Ideally this monitoring process would continue during hibernation.
I guess there wouldn’t be anything possible if power was completely removed, but at least then an attacker is dealing with only being able to begin cooling after shutdown and cells start being lost.
The system should also balk if restarted within a short period of time, but a rapid temperature reduction. This would help prevent non-removal attacks (Eg: rebooting with a minimal OS to pull whatever one could -> great for MACs).
We use these features to store small amounts of very sensitive data, key material for example.
As far as I know the only two systems that use cryptographically meaningful memory encryption are Xbox 360 and zArchitecture mainframes.
Various secure crypto processors usually have some support for external "encrypted" SRAM, but as this typically involves microcontroller platforms and byte/word-wide accesses to said memory the implementation in the best case boils down to CTR mode (usually of some secret semi-proprietary algorithm of questionable cryptographic qualities) without IV or any authentication.