This strategy of employing familiar language in unfamiliar contexts gives the appearance of being radical but may not be quite that. It strikes me as being largely a reversal of Skinnerian behaviorism: the behaviorists said that human beings are nothing special because they're just like animals and plants, responding to stimuli in law-governed ways; now the object-oriented ontologists say that human beings are nothing special because animals and plants (and hammers and black holes) all possess the traits of consciousness and desire that we have traditionally believed to be distinctive to us. The goal of the philosophical redescription seems to be the same: to dethrone humanity, to get us to stop thinking of ourselves as sitting at the pinnacle of the Great Chain of Being.
It's hard for me to take Morton too seriously because our ( by which I mean his and mine ) Metaphysics are so diametrically opposed. Hyperobjects are so ontologically complex as to give the feeling they have been invented solely to justify the philosopher's pre-existing beliefs ( though in fairness, you can write that about a lot of things ).