Hacker News Reader

Hacker News

Comment by sonusario | Hacker News Reader

Parent Full thread

sonusario

> [part 1, of course!]

It is what it is I guess.

> I suspect the problem is more the nailing down of definitions than the logical structure of the argument

Possibly, but where we are missing each other on definitions would likely be more noticeable in a syllogism.

> The point of testability is to weed out those claims that are indistinguishable from stuff that someone just made up.

Is it possible that a testable claim could imply another claim that is not testable? In other words, could you have an implicit reason for believing that something is true rather than an explicit one?

> I don't know, possibly not.

So, if it is possible that some aspects of reality are not testable, then it is possible that a claim about such an aspect of reality is not compatible with science?

===

> You are believing something, it seems, because it hasn't been disproven to you.

That is not the case. I think there is great evidence. If it is false, then it is likely that my willingness to accept things is too generous, but I'll make any effort I can to get past that if that is indeed the position I find myself in.

> So, no matter whether they are true or false, you won't ever find a way to disprove them.

So, might you be attempting to say that non-testable claims are incompatible with doing science, rather than non-testable claims being incompatible with science itself?

> If you are interested...

I am.

===

> No, by testing with an established scientific methodology. You simply use methods that you do already know are reliable to test other methods whether they are reliable.

So, is there a chain of scientific methods that establish further scientific methods with no beginning, or is there some first self-evident method, that can't be tested for reliability without being circular?

===

> That's like asking "can claims about John be about Jack?"

So are you saying "you can't make a claim about John be about Jack, because John is not Jack", and to parallel "you can't make a claim about math be about reality because math is not reality"? What if John was Jack's middle finger, how could a claim about John not be about Jack?

>>>> So, it is not obvious to you that '1 < 2' does or does not have a referent, because the Peano axioms that '1 < 2' is derived from may or may not be a purely artificial construct of humans (or possibly more generalized evaluators)?

>>> I guess so? ...

>> My point is... If you don't know that '1 < 2' has no referent, then you don't know that mathematical claims are not about reality. I don't need to establish "'1 < 2' has a referent" to establish that you don't know whether mathematical claims are about reality.

> Let me clarify: ... '1 < 2' has no referent absent the axioms defined by mathematicians

Given the Peano axioms, and their evaluations and derivations by humans, does '1 < 2' have a referent?

===

> But I have never made that claim, so what is the point of bringing it up?

You objected to my claim that "everything has an explanation" thinking I had not substantiated it. I get that you're not making the opposing claim, but in order to substantiate my claim I showed that the opposing claim can't be true. Even if your not making the opposing claim, your objection has no case because the opposing claim can't be true. If "not everything has an explanation" can't be true then "everything has an explanation" must be true. So you can choose to reject my claim, but that is a choice to reject a substantiated claim. If you don't think I have substantiated it, let me know why.

> I don't have a criterion? I don't think there is any distinction to be made, and if you think that there is, it's up to you to demonstrate some way to make the distinction.

You don't have a definition for physical? You don't think there is a distinction, or do you lack reason to think there is a distinction? For the criterion that I did give what was deficient? (you said that I didn't but I did: to be physical is to be able to have measurable effects or to be measurably affected)

===

> For any action X, "being moral" is semantically equivalent to "being moral to do", and "immoral" is the negation of "moral". Therefore, your statement says that there exists an action that is moral and not moral at the same time.

My statements never fluctuate the moral value of X.

Another rephrase: It is immoral to do (A: X while thinking X is immoral) even if (B: X is moral). You'll be better off doing (C: any X while thinking X is moral) even if (D: X is immoral).

Regarding A and B: A is immoral, even though B says X of A might be moral. It is not doing X that is immoral, it is doing A.

Regarding C & D: The entirety of C is moral, even though D says X of C might be immoral. It is not X that is moral, it is C.

> The primary problem is not what you are saying, the primary problem is the method you use to justify it.

What is my method, and what is problematic with it?

> That you have in no way demonstrated that your version of morality does produce any of the results promised, it's just an empty assertion.

If, for my demonstration, I were to refer to the lives of the saints, they being better at achieving their goals of happiness than anyone else whom does not employ their methods by far, how might you object then?

View on HN

[part 2]

> You don't have a definition for physical? You don't think there is a distinction, or do you lack reason to think there is a distinction? For the criterion that I did give what was deficient? (you said that I didn't but I did: to be physical is to be able to have measurable effects or to be measurably affected)

I have never heard a coherent explanation of what the distinction would be.

Yes, you said that to be physical is to be able to have measurable effect [...], but then denied that the measurable effects of the potential of the universe to change state (namely, the measured change in state) implies that the potential of the universe to change state is physical, while you also say that the same kind of measurement when applied to the effects of charged particles implies that electrons are physical ... so, it's completely incoherent. You have not specified any method that I (or you) could apply to an arbitrary object to classify it as either physical or non-physical, you have just given vague criteria that can be interpreted any way you like and then simply asserted that the potential of the universe to change state is non-physical while electrons are physical.

