We must be using different definitions of subjectivity. I'm just referring to whatever one experiences at some point in time. Do you experience anything? Then you have subjectivity.
We must be using different definitions of subjectivity. I'm just referring to whatever one experiences at some point in time. Do you experience anything? Then you have subjectivity.
We are, because an ontology that takes subjectivity as primitive/irreducible is different than an ontology that reduces apparent subjectivity via third-party objective facts. You subscribe to the former, I subscribe to the latter. It is precisely this distinction that differentiates materialists and dualists in the philosophy of mind.
This question doesn't yield any insight, because it still leaves us with the question of the nature of subjectivity, a term you use with impunity but without definition!
You seem to be implying that subjectivity and objects must form some sort of recursive relation, but this then already assumes subjectivity is irreducible and the question at hand is precisely whether such an elaborate construct is necessary. There's plenty of evidence hinting that we're just special pleading about consciousness's special properties.
>it still leaves us with the question of the nature of subjectivity, a term you use with impunity but without definition!
I didn't try to promote or define subjectivity, I challenged you to define an object without making any references to something subjective (as this is the ontology you said you subscribe to). What I was getting at is that you'll be hard pressed to present any object that is not a concept created by a subject. Mind you, I'm not saying objects and subjects are real, but that they are co-created by the mind and as such are equally unreal as far as representing what actually is.
I can easily posit an ontology that references no subjects. Just because I formulated said ontology from sense perception doesn't entail that it references subjective concepts.
> Mind you, I'm not saying objects and subjects are real, but that they are co-created by the mind and as such are equally unreal as far as representing what actually is.
Except as per Moore, this sort of skepticism necessarily presupposes the very knowledge that it attempts to undermine, and therefore it contradicts itself and is literally false.
My point is that calling it sense perception will not make the subjective pre-conceptual experience of it go away. I'm not advocating a ghost in the machine here, but trying to show that neither the ghost nor the machine can survive as primitives when put under deep scrutiny, but I first need to demonstrate how neither can independently exist as a valid concept.
>this sort of skepticism necessarily presupposes the very knowledge that it attempts to undermine, and therefore it contradicts itself and is literally false.
Not sure I follow how this relates to the quoted sentence, but the problem with any explanation (physical or philosophical) is that it is always limited to discussing concepts and relationships between them and can never break the boundaries of what can be grasped by thought (this explanation not excluded). My attempt is to show that thought (and thus any object derived from it) is not the pristine reality, but something that comes after reality is processed. At most, thought can point in the right direction (e.g, understand it's own limitations).
You're evading the issue. You initially claimed that there is nothing to prove about subjectivity. This is patently false.
The subjectivity you apparently experience by observation, if taken at face value as you initially suggested, ie. "there is nothing to prove", is logically irreducible to third-party objective facts.
And yet, third-party objective facts are the best explanation we have for everything else.
Therefore, you do have something to prove regarding subjective experience, contra your original claim.