursion? I personally question the decision to use a Turing-complete language to express contracts in the first place.