> FIDO2 is built on the same security and privacy features of FIDO U2F: strong public key cryptography, no drivers or client software and one key for unlimited account access with no shared secrets.
They should've kept all the Microsoft stuff out of the post, other than just mentioning that they've been working on the spec together. The Azure stuff seems to have confused everyone about how this actually works.
There are also other app-based ways to login to websites with public key crypto, such as https://www.grc.com/sqrl/sqrl.htm, or https://www.civic.com/. But of course they are less secure than the hardware/Yubikey version, for the same reason Yubikey U2F tokens are more secure than Google Authenticator for 2FA (well, unless companies act stupid and enable "SMS backup" alongside Yubikey support, in which case it's even less secure than Google Auth-only as an option).
[1]: https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/graphs/contributors
[2]: https://www.w3.org/blog/webauthn/2018/01/11/meeting-minutes-...
EDIT: add forgotten link
It seems like a chicken and egg problem. There's very little incentive to improve it because practically no one uses it. And no one uses it because it's a bad user experience.
But I would prefer it over using a Yubikey because, IMO, the private key should be associated with a machine, rather than a person. That is, if one of my devices is stolen or compromised, I can use another one of my devices to revoke the stolen/compromised device's access.
Even if you contrast it against something like e.g. LastPass or Keepass, you're still missing a ton of infrastructure.