On the other hand, whether or not philosophy is a science is also up for question; if we go by what you're saying, we can approximate "real knowledge" to be "progress", but whether or not philosophy makes progress is hotly debated in metaphilosophy. There are some interesting arguments on this[0] site about it. In particular, as you note, the notion that science is purely empirical/"experimental" is relatively new, and outside of the Anglosphere, at least, it was common to see philosophy take up the name of science through words such as Wissenschaft - both Kant and Hegel published works which had their titles translated as the "Science of Logic", for instance.
But most people seem to agree that the crudest formulation of science as that which is falsifiable (a la Popper) is inadequate; as the SEP notes, astrology is falsifiable and would thus qualify as a science! Furthermore, research has shown that what we regard as "science" published in the Nature journal actually doesn't usually come in the form of starting with a falsifiable hypothesis, but the research is exploratory in the first place.
Defining science is tricky, and I think we should reconsider how much weight we assign to the term as a proxy for the concepts of rigor, progress, replicability, ability to provide new knowledge, to confirm old knowledge etc.
[0] http://www.philosophyisscience.com/