Page 31 of the report was of primary interest--hosts hard-coded in diagtrack.dll:
geo.settings-win.data.microsoft.com.akadns.net db5-eap.settings-win.data.microsoft.com.akadns.net settings-win.data.microsoft.com db5.settings-win.data.microsoft.com.akadns.net asimov-win.settings.data.microsoft.com.akadns.net db5.vortex.data.microsoft.com.akadns.net v10-win.vortex.data.microsft.com.akadns.net geo.vortex.data.microsoft.com.akadns.net v10.vortex-win.data.microsft.com us.vortex-win.data.microsft.com eu.vortex-win.data.microsft.com vortex-win-sandbox.data.microsoft.com alpha.telemetry.microsft.com oca.telemetry.microsft.com
At this point, I would recommend choosing to treat the {akadns.net, microsoft.com, microsft.com} TLDs with general distrust. Also in the report:
40.77.226.249 40.77.226.250 13.92.194.212 52.178.38.151 52.229.39.152 52.183.114.173 13.78.232.226
For convenience, I've enumerated the corresponding CIDRs:
13.104.0.0/14 13.64.0.0/11 13.96.0.0/13 40.112.0.0/13 40.120.0.0/14 40.124.0.0/16 40.125.0.0/17 40.74.0.0/15 40.76.0.0/14 40.80.0.0/12 40.96.0.0/12 52.145.0.0/16 52.146.0.0/15 52.148.0.0/14 52.152.0.0/13 52.160.0.0/11 52.224.0.0/11
I'm not sure how to react to the observation of the usage of "microsft.com". I'll admit my instinct is to perceive this as, at worst, a rather clandestine attempt at circumventing basic DNS black-holing techniques--in which case, well played MSFT.
Now if you'll excuse me, I have some firewall policies to update.