So I'm wondering if the services actually have some sort of archiving requirement for law enforcement purposes? Maybe for a certain number of years, they have to save your data or something like that?
If there's anyone who would be familiar with the legal obligations of these services vis-a-vis data archiving I'd be really interested in hearing more about what we should reasonably expect from these services in terms of deletion etc?
Apart from a handful of specific cases like financial data, the US has no general data-retention laws. You can delete stuff aggressively as long as it's based on a consistent archival policy, not one-off deletions where you risk looking like you chose a particular thing to delete to hide evidence.
You can tell this is possible in practice by looking at how common it is to have aggressive permanent-deletion policies in corporate email, at least outside of tech. A number of big US companies automatically delete read emails in employees' inboxes after N days (with N ranging from 7 (!) to 365), unless the employee specifically takes action to refile the email into a project folder with a different per-project retention policy. The goal of those policies is to reduce companies' exposure to fishing expeditions in future lawsuits by just keeping less email around. To make that effective, the policies really do delete the emails, including from any backup systems.
Given that they have figured out how to perma-delete their own old email, I believe companies could really delete user-deleted content, perhaps after some specified period of time, if they wanted to. But unlike with their own internal emails, they don't have the same incentives to be aggressive about purging that stuff from their servers. If anything, they have the opposite incentive, to keep as much user data around indefinitely as possible.
My understanding is that an image is by itself PII, regardless of whether or not it has any additional information associated with it. I don’t think there’s a way to retain images without contravening GDPR.
When looking at a single datum by itself, this seems to rule out anything except PII i.e. data that identifies or can be used to identify an individual.
What that says is that, if (A,B,C) identifies a person, each of A, B, and C, in isolation, is personal data, not that you will be allowed to keep the pair (A,B) if it doesn’t.
One mathematically can cut each bit of information in units of arbitrarily small entropy. So, if taken to the letter, “this user is not Mark Zuckerberg” would be personal data. I doubt jurisprudence will go that far, but we’ll see.
Whether information that can only be used to identify someone but doesn't tell you anything useful about them is still personal data is unclear to me.
Not in this case, because if the photos or videos contain recognisable people then they are themselves personal data.
How far the new subjects rights involving data deletion will go in practice is one of the biggest unknowns with the GDPR. Clearly from a technical point of view we understand that deleting a key isn't the same as deleting data from a disk, and often that would also include deleting a file in a filesystem if the underlying storage isn't robustly wiped as well. Throw in the kinds of distributed architecture, redundancies and backup systems that many organisations use, particularly in the era of cloud-based hosting and off-site backup services, and you have an unfortunate conflict between not truly deleting data (and therefore still having some degree of risk that the data will leak even if it's intended to be beyond use, contrary to the spirit and possibly the letter of the new regulations) and potentially high or even prohibitive implementation costs to ensure robust deletion of all copies of personal data when a suitable request is received.
The hard part is actually enforcing it, and assessing compliance.