Any deeper implications of this are left as an exercise for the reader.
Any deeper implications of this are left as an exercise for the reader.
Don't mistake "don't know how" with "cannot". The fact that we currently don't know what consciousness is, doesn't entail that we won't one day. Consciousness will likely one day be considered a some physical process, which means it will one day be measurable.
The difficulties surrounding qualia require a resolution, but it's a mistake to just take some people's word that physicalism can't account for our qualitative perceptions.
The only people I know of that might contest that non-human animals are conscious are dualists who attribute consciousness to minds and minds only to human beings.
> it's a mistake to just take some people's word that physicalism can't account for our qualitative perceptions
Physicalism BY DEFINITION cannot account for qualia because the presuppositions of physicalism BY DEFINITION rule out the possibility of accounting for qualia. This is not the same as saying that consciousness or the experience of color is non-physical. It is the same as saying that the metaphysics of physicalism is too inadequate. Sadly, physicalism has become a blindly held dogma by philosophers like Dennett and Rosenberg, leading them to embrace eliminativism (the denial that qualia exist at all). Naturally, this is an evasion, a Procrustean cherrypicking of the evidence to suit the scientistic, physicalist dogma. It is an incoherent position and a non-starter.
The solution is to embrace a richer metaphysics instead of repeating the vacuous claim that we will/may one say have a solution to the problem of qualia while clinging to presuppositions that are false. It can't and won't happen.
Except we clearly invented a term describing something we've observed or believe, therefore something must be accounted for. Ergo, physicalism still must account for qualia, even if it's not the account you were hoping for.
> Sadly, physicalism has become a blindly held dogma by philosophers like Dennett and Rosenberg, leading them to embrace eliminativism (the denial that qualia exist at all).
Please, every time we thought humans were special, we were wrong. Arguments arguing for our specialness effectively amount to special pleading.
> The solution is to embrace a richer metaphysics instead of repeating the vacuous claim that we will/may one say have a solution to the problem of qualia while clinging to presuppositions that are false. It can't and won't happen.
So said the vitalists. Met any vitalists lately?
Let us say that we have a computer system so complicated that it is capable of mimicking a human being with perfect accuracy. You would probably say that that computer is not a being that has consciousness, because it is merely doing calculations to replicate behavior. Problem is, you could easily say the same about any given human being. There is, quite literally, no way to tell the difference through objective measurement.
We can measure responses to stimuli, we can determine the complexity of a system, but we have no way of determining if a system experiences anything or is simply running a program, and we never will.
I have no problem considering such a system conscious and intelligent. What's the difficulty exactly?
> Problem is, you could easily say the same about any given human being. There is, quite literally, no way to tell the difference through objective measurement.
Exactly, which means there is no difference.
Consciousness will turn out to be a functional process, which means any system with the same structure will exhibit consciousness. This would be an objective measurement.
If that happens it will be in good company; at one point people thought that temperature and heat, for example, were fundamentally subjective and not measurable.
Where did I do that?
> Consciousness will turn out to be a functional process
Here's where I disagree. In order to know what kind of physical structure produces consciousness, you need to know what consciousness is, and we have no way of doing that. You can define some arbitrary criteria, say, having the ability to make metatools, but that is meaningless in this context, "conscious" will just be another word for "can make metatools".
In an effort to clarify, let me ask you this: why do you care what is and is not conscious?
I don't see how this is different than any other empirical fact we didn't know before we started exploring the world. In what way could we properly characterize fire, or stars, or bacteria before we had any conception of such things? Yet, I don't think anyone sensible would disagree that we largely understand these concepts now.
Similarly, consciousness is an amalgamation of different information processes that we have yet to disentangle, and all we have is a catch-all term "consciousness" to describe our ignorance.
> In an effort to clarify, let me ask you this: why do you care what is and is not conscious?
I care about anything that is not yet explained.
We didn't know that bacteria existed, but we knew what disease was. Once we had the concept of bacteria, showing it to be related to disease was a matter of testing. How do you test if something has a consciousness? I know that consciousness exists because I experience it, but for all I know you don't, and I have no way of knowing any different because experiences are, by definition, subjective.
You've probably seen this old XKCD about color [1]. It's like that. We can both perceive a wavelength of light and have labeled it "blue" for the purposes of communication, but we cannot possibly know eachother's experience of it. The very question is meaningless in an empirical model of reality.
> Similarly, consciousness is an amalgamation of different information processes that we have yet to disentangle, and all we have is a catch-all term "consciousness" to describe our ignorance.
I disagree. You describe what I would call "mind". The kind of consciousness I'm talking about could be described as "the experience of being". We all know what it is, but we get our communication about it confused with concepts like intelligence, mind, and complexity. I suspect this is because we grew up with a scientific worldview and have difficulty allowing ourselves to believe something non-objective can exist, so we entangle it with concepts that are objective to force it into our model of reality.
> I care about anything that is not yet explained.
Ok, fair enough. I asked because this sort of discussion usually takes place in the context of people having already come to the conclusion that human beings (and maybe some animals) are special and trying desperately to find a line of reasoning that allows for them being conscious, but not computers or plants or other such things. Some of my earlier arguments presumed this context and that may have been a source of mutual confusion.
Actually, I would seriously consider the proposition that it is intelligent, especially if it wasn't mimicking one specific person, and would be inclined to take Occam's razor to the proposition that it is actually faking it in ways that cannot be explained.
In contrast, there is an epistemic problem about whether other minds exist: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/other-minds/
Prove that the animal has a concept of goals and is not simply a complex arrangement of reactions environmental conditions, like a coffee table moving when you bump into it.
Not yet we don't. The full spectrum of intelligent behaviour is still out of reach for computers because we don't yet precisely know what intelligence entails. At best, we have small pieces of the puzzle that only sort of fit together.
It's still pretty clear that coffee tables exhibit none of them though.
Few would refer to a coffee table as intelligent. You seem to be inconsistent in what sort of arguments you will accept.
My argument is that intelligence is a much fuzzier thing than people like to admit. Usually though they're using it as a stand in for "consciousness", or the ability to experience the world as we do.
I agree that intelligence is largely mysterious at this point, but I think you are pushing it too far in the unknown-and-unknowable direction. A debate in which the intelligence of coffee tables is an issue is not likely to provide much enlightenment about intelligence.
"few would regard" isn't my argument though. It is an assumption of the other poster's position. I suppose I could have phrased it as "I would assume you wouldn't regard...". This was done to point out the inconsistency in their reasoning (which is admittedly assumed, if they had responded otherwise then we probably wouldn't actually be disagreeing).
>but I think you are pushing it too far in the unknown-and-unknowable direction
Actually where I'm going with this is that intelligence isn't actually what we care about re: morality, it's just a metric sometimes used because people haven't thought it through.
Your concern with morality seems to have entered the thread rather late and tangentially, and it is not clear to me what you are trying to say about it - in fact, it feels as if you are arguing against a position that no-one here has taken.
If you're not a behaviorist, then it's perfectly reasonable to presuppose some definition of intent. You could further debate how I would define the coffee table itself (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/object/), but that's the wrong level of analysis.
Other animals do this. They perceive their own movements as different from an others.
If your argument is that there is no difference, then you have to start adding a bunch of other rules to justify how you determine the moral worth of one class of things that respond to stimuli from others, which is beyond the original scope of discussion, I think.