> Another rephrase: It is immoral to do (A: X while thinking X is immoral) even if (B: X is moral). You'll be better off doing (C: any X while thinking X is moral) even if (D: X is immoral).

So, it is, under certain circumstances, immoral to do what is moral?

Could you explain in what way something could be meaningfully moral that does not mean that doing it is moral? Like, how could a sentence of the form "X is moral" possibly mean anything other than "doing X is moral"?

You could just as well be saying "It tastes bad to eat what you don't like even if it tastes good" ... as if there is any essence to "tasting good" that is independent from someone eating the thing. All it means for something to "taste good" is that someone likes to eat it, and if you don't like to eat it, then it doesn't taste good, and the same thing rather obviously seems to apply to "being moral" and "doing".

> Regarding A and B: A is immoral, even though B says X of A might be moral. It is not doing X that is immoral, it is doing A.

That doesn't resolve the contradiction. All you are saying here is that (A) whether X is moral depends on one's personal opinion and (B) that whether X is moral is objectively defined. You maybe should decide for one of those. Either it's defined by one's personal opinion, then there is no objective definition, or there is an objective definition, then it's not defined by one's personal opinion. Both at the same time doesn't work.

> What is my method, and what is problematic with it?

What I meant was: The primary problem is not that you are saying that acting according to god's will will maximize your well-being (or whatever the exact claim was, I might be butchering it somewhat), the problem is (probably) how you come to that conclusion. Now, I am making some assumptions based on how theists generally justify their position, and it is possible, though somewhat unlikely, that you have a completely different justification. But in any case, the important question is whether your justification is sufficient, not whether the claim is false.

> If, for my demonstration, I were to refer to the lives of the saints, they being better at achieving their goals of happiness than anyone else whom does not employ their methods by far, how might you object then?

1. You couldn't have picked a more biased example. If I were to show you that there exist millionaires who got rich with day trading, would you consider that evidence that day trading generally makes people rich? If you want to figure out whether some method reliably gives a particular result, you have to look at all people who have attempted the method, not just those who are known for having ended up with a good result. Even terrible methods usually will not prevent all good outcomes.

2. That is an extremely limited perspective on happiness. To take a somewhat random example, one big contribution to lack of happiness in the world are diseases. The saints most certainly were not exceptionally good at either helping to cure or manage diseases in general, nor at avoiding getting ill. That doesn't take away from the forms of happiness they might have been able to achieve (not that I am all that familiar with the lives of Catholic saints), but it's not at all obvious that they were particularly good at achieving overall-happiness, nor that their goals were indeed limited to those particular kinds of happiness, and they didn't mind getting ill, for example.

If you want to figure out which of any competing methods for achieving a goal is better at doing so, you have to compare scenarios that actually use different methods. A saint who makes all decisions based on what they believe to be divine revelation, say, but who lives in a secular society where all other decisions are made based on scientific ideas, is not in fact using only divine revelation to achieve happiness, but possibly simply benefits from all the discoveries made by people using scientific decisionmaking for increased happiness, with possibly some comparably minor additional improvement due to their god belief, or whatever. If you wanted to compare methods, you would have to compare scenarios where either only one or only the other method is being used, or you risk misattributing results.

[part 1 ... ;-)]

> Possibly, but where we are missing each other on definitions would likely be more noticeable in a syllogism.

Well, maybe, but part of the problem is that I don't really know yet what assumptions to build on that you would share. There are tons of ways to demonstrate incompatibility between religion and science, depending on which assumptions (definitions, in particular) you build on.

> Is it possible that a testable claim could imply another claim that is not testable?

Yes. Example: The earth being flat implies that invisible unicorns exist. "the earth is flat" is testable, "invisible unicorns exist" is not (arguably), and the implication is true (ex falso quodlibet).

> In other words, could you have an implicit reason for believing that something is true rather than an explicit one?

For one, testability is not a reason to believe a claim, as can be seen from the claim above that the earth is flat, which is testable, but demonstrably false. Lack of testability is a reason to not believe (because it's indistinguishable from claims that were just made up), testability is not a reason to believe (because the test might very well disprove the claim).

But the bigger problem with that question seems to be that it assumes some sort of essentialist testability. If we turn the implication around, we get a correct statement: If some claim B implies a claim A, and A is testable, then that is reason to not disbelieve B for lack of testability. But it makes no sense under any circumstances to label B as "untestable": Disproving A implies disproving B, and thus if you have some method for testing A, that method is also a test of B, and thus B is testable.

If a test could disprove your claim, then that is what it means for the claim to be testable, the amount of indirection between the claim and the test is irrelevant.

> So, if it is possible that some aspects of reality are not testable, then it is possible that a claim about such an aspect of reality is not compatible with science?

Yes. Making claims that are indistinguishable from stuff that's just made up is not compatible with science, because science is about making claims that are as reliable as possible, and claims that are indistuinguishable from stuff that's just made up is notoriously unreliable.

Or another way to put it: Making claims about the untestable implies the claim that you are able to detect the undetectable, which is self-contradicting. Either you can detect something, then you can use that to construct a test, or you can't, then you have no basis for claiming that you can.

