Sure, I wasn't objecting, it just made it a bit unclear what you meant by that first question ...
> How do you determine whether a claim is about reality?
By looking for statements that as input for their evaluation depend on something that is not just a matter of definition. (And if something is ambiguous by asking for clarification ...)
> Again, as I've stated before (and asked a question that you didn't answer, which turns out to be pertinent here):
I considered that answered by my answer to the preceding paragraph, but let's see ...
> To add to my previous statement on this having nothing to do with evaluation, and to provide a realistic thought experiment: If someone says "A diamond is on the moon", either it is true or it is not, regardless of its representation or evaluation. Evaluating the claim as true would require observing the diamond on the moon, but that "A diamond is on the moon" is either true or not before such an observation takes place.
Yes, I agree.
> So, my question "Can't something be true regardless of whether or not it's being represented?" is attempting to ask if the truth of some claim is true or false regardless of its symbolic or conceptual representation.
The problem with your analogy is that that diamond (or its absence) is represented, in the form of the diamond (or its absence). It's a claim about external reality, or a description of a pattern in external (physical) reality. That pattern is there, even without anyone conceptualizing it.
But claims about mathematical definitions are not about anything unless there is someone/something to define them. Mathematics is a formal construct made up of definitions by humans, and evaluated based on rules made up by humans. Claims about mathematics are inherently linked to those definitions, and to those rules of evaluation. A closer analogy would be about "a diamond on the moon", with "the moon" having no referent. Does "a diamond is on the moon" have a truth value if there is no moon?
> By the reasons I've been giving... By the fact that symbols and concepts are not the things they represent.
Well, but that seems to be exactly what your argument is built on?! Though I think we might also have been talking past each other on this, but that might be cleared up by what's below ...
> Where have I put the words 'immaterial' and 'axioms' together without first attempting to build up a reason to do so?
I don't think you did. But all the attempts at building up reason to do so seem to not succeed, and in part because some of them seem to just be elaborate ways to put the words together.
> Are you asking me or telling me? If you're telling me it is a category error, why?
I am telling you, because axioms are not made of a material.
> Image frames. How is this a challenge to my question?
It is a demonstration of the same category error, or so I would think ... I am slightly confused by your answer, though.
So, you think that images frames are a material, and movies are made of this material? So, like, MPEG files contain a material substance called "image frames" (which constitute the movie)?
> Do you think that the Peano axioms are material or not material?
I would tend towards saying that they are not material, in the same way that I would say that movies are not material. But that does not mean that I think that the Peano axioms can be said to exist absent a material representation, just as I wouldn't think that movies can be said to exist absent a material representation.
The point is that when you refer to a DVD as "a movie", you are expressing that you are talking about properties of that DVD that are not dependent on that specific DVD, or even on a DVD at all. You are talking about properties that can be mapped to an almost arbitrary material, hence the specific material is not significant to the discussion of the movie, hence the concept of a movie does not concern itself with materials. But that is no reason to believe that a movie could exist without material representation.
An expression of the form "movies are not material" only says something about which aspects are relevant to the abstraction, not about the underlying reality of instances of movies.
> No. The existence of non-physical reality has been demonstrated by scientific observation. The non-physical reality itself was not observed in order to do so.
Oh, that's where you are coming from, I see!
Would you also say that electrons are part of non-physical reality, for example? Mind you, we have never observed electrons themselves!
> Implicit in my reason is the claim that when one acts according to God's will they will attain maximal joy/happiness.
Well, sure, but then that's still mostly just the same claim using different words, not a reason to be convinced it's actually true?
> Not as mechanical as this, but to answer your question in short: "the global maximum of joy/happiness is achieved through acting according to God's will for your entire life, so don't let dips in local joy/happiness deter you from abiding by God's will".
And the global maximum of eating pleasure is achieved through eating according to Jane's will for your entire life, so don't let dips in local pleasure deter you from abiding by Jane's will.
Are you convinced yet that eating the way Jane wants you to is the way to go? If not, why not?