This is also true. I think the particular threat I was replying to was "can employees, on a whim, go into stored e-mail and view it?" You're right that there's another possibility, which is that on a whim the employees will engineer a system such that they can view all the plaintext that flows into and out of your inbox.
There are maybe a few things that could be done to reduce your trust in "Honest Munin's Very Secure E-Mail Hosting and Used Cars", like, I could publish the code to the server and run it in SGX, allowing anyone in the world to use SGX attestation to verify* that the code running in SGX is the code that I publish, and that code could only initiate encrypted network connections with other mail servers. So even if I ran that in good faith and sat outside the SGX container listening to the network traffic, I'd still be getting a face-full of encrypted data.
This is still a "verify*" because maybe something is funky with SGX. You're not really trusting me now though, you're trusting Intel and the SGX TCB. Maybe that's worse? I don't know. I still think that's an improved proposition over trusting the honesty of system administrators to not grep your INBOX on a whim, though.
edit: I guess this also kind of breaks down because the story for TLS in SMTP land is kind of dire, so you could probably actively MITM the communication between the SGX blob and the outside and there's no practical way for anyone to know that this is going on. Maybe someone will fix that someday! Probably not though!