> That is not the case. I think there is great evidence. If it is false, then it is likely that my willingness to accept things is too generous, but I'll make any effort I can to get past that if that is indeed the position I find myself in.

Well, granted, that is a likely alternative!

(Though I would say the problem is not necessarily that the evidence is false, but that it is insufficient ... or rather, that it should be. I mean, unless you really do happen to have the evidence that everyone has been waiting for ... ;-)

Also, good luck with that! :-)

> So, might you be attempting to say that non-testable claims are incompatible with doing science, rather than non-testable claims being incompatible with science itself?

I don't understand what the distinction is that you are making here.

> I am.

Well, let's see ...

http://www.atheist-experience.com/

Seems like a good starting point overall: Various hosts with different perspectives and styles, focus on talking to theists, so chances are they will address (or have addressed) what you are interested in, and obviously you could also try calling yourself if you feel like it, plus they regularly have guests who might have their own sites or youtube channels or whatever, so also a good way to discover more resources. You might also want to have a look at the tons of other programs they (the atheist community of Austin) have started to produce recently ... really, just dig around a bit and see whether anything fits your taste.

https://www.youtube.com/user/SansDeity

One of the hosts of the above, addressing specific topics more in depth.

https://www.youtube.com/user/AntiCitizenX https://casualentropy.blogspot.com/

Not necessarily very diplomatic, but they do dive into the more philosophical questions, so might be worth a read/listen.

https://www.youtube.com/user/magnabosco210

One guy (not the only one by far, you might also want to look for others) practicing street epistemology, with many talks addressing questions of religious beliefs.

https://www.recoveringfromreligion.org/resources

Not sure whether it's too relevant for you, but then, they have a collection of quite a wide range of different resources, so who knows, digging around there might turn up something interesting ...

If you want to read a book or two, the classics (almost) from Dawkins, Hitchens, Harris, and Dennett probably aren't the worst idea, Dennett in particular if you want to get more into the philosophy side of things. Other than that, I guess I would rather start from the above and look out for recommendations from there.

> So, is there a chain of scientific methods that establish further scientific methods with no beginning, or is there some first self-evident method, that can't be tested for reliability without being circular?

Neither, really, though more the latter than the former. You could say that the basis that everything else builds on is the assumption that our senses are somewhat reliable, i.e., that if an overwhelming majority of people agree about some observation, the observation is probably a reasonably accurate description of something that actually happened. And mind you that not much reliability is necessary in order to bootstrap this, because you can largely test that, too.

But when you think about it, you'll notice that that assumption isn't actually necessary if you are careful with formulating your goal. Namely, if your goal is to have as accurate a model of reality as possible, then that still holds if you have absolutely no way to make any reliable determination about reality: If you have no way to make any reliable determination about reality, then, by definition, no method will give you a better result than pure randomness, and thus every method is optimal (and pessimal at the same time). And as soon as there is even a little bit of structure to reality that you could figure out, building on your senses is going to outperform ignoring your senses.

> So are you saying "you can't make a claim about John be about Jack, because John is not Jack", and to parallel "you can't make a claim about math be about reality because math is not reality"?

More precisely, because a statement about math is not a statement about reality, other than that math is part of (human) reality.

> What if John was Jack's middle finger, how could a claim about John not be about Jack?

That's just a pointless question. And that is not because it is categorically wrong, but because it brings no insight. There is not a single statement that you couldn't object to with "but what if some words had completely different meanings than what the speaker presumably intended, based on common usage?" "'The earth is round' is true!"--"But what if by 'true' they meant false, or by 'earth' they meant a banana, or by 'round' they meant flat?" The answer is simply: They didn't.

> Given the Peano axioms, and their evaluations and derivations by humans, does '1 < 2' have a referent?

Yes, those axioms, evaluations and derivations (well, particular aspects of them). Just the same way that 'Game of Thrones' has a referent, given the series, and characters of that series have a referent, given the series. None of that implies some essence that exists absent those human artefacts.

> You objected to my claim that "everything has an explanation" thinking I had not substantiated it. I get that you're not making the opposing claim, but in order to substantiate my claim I showed that the opposing claim can't be true.

No, you haven't. At best, you have shown that holding that position is not justified (arguably, you haven't done that either, but it doesn't really matter for this). But lack of justification for one position does not imply that the position is false, nor that there is justification for the opposing position. It simply means that there is no good reason to believe that one position. If neither a given position nor the opposing position is justified, then we simply don't know which of the positions is correct.

> Even if your not making the opposing claim, your objection has no case because the opposing claim can't be true. If "not everything has an explanation" can't be true then "everything has an explanation" must be true. So you can choose to reject my claim, but that is a choice to reject a substantiated claim. If you don't think I have substantiated it, let me know why.

Well, see above. You have to show that it is impossible for something to be unexplainable, not just that we don't know whether something is unexplainable.

[part 2]

> Yes, you said that to be physical is to be able to have measurable effect [...], but then denied that the measurable effects of the potential of the universe to change state (namely, the measured change in state) implies that the potential of the universe to change state is physical, while you also say that the same kind of measurement when applied to the effects of charged particles implies that electrons are physical ... so, it's completely incoherent.

