> It's thought experiment to highlight the hard problem of consciousness, by demonstrating how the notion of experience is separable in our conception from any physical process we can imagine.

Except it isn't. The p-zombie thought experiment entails the p-zombie world thought experiment, where a universe evolved with nothing but p-zombies, and this world is identical to our own. How do you suppose our p-zombie equivalents would be here debating consciousness in this very moment in a universe in which such a thing doesn't actually exist?

> That is, regardless of how our brain physically comes to behave as if it were conscious, we can still conceive of a version of it that does not actually experience consciousness.

I certainly can't without allowing what seems to be absurdity or inconsistency. I'm not sure how you manage to do it.

> To say that conscious experience "is" a physical process, is to my conception, a category error.

Why?