Yes, rationally speaking North Korea and the USA are not going to attack each other since the potential losses by far outweigh any potential gains. They know it, they also know that the other side knows it, and they know that the other side knows that they know that ... etc.
But at the same time, at least from the POV of North Korea, they think they're pretty close to a win-by-stalemate situation (multiple mobile ICBMs that can retaliate against the continental USA, ensuring they will never be attacked.) so it stands to 'reason' that the USA would attack right now, because it's their last chance to stop North Korea from winning.
Humans are not rational, we can only build control systems and hope they catch and filter out any irrationality.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasili_Arkhipov
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanislav_Petrov
[3] https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/08/jfk-vs-...
It's likely the US cannot accomplish a preemptive attack without a loss of thousands if not millions of lives with their ally, South Korea[0][1]. This would be a major defeat for the US before any greater war effort even began, which may eventually draw other nations like China. Given that North Korea wouldn't be the first US enemy to have ICBMs that can carry nuclear payloads to the US, it seems very implausible for the US to do anything about it vis a vis the immense consequences and even larger unknowns.
0. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5027-1.htm
1. http://thebulletin.org/sea-sarin-north-korea%E2%80%99s-chemi...
North Korea could sell weapons to, say, an oil rich non state actor in the Middle East that might use a missile launched from a ship to attack Israel.
Proliferation has already been a huge issue. Pakistan may well have already helped North Korea in their missile or nuclear weapons programs.
North Korea might attack if they suspect that a strike or invasion is coming. Their warning systems are not of high quality. That's probably why they worry so much when the US and South Korea do exercises.
This is not to say any of this will happen, just that there are plausible reasons why either side might try something.
On the other hand, it's also very important for China for this not to happen. Once this happen, the US can justifiably start investing in earnest in the ABM defense, and there are several options that can be pursued: beefing up the current options, like the ground-based midcourse defense, the Aegis and the THAAD systems, but also more experimental ones, like laser based defense, or rail-gun based. China has a nuclear doctrine that is strictly deterrence based (i.e. no firs strike, including no pre-emptive strike). In the face of a much more effective US ABM defense, their deterrence can disappear and that means they either change their doctrine, or engage in an arms race which they see no good reason to do.
So it's almost as important for China not to let NK to do their extra-atmospheric test. However, my money is that NK will do that test in the next 6 months.
Either act now, take out NKs nuclear threat before they have the potential for launching multiple strikes. Or wait, and and hope they are bluffing about attacking the USA and that the political situation doesn't worsen there.
The USA has a good chance, provided it plans well, of taking out NKs nuclear threat before it can launch using coordinated strikes with a lot of redundancy. The cost would be the artillery bombardment of Seoul, which could take anywhere up to 100k lives depending on how long it takes to knock out NK artillery, so the USA and SK would need to quickly dispense with that. After which NK would pose no threat to SK, and USA/SK can decapitate the leadership while keeping the power structures and NK military in place, then hopefully have a plan for rebuilding NK as an independent nation.
In what ways does NK not act rationally?
If Kim Jong Un feels in any way trapped, helpless, or doomed; why would he not attack?
So the risk is broadened to anything that can cause these feelings in a single person: internal politics, externally-perceived (real or imaginary) threats or actions, mental illness, disease, civil unrest in the DPRK, deterioration of the relationship with China, sanctions, internal military failures or public test failures, internal sabotage to the military program, or anything else that I haven't thought of.
Once, [President Johnson's penis] Jumbo was called upon to serve the country in a time of great need, when words – even words from the POTUS – would simply not do. In a mercifully off-the-record moment at the height of America’s entanglement in Vietnam, reporters asked Johnson to explain, simply, “Why?” Unable to conjure a suitable answer, LBJ instead produced his veiny avatar.
“This is why!” Johnson declared, presenting Jumbo to the press pool like a flaccid, useless Excalibur. Thankfully, he didn't put his sword in their stones.
https://m.ranker.com/list/lyndon-johnson-penis-obsession-sto...
The real problem North Korea has presented the US, is it's forced into a stalemate with a drastically inferior nation in all regards (much smaller population, few major cities, hyper small economy, weak overall military capabilities). Picture tiny, hyper impoverished Cuba holding the US hostage with hundreds of nukes so close to US territory, it's a similar concept once ICBMs get into the mix.
Standing off with Russia and China, two great powers in most regards historically, the US could respect that context begrudging. If any entity goes nuclear, the exchanged loss is immense in all regards on both sides; China has a billion people, Russia has 144 million (the USSR had near 300 million); both have lots of major cities; both have vast military capabilities; and so on.
It's a horribly bad exchange problem when you start adding up the trade. The US could lose a dozen or more major cities, millions of people, while North Korea loses hundreds of thousands of people living in a couple cities that are barely developed to begin with. Simply put, the US has dramatically more to lose in every regard, the scale is so far tipped to one side it's almost unthinkable to make such a trade with North Korea.
Why does North Korea need ICBMs when they presumably already possess a regional nuclear deterrent, which itself should be adequate to secure their country against invasion?
I guess the obvious answer would be that they want to be even more secure. But that is just a deduction on my part and as such, it feels like a bit of an unconfirmed piece in my understanding of the situation.