Take this counter example: City A implements a land tax to "encourage" developers to build units of affordable housing. Developers sitting on under-developed land start building units. Company A employs 10,000 people, most of them in the downtown region of City A. With the new land tax the next lease for Company A is higher enough due to this cost for them to consider a move to City B. City/State B offers them a nice tax break to move their jobs and headquarters and Company A does. Now out of 10,000 jobs, City A has many homes that are now available, units which were under development are no longer needed, prices drop, people can now afford housing but I cant imagine outside investment moving into the city. And this glosses over what happens to the developers, contractors, and others who will now be out of a large chunk of change due to the oversupply of housing and reluctant to re-invest into City A.
In the same vein, it would be hard to believe that any company looking for a "cheap" deal would consider City A if it did not already have a large pool of talent. If your a small to mid-size business do you take the risk of higher overhead regardless of property type to move to City A? If your a large company, why would you move your offices there just to pay much higher leasing costs?
While you have created more affordable housing, you have also created less desirable living and investment conditions.
At the end of the day, a cities desirability is mostly based on its ability to provide capital to its residents.
So the tax on nice buildings goes down, making the city more attractive to companies, incenting companies to move to City A and incenting capital to invest in properties in city A.
I would have to see some more detailed analysis that shows you can simultaneously set this rate at a point low enough to not kill current investors and high enough not create a huge budget hole for the city in question.
As to the dynamic you present, it looks like self-balancing in that there's an implied assumption that people really prefer City A to City B for various reasons (density among them, no doubt).
The great thing about all this is that we get to have 50 States, and many more cities altogether, experimenting (or not) with LVT, so we'll actually be able to measure the impact of LVT.
Quoting Henry George:
"The way taxes raise prices is by increasing the cost of production and checking supply. But land is not a thing of human production, and taxes upon rent cannot check supply. Therefore, though a tax upon rent compels owners to pay more, it gives them no power to obtain more for the use of their land, as it in no way tends to reduce the supply of land. On the contrary, by compelling those who hold land for speculation to sell or let for what they can get, a tax on land values tends to increase the competition between owners, and thus to reduce the price of land."
Investments like that would look a lot less desirable if the land was taxed in the proposed fashion.
1. A tax on the unimproved value of land, also called a land value tax.
2. A tax on improvements (buildings etc).
Currently the rate of tax 1 (LVT) is the same as the rate of tax 2. The assertion here is that it would be better for society if tax 1 were higher than tax 2, or even that tax 2 is zero and tax 1 is raised accordingly.
Getting rid of #2 would be really harmful and would be an absolute gift to the upper classes. Or, if it didn't cut taxes for the wealthy, it would significantly raise taxes on a lot of the middle class, forcing them out of smaller homes in good school districts.
Today's middle class has lots of political power. Tomorrow's middle class doesn't. We're allowing generations to extract wealth from those who come after them without considering the consequences.
Granted, mine is just one sample point, but it was enough to keep me interested and wanting to see further (and better) studies done.
That's the whole point of the land tax... if you want to plop a single-family home on a given parcel of land, you can if the single family wants to pay for the whole thing. But there's a strong incentive to build taller so more people competitively split the tax.