Where did "'the measured change in state' is an effect 'of the potential of the universe to change state'" come from? I never stated this, thus you've made a straw-man and then drew comparisons with it to electrons, effectively making up the notion of me being incoherent.

===

> So, it is, under certain circumstances, immoral to do what is moral?

Moral =/= immoral

> Like, how could a sentence of the form "X is moral" possibly mean anything other than "doing X is moral"?

It doesn't. There is more to the form of my sentences that you are clearly missing. My form is "A: X while you think X is immoral", "doing A is immoral".

Another way to think of it. "A: X while Y". A is moral when "X: Throwing darts" and "Y: aiming at a dart board". You can modify Y to "aiming at someones face" and make A immoral with out changing X.

> Either it's defined by one's personal opinion, then there is no objective definition, or there is an objective definition, then it's not defined by one's personal opinion. Both at the same time doesn't work.

Oh please. The objective definition incorporates subjective conditions. Ex: Define F as the set of propositions {A -> B, C -> D, A -> ~D, C -> ~B}. F is an objective framework which never changes, but what is derived from F is subject to the truth values of A, B, C, and D.

===

> Now, I am making some assumptions based on how theists generally justify their position, and it is possible, though somewhat unlikely, that you have a completely different justification.

I'm curious. How do you think theists generally justify their position?

===

> 1. You couldn't have picked a more biased example. If I were to show you that there exist millionaires who got rich with day trading, would you consider that evidence that day trading generally makes people rich?

False analogy. I'm claiming that everyone whom employs the methods of the saints achieves their goals of happiness. Your analogy would only be valid if everyone got rich with day trading, and if that were the case then that would be evidence that day trading generally makes people rich.

> If you want to figure out whether some method reliably gives a particular result, you have to look at all people who have [carried out] the method, not just those who are known for having ended up with a good result. Even terrible methods usually will not prevent all good outcomes.

Replaced "attempted the method" with "carried out the method" because you can fail an attempt, but to fail to attempt the method is to not follow the method. There is not a single known instance of a person having carried out the methods employed by the saints that didn't end up with good results.

> but it's not at all obvious that they were particularly good at achieving overall-happiness

Depends on how you are defining overall happiness. Many saints died joyfully while being tortured to death.

> If you wanted to compare methods, you would have to compare scenarios where either only one or only the other method is being used, or you risk misattributing results.

The problem you'll find with this is that you're not likely to find anyone who employs no aspects of the methods used by the saints, particularly because such a person, and you'd agree, would be completely depraved.

[part 1]

> I don't really know yet what assumptions to build on that you would share.

Then just start with something, and if I don't agree with your assumptions then we can decide where to go from there. It doesn't have to be perfectly formal, but at least needs to flow via enumerated propositions. I fail to see how avoiding to produce a formal argument for your position isn't an attempt at equivocation. Why else attempt to only argue informally where the informality is more likely to generate greater ambiguity?

> Yes. Example: ...

Is it possible that a testable claim could be true and imply another claim that is not testable?

===

> ... I mean, unless you really do happen to have the evidence that everyone has been waiting for ...

Flat earthers may say the same to anyone whom tells them that there is great evidence that the earth is an oblate spheroid. Simply thinking that evidence isn't sufficient doesn't mean that it isn't.

> I don't understand what the distinction is that you are making here.

Science is a method. Doing science is to use the scientific method. The scientific method involves testing claims. Using the scientific method on non-testable claims is contradictory. The scientific method and the claims it has proven can co-exist with claims that can't be tested so long as those claims don't contradict the scientific claims. While those claims that can't be tested can co-exist with the scientific method, the incompatibility is in attempting to do science with those claims.

===

> Well, let's see ...

Thanks :-)

===

> And mind you that not much reliability is necessary in order to bootstrap this, because you can largely test that, too.

I get what bootstrapping means in compiler terms, but regarding methods of discerning truth, the notion of bootstrapping would seem to fly in the face of Gödel.

> But when you think about it, you'll notice that that assumption isn't actually necessary ... And as soon as there is even a little bit of structure to reality that you could figure out, building on your senses is going to outperform ignoring your senses.

Still sounds like your relying on the assumption that our senses are reliable... Like, you wouldn't know that using your senses out performs ignoring your senses unless you were already relying on your senses to determine that.

===

> More precisely, because a statement about math is not a statement about reality, other than that math is part of (human) reality.

When you apply the name "John" to one person and the name "Jack" to another, there are physical criterion to distinguish between John and Jack allowing us to verify via testing that a claim only about John is not a claim about Jack. Unless there are physical criterion that allows us to distinguish between math and reality, you've made a false analogy.

> The answer is simply: They didn't.

The conclusion I'm looking for is "They couldn't" and in particular "They couldn't intelligibly mean 'claims only about math are claims about reality'" and I want to know why. Only saying "they didn't" leaves the door open for someone else who could.

===

> Yes, those axioms, evaluations and derivations (well, particular aspects of them). Just the same way that 'Game of Thrones' has a referent, given the series, and characters of that series have a referent, given the series.

