> And anyway, that seems like a good thing - there should be a force tempering high risk endeavors.
The point is that it does the opposite.
Suppose you have a high risk company with a million shares and a would-be share price of $1000, but 20% of the shares are shorted so the share price is $900.
Now if the company fails, the total losses to the actual shareholders are 8% higher even though the price per share was lower because there are de facto more shares in existence.
Meanwhile if the company succeeds, the shareholders make significantly more, because there are de facto 20% more shares in existence and the shareholders paid $900 each instead of $1000, with the shorts having to pay the difference. Which is why the total (e.g. $900 times 1.2M instead of $1000 times 1M) is more -- because it's attracting more total investment into the stock by having the shorts reduce the cost of buying shares today and then heavily subsidize potential gains tomorrow.
> If your company has an appreciable amount of short interest the likely reason is that the company's overvalued, not that Jim Chanos is colluding with Andrew Left and Bill Ackman just to bring down your company and profit off your failure.
Haven't they tended on average to lose money on shorting?
> On the flip side, causing a large undertaking to fail faster when it was doomed from the beginning is obviously more efficient.
True in theory, but is that actually what happens? Large companies rarely do anything fast. Even when the shorts are right, it's usually months or years before it all shakes out. And as above, when they're right what they're really doing is increasing total third party exposure to the loss.
> Many people are worried that volatility is too low these days (thus why Feb was such a big deal), so I'm not sure that's a great argument.
People are worried about volatility as an indicator, not because it's a good in its own right that society benefits from creating artificially.