Your argument here amounts to: if it's not descriptive, it must be prescriptive. By this argument, the entirety of pure mathematics is prescriptive. Is the idea of a semiring a description of a particular natural object? But it makes little sense to claim the idea of semirings is normative. After all, math studies many structures that don't satisfy the semiring laws, as well!
Likewise, computer science studies many forms of "computation" which aren't physically realistic. Is computational complexity theory "normative" in studying Turing machines, or PRAM machines? No, they are merely convenient abstractions which get at the essence of a particular problem.
The lambda calculus is similar: it is a convenient abstraction which gets at the essence of a particular way of computing. It's a useful starting point for a certain kind of PL theory because its semantics are relatively simple. But it's certainly not the case that all PL theory studies the lambda calculus. PL theory includes work on verification of imperative programs; on macro expanders; on compilation techniques; and on pure logic.
What is certainly true is that many people who study PL theory do have normative (usually aesthetic) ideas about PL design, and these seep into the kinds of systems they tend to study. I agree that computer science isn't a natural science. But it isn't as simple as "anything not descriptive is normative", or that (quoting a sibling comment) PL theory is just "a theory of some variant of the lambda calculus".