>>>>> The point is: A bunch of axioms and what results from them.

Under this axiomatic context: Do distances, spaces, cardinalities, and sets symbolically or conceptually exist absent of any physical representation?

===

> No, you haven't. At best, you have shown that holding that position is not justified (arguably, you haven't done that either, but it doesn't really matter for this). ... Well, see above. You have to show that it is impossible for something to be unexplainable, not just that we don't know whether something is unexplainable.

Explain how I haven't. You're just saying I haven't. Where is the misstep in my argument (formalized below)?

==========

1 ) If X has no explanation, then X can't be explained.

2 ) If X can't be explained, then X is unintelligible.

3 ) If X is unintelligible and X is a part of reality, then the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted.

4 ) If the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted, then all claims about reality as a whole are unintelligible.

5 ) If all claims about reality as a whole are unintelligible, then the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" is unintelligible.

6 ) If the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" is unintelligible, then the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" cannot be truthfully asserted.

----------

7 ) X is a part of reality and X has no explanation (ASSUME for RAA)

8 ) X is a part of reality (Conjunction Elimination from 7)

9 ) X has no explanation (Conjunction Elimination from 7)

10) X can't be explained (Conditional Elimination from 1, 9)

11) X is unintelligible (Conditional Elimination from 2, 10)

12) X is unintelligible and X is a part of reality (Conjunction Introduction 11, 8)

13) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted (Conditional Elimination from 3, 12)

14) All claims about reality as a whole are unintelligible (Conditional Elimination from 4, 13)

15) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" is unintelligible (Conditional Elimination from 5, 14)

16) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" cannot be truthfully asserted (Conditional Elimination from 6, 15)

17) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted and The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" cannot be truthfully asserted (Conjunction Introduction 13, 16)

18) Therefore: It is not the case that X is a part of reality and X has no explanation (Reductio Ad Absurdum from 7 to a contradiction on 17)

---------

Rephrasing of the Conclusion: Either X is not a part of reality or X has an explanation (De Morgan)

Rephrase of the Rephrasing: If X is a part of reality then X has an explanation (Implication)

==========

[part 2]

> Replaced "attempted the method" with "carried out the method" because you can fail an attempt, but to fail to attempt the method is to not follow the method. There is not a single known instance of a person having carried out the methods employed by the saints that didn't end up with good results.

Those methods don't possibly include as one step being successful? As in: If you don't get the good result, then the only accepted explanation is that you didn't do it right? Because that would be an untestable claim, then.

Also, in any case, that doesn't resolve the bias, as that sounds pretty much like a textbook example of survivorship bias. Or in other words: Why would you expect to know about someone carrying out the methods and failing? The fact that you don't know about them does not mean that they don't exist, and it seems pretty obvious that those who succeed would be way more likely to be known. Also, it seems just completely impossible to know that such a person never existed, given that anyone out of billions or humans could have been someone who tried?

> Depends on how you are defining overall happiness. Many saints died joyfully while being tortured to death.

Seriously? You are telling me that you can't recognize this as a case of mental illness, and the only possible explanation in your mind is that they found a path to happiness that would be usable by anyone? Sorry, but your claims really are getting absurd. Pretty much what you'd expect from someone who tries to find any justification for a predetermined conclusion, rather than following the evidence where it leads, though.

> The problem you'll find with this is that you're not likely to find anyone who employs no aspects of the methods used by the saints, particularly because such a person, and you'd agree, would be completely depraved.

I'm not sure that I would agree they would be depraved, I am not really sure what your point or argument even is there.

But in any case, sure, that might be a problem, but that is not my problem. If you make a claim, it's your responsibility to provide the evidence, and if that's too difficult, then that doesn't mean that your position is reasonable without evidence, it simply means that you are making unsubstantiated claims.

[part 1]

> Then just start with something, and if I don't agree with your assumptions then we can decide where to go from there. It doesn't have to be perfectly formal, but at least needs to flow via enumerated propositions.

Well, it's just that I have already tried that, and even the most basic concepts seem to be problematic. At its core it's pretty simple, actually, but I guess we'll just end up at exactly the same discussion we are already having:

1) Science says that untestable claims about reality are unreliable.

2) Religion says that certain untestable claims about reality are reliable.

3) Therefore, religion's claims as to the reliability of some claims about reality contradicts science's claims as to the reliability of those claims.

> Is it possible that a testable claim could be true and imply another claim that is not testable?

No.

> Flat earthers may say the same to anyone whom tells them that there is great evidence that the earth is an oblate spheroid. Simply thinking that evidence isn't sufficient doesn't mean that it isn't.

Yeah ... so? They are still wrong, and I am most likely not.

> Science is a method. Doing science is to use the scientific method.

No. "The scientific method" is a very naive conception of science that is possibly useful as a teaching device, but not much more.

You seem to insist on modeling science as a dogma. The problem is: It just isn't.

Doing science is to use whatever methods that deliver demonstrably reliable results and reject whatever methods that don't. There is no fixed method, because that in itself would be unreliable.

> The scientific method involves testing claims. Using the scientific method on non-testable claims is contradictory.

