Comment by michaelt | Hacker News Reader

Comment by michaelt | Hacker News Reader

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  our attack can be enabled with any remotely exploitable
  vulnerability that allows the attacker to reprogram the
  firmware of an ECU (e.g., the infotainment system).

I will be honest, it seems very unprofessional if vehicle safety engineers have allowed complex, network-connected entertainment systems to have write access to the same CAN bus that the brakes and throttle are on.

After all, if a hacker can remotely reprogram anything on that CAN bus, for sure they can remotely trigger a fatal crash.

I know that Volvos have two separate CAN buses, one for important safety critical systems and one for interior functions and infotainment.

They are joined with a proxy/firewall that provides separation and limits the functionality available between the two.

I'm guessing this attack would only work in this case if the attacker could physically access the OBD port to gain entry to the safety critical bus.

I believe devices on the CAN can typically see, and therefore spoof or simulate, packets from other devices. I'm not sure that physical access is really necessary because modern vehicles ship with networking capabilities (e.g. OnStar) that already have access to the CAN.

[1] http://opengarages.org/handbook/ebook/

... All it takes is a specially-crafted attack device, introduced to the car’s CAN through local access, and the reuse of frames already circulating in the CAN rather than injecting new ones (as previous attacks in this manner have done)....

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