For the past couple years here in the US, scammers have been calling with stolen numbers that match your prefix more than a random caller probably would. So for ABC-DEF-GHIJ all of ABC-DEF matching is a pretty good sign it's a spammer if you live in a large metropolitan area. Unfortunately it makes them nearly impossible to track back, because when you call the number back, it's some random private number that didn't even make the call and has no idea what you're talking about. I've had a couple very angry people call me and yell to stop trying to sell them credit cards.
> That doesn't affect 2FA
You can use the same techniques to say "I am 555-111-2222, route all sms for that number to me".
> that won't show up as "me" on my friends' phone screens when they call
They absolutely can do that.
It's not that they bought numbers in each of the prefixes, it's that they're forging the signaling information for another number in your prefix dynamically, based on your number.
https://media.ccc.de/v/31c3_-_6249_-_en_-_saal_1_-_201412271...
https://media.ccc.de/v/31c3_-_6122_-_en_-_saal_1_-_201412271...
About practice - one of Telegram users was comprised using his phone number, because russian government just ordered to mobile operator to do this. It was much more simple than copying sim card :)
Or is there a way to copy SIM card remotely???
As for state-level adversary, I get it. I'm even less concerned here :)
This is already "practical" if you have a capable enough adversary; for example, there have been reports of attackers subverting SMS-based 2FA.
https://www.google.com/search?q=attacks+on+sms+2fa
This could be based on cooperation of the carrier, or perhaps SS7 attacks, or IMSI catchers.