Then don't use "the scientific method"! It is well-established that untestable claims are unreliable (and I have explained at length why), and so science uses that knowledge to weed out unreliable claims. Weeding out unreliable claims is a very important part of doing science effectively.

> The scientific method and the claims it has proven can co-exist with claims that can't be tested so long as those claims don't contradict the scientific claims.

No, when science tells us that your claim is indistinguishable from stuff someone made up, then that is not consistent with you telling us that you know it to in fact be true. Either there is indeed a good reason to think it is in fact true, then science is wrong and needs to be corrected so it doesn't classify a reliable claim as unreliable, or there is not, then you are irrational when accepting it anyway.

All you are saying here is that it is reasonable to believe made-up nonsense as long as science hasn't disproved it yet. And just to make sure you don't misunderstand: I did not say that whatever model you propose is made-up nonsense. But as it is indistinguishable from made-up nonsense, either both your proposed model and made-up nonsense are reasonable to believe, or neither is, because you don't have the option to distinguish the indistinguishable.

> While those claims that can't be tested can co-exist with the scientific method, the incompatibility is in attempting to do science with those claims.

No, the incompatibility comes from the fact that both are claims about the same subject matter, namely reality, and that those claims are contradictory.

> I get what bootstrapping means in compiler terms, but regarding methods of discerning truth, the notion of bootstrapping would seem to fly in the face of Gödel.

All I mean is that you (kindof) have to make some assumption of sorts, because there is no way to prove ultimate reality or disprove hard solipsism. If someone insists that they are a brain in a vat, there is no way to prove to them that they are not. But still, most people are willing to accept that other people exist, at least as a useful model of the reality they experience, so you generally can build on that assumption to make convincing arguments.

> Still sounds like your relying on the assumption that our senses are reliable... Like, you wouldn't know that using your senses out performs ignoring your senses unless you were already relying on your senses to determine that.

You do know that by definition. Senses are, by definition, those inputs that reflect external reality. Ignoring all inputs about external reality cannot possibly be more successful at manipulating the external reality than using inputs about external reality. And mind you that that would include stuff like a "god sense", if that were a thing, and god were a part of reality that you could sense.

> Under this axiomatic context: Do distances, spaces, cardinalities, and sets symbolically or conceptually exist absent of any physical representation?

I don't know. I certainly don't see any reason to believe so.

> Explain how I haven't. You're just saying I haven't. Where is the misstep in my argument (formalized below)?

The primary problem with that whole argument is that it considers having an explanation a property of the thing to be explained, rather than of the subject (not) understanding the thing.

For one, that seems like an incoherent concept, but more importantly, it's just completely unhelpful. We were talking in the context of what we can know, and if we can't know something, it is completely irrelevant if it had some property of "having an explanation" that isn't accessible to us.

> Where did "'the measured change in state' is an effect 'of the potential of the universe to change state'" come from? I never stated this, thus you've made a straw-man and then drew comparisons with it to electrons, effectively making up the notion of me being incoherent.

Uh, well, I dunno, possibly I misunderstood something. Could you then provide a criterion by which to distinguish the physical from the non-physical, that could be applied to an arbitrary object to determine whether it is physical or non-physical, and that's not using just vague terminology that could eaily be interpreted in a dozen different ways?

> Another way to think of it. "A: X while Y". A is moral when "X: Throwing darts" and "Y: aiming at a dart board". You can modify Y to "aiming at someones face" and make A immoral with out changing X.

Sure. And what would be the analogue of "aiming at the dart board" in your abstract argument then? Wouldn't that be that it is moral to do what is moral when you think it is moral? So, it is immoral to do what is moral when you think it is immoral, and it is moral to do what is moral when you think it is moral. Or in other words: Whether something is moral is completely determined by whether you think it is moral, and whether it is moral has no effect on whether it is moral?

> Oh please. The objective definition incorporates subjective conditions. Ex: Define F as the set of propositions {A -> B, C -> D, A -> ~D, C -> ~B}. F is an objective framework which never changes, but what is derived from F is subject to the truth values of A, B, C, and D.

But what is your objective definition? There is no problem with having an objective definition that depends on subjective conditions. But there is a problem with having an objective definition that completely delegates to subjective conditions while also claiming to give evaluation results that are independent of (those) subjective conditions, which seems to be what you are doing.

There seems to be no situation in which your rule of "doing X is (im)moral if is you think it is (im)moral" would leave the morality of an action undefined, but you still claim that this is the exception to a rule that applies in other cases. What are those other cases?

> I'm curious. How do you think theists generally justify their position?

There isn't one justification, but still a somewhat limited set of justifications, that are all equally bad, but for different reasons. So, not really something I can answer in under a few dozen pages. But I guess the videos on Matt Dillahunty's youtube channel (SansDeity) do cover quite a lot of those, if you want to find out. They also had a counter-apologetics wiki at http://wiki.ironchariots.org/, but that's been offline for a while ... but, just looking into it, it seems like someone has put up a fork: https://religions.wiki/ --I guess that might be worth a look as well.

