For me it's not a problem that old commits are signed with revoked keys, there are several ways one can get old broken signatures (e.g. key rotation) and by design they should not be trusted.
One interesting voice in signing all commits by Linus:
> Signing each commit is totally stupid. It just means that you automate it, and you make the signature worth less. It also doesn't add any real value, since the way the git DAG-chain of SHA1's work, you only ever need _one_ signature to make all the commits reachable from that one be effectively covered by that one. So signing each commit is simply missing the point.
Source: http://git.661346.n2.nabble.com/GPG-signing-for-git-commit-t...
Also, depending one one's threat model signing all commits can still be not sufficient: https://github.com/git/git/commit/a85b377d0419a9dfaca8af2320...