In general, you could have a unikernel where it's impossible to get executable buffer overflow because there are no memory pages that are both writable and executable - as the article describes, that'd need some help from the hypervisor for the initialization.
Return oriented programming exploits could work anyway, though.
I think - I'm still learning about this embedded stuff.
The trouble is that instead of uploading "/bin/sh" you'd have to upload the whole shell which you'd want to run; instead of making a syscall for something that a normal kernel would do but this one doesn't, you'd have to compile and upload appropriate code (including device drivers) to get that done.
It'd be a "bring your own machine code" party.
Yes
> whereas a normal operating system would detect the out-of-bounds memory access and kill the process?
No. A buffer overflow in a normal operating system usually results in the the attacker gaining control over the process that the buffer overflow occurred in. This is not as bad as an attacker gaining full system access, but is generally plenty for an attacker to accomplish their goals.
Meaning that if you have a buffer overflow or similar, all you could access was what was in the VM (unless you also happen to pack a VM escape).
That said, i can't help think "DOS in a can" whenever i read about unikernels.
IncludeOS actually came out of a research need to stress-test hypervisors and run 10000 VMs on a single host. Since it is a clean slate system it has some different characteristics and those can be exploited in certain use cases and so people have kept on working on it.