> False analogy. I'm claiming that everyone whom employs the methods of the saints achieves their goals of happiness. Your analogy would only be valid if everyone got rich with day trading, and if that were the case then that would be evidence that day trading generally makes people rich.

Well, possibly that is what you intended to claim, but you very much didn't. You wrote about saints as opposed to people who didn't use their methods, and you also didn't make the claim that all people who used those methods were saints. So, the analogy was perfectly fine.

> 1)... 2)... 3)...

How do you determine that something is not testable? How do you determine that something is unreliable?

When you say "Science says", what do you mean? When you say "Religion says", what do you mean?

>> Is it possible that a testable claim could be true and imply another claim that is not testable?

> No.

Why?

===

> Yeah ... so? They are still wrong, and I am most likely not.

How do you know that there is a greater chance that you are not wrong? What are the percentages you have calculated to conclude this?

===

> Doing science is to use whatever methods that deliver demonstrably reliable results and reject whatever methods that don't. There is no fixed method, because that in itself would be unreliable.

Is "use whatever methods that deliver demonstrably reliable results and reject whatever methods that don't" a fixed method?

> It is well-established that untestable claims are unreliable (and I have explained at length why)

Would you please explain "at length" once more in the form of a syllogism that ends with the conclusion "Therefore all non-testable claims are unreliable"?

> Either there is indeed a good reason to think it is in fact true, then science is wrong and needs to be corrected so it doesn't classify a reliable claim as unreliable

It's becoming more clear that we seem to have different criterion for what we consider testable. Would you consider all claims that are provable or disprovable testable? Would you consider all claims that if true, and not provable or disprovable, are not testable?

> No, the incompatibility comes from the fact that both are claims about the same subject matter, namely reality, and that those claims are contradictory.

What are some claims of science and religion (regarding religion, particularly fundamental ones) that are contradictory, as in they claim opposing things (X and ~X)? Or are the only claims that are incompatible as far as you are concerned the ones stated in your above syllogism?

===

> All I mean is that you (kindof) have to make some assumption of sorts, because there is no way to prove ultimate reality or disprove hard solipsism.

So, there is some first self-evident method that can't be tested for reliability without being circular?

> You do know that by definition. Senses are, by definition, those inputs that reflect external reality.

A definition you have assumed? Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying anything is wrong with that assumption, it is a self-evident one, but call it like it is.

===

>>> More precisely, because a statement about math is not a statement about reality, other than that math is part of (human) reality.

>> When you apply the name "John" to one person and the name "Jack" to another, there are physical criterion to distinguish between John and Jack allowing us to verify via testing that a claim only about John is not a claim about Jack. Unless there are physical criterion that allows us to distinguish between math and reality, you've made a false analogy.

>>> The answer is simply: They didn't.

>> The conclusion I'm looking for is "They couldn't" and in particular "They couldn't intelligibly mean 'claims only about math are claims about reality'" and I want to know why. Only saying "they didn't" leaves the door open for someone else who could.

===

>> Under this axiomatic context: Do distances, spaces, cardinalities, and sets symbolically or conceptually exist absent of any physical representation?

> I don't know. I certainly don't see any reason to believe so.

Then you can't see any reason to believe '1 < 2' could make reference to anything other than the physical representations of distances of space, cardinalities of sets, and any other needed mathematical structures?

===

> The primary problem with that whole argument is that it considers having an explanation a property of the thing to be explained, rather than of the subject (not) understanding the thing.

==========

1 ) If X can't be explained, then X is unintelligible.

2 ) If X is unintelligible and X is a part of reality, then the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted.

3 ) If the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted, then all claims about reality as a whole are unintelligible.

4 ) If all claims about reality as a whole are unintelligible, then the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" is unintelligible.

5 ) If the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" is unintelligible, then the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" cannot be truthfully asserted.

----------

6 ) X is a part of reality and X can't be explained (ASSUME for RAA)

7 ) X is a part of reality (Conjunction Elimination from 6)

8 ) X can't be explained (Conjunction Elimination from 6)

9) X is unintelligible (Conditional Elimination from 1, 8)

10) X is unintelligible and X is a part of reality (Conjunction Introduction 9, 7)

11) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted (Conditional Elimination from 2, 10)

12) All claims about reality as a whole are unintelligible (Conditional Elimination from 3, 11)

13) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" is unintelligible (Conditional Elimination from 4, 12)

14) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" cannot be truthfully asserted (Conditional Elimination from 5, 13)

15) The claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" can be truthfully asserted and the claim "reality as a whole is unintelligible" cannot be truthfully asserted (Conjunction Introduction 11, 14)

16) Therefore: It is not the case that X is a part of reality and X can't be explained (Reductio Ad Absurdum from 6 to a contradiction on 15)

---------

Rephrasing of the Conclusion: Either X is not a part of reality or X can be explained (De Morgan)

Rephrase of the Rephrasing: If X is a part of reality then X can be explained (Implication)

==========

> Could you then provide a criterion by which to distinguish the physical from the non-physical, that could be applied to an arbitrary object to determine whether it is physical or non-physical, and that's not using just vague terminology that could eaily be interpreted in a dozen different ways?

