You're assuming that random people on the internet are going to collectively be more secure than CAs, which is obviously not the case.
Imagine you get an email signed by the IRS, and which is trusted by people A1, A2 and A3, who are trusted by people B1, B2, and B3 ... who are trusted by Z1, Z2, and Z3, who are fully trusted by you.
Should be reliable, right?
But while Z1, Z2 and Z3 may keep all OPSEC rules, you have no guarantee that they verified that Y1, Y2 and Y3 did. And even if they did, you have no guarantee that ...
And even if you did, can you guarantee that no one there got any malware, which signed off on a bunch of fake certs?
I'm not saying WOT solves all of our problems. It only makes it slightly better than verifying every key yourself. But it's better than the CA model because you can make it work for you.
1. This is a ton of work and a lot of guesswork even for educated individuals. I end up looking at either explicit chains of trust (I trust Bob and he trusts Alice and she says that this is definitely my bank's website) or some random value an algorithm spits out that tries to convey how "trusted" an entity is based on how many paths there are to it and how short they are. In either case, it's a manual decision that will often feel arbitrary.
2. Laypersons are completely fucked. No way my grandmother can reasonably decide who to trust this way.
If web of trust ever becomes widespread somehow, I guarantee you a month later Google and Apple and Microsoft will become the de facto CAs because everyone will just look to them in the web of trust and see if one of them vouches for their banking website.
Except that none of those companies bother verifying one's identity if you're not actually paying for their services.
> and see if one of them vouches for their banking website.
In that scenario, could I not just verify the bank's public key when I'm physically in one of their branch locations while opening an account? They could also verify my public key at the same time. That would allow for a direct line of trust. The same could apply to any company one deals with.
I'm sure in this scenario, those companies will be delighted to step fully into the role of CA including accepting money for identity vouching.
> In that scenario, could I not just verify the bank's public key when I'm physically in one of their branch locations while opening an account? They could also verify my public key at the same time. That would allow for a direct line of trust. The same could apply to any company one deals with.
No. The same couldn't apply to any company. My primary bank is online only. And how many times have you actually walked into an Amazon office? Or Paypal? Are people in Ohio supposed to fly to San Jose to get Paypal's public key when they create an account? Or are we going to wait for the post office to deliver a physical copy of Paypal's public key (and we'll just trust that whole transaction couldn't be compromised). Physical key exchange is simply not practical in most cases.
You could? Would your grandmother? Would you fly to Mountain View to get Google's? And then turn around and fly to Washington DC to get the IRS's? And then turn around and fly to who knows where to get HN's? And then tell them to keep customer staff ready to assist you to install their public keys?
And what about personal blogs that don't want to be MITM?
Can your grandmother trust you? Or maybe you're not prepared to keep her secure so you just tell her "trust Google, grandma".
The fact that I have to answer this tells me that you haven't though through the implications of web of trust very far.
We have natural experiments showing that WoT, at least as implemented, doesn't scale. I hate that humans don't seem to be able to make it work, but that's reality for you.
Yes, I am a security pessimist.
I think a real solution would be something like a multi-root, score-based system (e.g. if the U.S. government, Underwriters Laboratories & ICANN all state that I'm talking to www.google.com/172.217.13.238, then I honestly probably am) — but I'm worried that it'd be way too complex for normal people.
CAA records help with this, where available, but still leave some things to be desired.
While I maybe trust someone to be a real person after I've met them in real life and ate their spaghetti to give me back the 10$ they borrowed, I wouldn't trust them to verify the identity of the IRS for me.
The current solution is that we have some third parties which follow strict rules defined by themselves and browser vendors. Everyone involved has a very good incentive to remain trustworthy, otherwise they'd be out of business.
Sadly this doesn't prevent bottomfeeders like Trustico, StartTLS and others to leech of the system while some are genuinely interested in securing everyone's communication (see LE)
The Web of Trust only works if your trust in someone is binary and understandable to a computer, otherwise the browser might tell you "This website is 35.218% Trustworthy".
HTTPS trust must be binary. Either the cert is trusted or it isn't.
It's even more fun; GPG is considering to abandon the WoT. They're switching to TOFU instead, the first time you see a key it's trustworthy, similar to SSH.
Which is horrible unless your first connection to a server is trustworthy or you have an out-of-band way to verify keys (which is why it works in SSH, and can't work on the web).
For PGP/GPG I feel like that TOFU is what most people are doing anyways, this change will only formalize the 0.90-quantile behaviour.
Yes, probably. Key signing parties used to be a thing. I was able to find one that happened in London in 2014 (no idea how many keys were signed, though). Unfortunately people are not aware of the concept of trust and especially of the fact they delegate trust to these third party CAs. It's just not a proper way to do security.
The TOFU model is the best thing if you actually verify the keys out-of-band. Web of trust is the best way I'm aware of to enable in-band verification. I don't claim that it will actually work in practice. But that's fine. All it means is you can't actually do in-band verification in practice. I think most people here are beginning with the assumption that in-band verification is possible and then criticising WOT for its practical shortcomings which is ridiculous.
[1] This is the sort of lazy mistake I would make, because I'm not a security expert.
TLS, however, is an "evolution" of SSL and many, many people still use this nomenclature. It doesn't "reek of amateur hour and shallow knowledge", it's just a holdover from the past.
We all know and understand what others are referring to when they say "SSL". It's like when I tell the girlfriend I'm going to go on a "bike ride". She understands that I mean I'm going for a ride on my Harley, a motorcycle, and not an actual bicycle.
Or last weekend, when a friend asked me, "Hey, could you move your car so <other person> can get out?". While I could have stood there arguing with him or correcting him (since my car was actually at home, in my driveway), I instead went out and moved my truck so that the other guest could leave.
This excessive, unwarranted pedantry is annoying as hell. You may be "technically correct" but you make everyone around you dislike you.
To make an absolute statement about the fundamental soundness of PKI and then use completely the wrong term? Come on. Can you imagine a real expert doing this and not at least recognize their own mistake? Don't talk about "fundamental flaws" when you don't know the difference between SSL and TLS and PKI. This is very much like someone trying to criticize the design of TCP/IP and not knowing the difference between an IP address and a MAC address.
Try saying this in the Netherlands (or, presumably, Denmark). Everyone would be surprised when you bring out your motorcycle instead of your bike (i.e., bicycle).
It's not quite as bad as calling JS Java or vice versa, it's more like saying Java and then saying Java 1.2 and Java 1.8 and so forth.
And I understand that your real criticism was with PKI. That makes it even worse that you called it SSL. Again, I feel like you're showing your lack of expertise in this area. I'm not an expert at all in this area and yet even I can recognize that you're playing armchair security expert.