From a breif review, I see two potential issues:
a) the encrypted sni record contains a digest of the public key structure. This digest is transmitted in the clear (as it must be at this phase of the protocol), so a determined attacker could create a database of values for the top N mirror sites.
b) in order to be useful, the private key for the public keys would need to be shared across all servers supporting that hostname. That's not a big deal for a normal deployment, but it's not great for a volunteer mirrors system -- lots of diverse organizations own and operate the individual mirrors and we need to count on all of those to keep it secure. Also, it adds an extra layer of key management, which is an organizational and operational burden.
It's also pointless without DPRIVE. If people can see all your DNS lookups they can guess exactly what you're up to. That's why that Firefox build did both eSNI and DoH
It’s being added, but early stages. Internet draft is here:
DNSlytics, DomainTools, W3Advisor and others offer this.