I'm always stunned when I'm reminded that there are places in the world that not only went electronic, but absolutely fail at its basic security as opposed to getting burned with some elaborate and/or clever attack.
I'm always stunned when I'm reminded that there are places in the world that not only went electronic, but absolutely fail at its basic security as opposed to getting burned with some elaborate and/or clever attack.
That we can't produce secure voting software is just a testament to how much we suck at software engineering and making safe computers in general, because cryptographically this is a solved problem.
Hell I'd argue that modern implementations like Estonia's are pretty close to an acceptable standard of trustlessness. But that's thanks to open standards and public ledgers. The closed source voting machine was never a good idea, and never will be.
Given the ancap vibe of blockchain in general this is all a bit ironic isn't it?
Paper ballots are cheap and auditable, and can be understood by anyone that knows how to count.
my somewhat cynical conclusion is that its being left weak intentionally either to save money or plain old incompetence as there is not much openness/competition in govt contracting process.
if we ever are to wholeheartedly accept this there has to be complete transparency in the process. at a policy level this is absolute must is we want to converge to a stable long-term solution.