To exist and be non-physical is to exist and be incapable of changing state, to exist and be incapable of changing state is to exist and be non-physical.

===

> Whether something is moral is completely determined by whether you think it is moral, and whether it is moral has no effect on whether it is moral?

Wow have I done a terrible job of separating the conscience act from the external act. To be abundantly clear, it is immoral to violate your conscience. There can be two actions that occur when you perform an action: Choosing an action is itself an action, and performing the chosen action is separate from the choosing of that action. So if I where to correct my comments along these lines I would properly state: "It is immoral to [choose to] do what you think is immoral even if [what you choose to do] is moral, so you'll be better off doing [an action] you think is moral even if [that action] is immoral [because choosing to do otherwise would be immoral]. You are better off this way because you are not as/(at all) culpable for your actions if you didn't know they were wrong. That being said we are obligated to correct our neighbors' incorrect moral beliefs and to be open to being corrected."

===

> Sorry, but your claims really are getting absurd.

Argumentum ad Lapidem

Do you expect all true claims to sound rational before you've heard their justification? What did you expect given that I haven't been taking any steps to establish them?

> Pretty much what you'd expect from someone who tries to find any justification for a predetermined conclusion, rather than following the evidence where it leads, though.

"Ad Hominem"

Ouch. Like you've done with 'claims only about math are not claims about reality'? (<- ad hominem)

That might be what you'd expect, but if you claim that's the kind of person I am then you'll need to substantiate that claim.

Lol, I've stated that I'm not taking any steps to establish my claims to you, as they don't usefully tie into to our compatibility discussion, several times now.

> ... it simply means that you are making unsubstantiated claims.

I've stated that I'm not taking any steps to establish my claims here several times now. Echo echo echo ...

> Would you please explain "at length" once more in the form of a syllogism that ends with the conclusion "Therefore all non-testable claims are unreliable"?

Because they are indistinguishable from stuff someone just made up. Do you agree that making shit up is not a reliable way to determine facts about reality?

> It's becoming more clear that we seem to have different criterion for what we consider testable.

I suspect that's a central problem, yes. The scientific notion of testability is something people with a religious background often seem to have difficulty wrapping their head around.

> Would you consider all claims that are provable or disprovable testable? Would you consider all claims that if true, and not provable or disprovable, are not testable?

First of all, just to make sure we aren't getting confused: This is all about "real truths", not about "formal truths", as "proof" is generally the term used by mathematics to describe derivation of formal truths, not so much by scientists, who would rather use terms like "evidence" or "demonstration" to describe, well, evidence for a hypothesis ... though people often colloquially use "proof" for either, even scientists, but it should be understood that it is being used in a meaning distinct from the mathematical use.

Also, I suspect that you are probably completely on the wrong track with "provability", even if I assume that you mean some sort of evidence-driven thing, because testability is not about whether some claim has been shown to be true or false, but about whether the claim could be shown to be false.

Testability is not a question of showing that something is true, because that isn't really a thing with inductive reasoning: For any model where you have not actually tested every prediction that you could derive from it (and those tend to be infinitely many for any non-trivial claims), you can not possibly be sure that there are no circumstances under which it would make a wrong prediction. So, testability is only concerned with showing that a claim is false, by demonstrating a contradiction, because you can indeed be sure that a model that makes predictions contradicted by a single test is incorrect (assuming you did not screw up the test, of course).

Now, of course, for a claim to be considered testable, it is not required that you demonstrate that it is false, that would be kinda pointless. The requirement is that you could potentially demonstrate it to be false if it were false.

So, for example, "water boils at 100 °C at atmospheric pressure" is testable, because there is an experiment that you could do that would contradict the claim if it weren't true. For example, if water actually only boiled at 200 °C, you could put together a demonstration where you heated water to 150 °C, showing that it didn't boil, thus contradicting the claim, thus demonstrating that it is false.

On the other hand, "invisible unicorns exist" is not testable, because there is no experiment that you could possibly do that would show it to be false. No matter what you observe about the world, there is no possible observation that could contradict the claim. That is simply because the claim does not make any predictions about observable reality--and if there is no prediction, there is no way to make an observation that would contradict any prediction.

Another common form of untestable claims, especially from religious people, is of the form "God listens to prayer and sends you help when you need it. When you pray, but you don't receive the help you think you need, god knew better that you actually didn't need the help you thought you needed." So, you pray, and either you get what you prayed for, then that is counted as evidence that god listened to the prayer, or you don't get what you prayed for, then that is counted as evidence that god knows better than you. The important point is: No matter what happens, it is counted as evidence for god. But an experiment where the result is counted as evidence for a particular hypothesis, no matter what the result of the experiment is, doesn't actually provide any evidence for anything, because the conclusion from the experiment does not actually depend on the result of the experiment. If you count every possible outcome as evidence for your hypothesis, there is no point in even doing the experiment, the result is the same as if you were to simply come to the conclusion without an experiment. Or in other words: Such a claim is indistinguishable from something that someone just made up.

> What are some claims of science and religion (regarding religion, particularly fundamental ones) that are contradictory, as in they claim opposing things (X and ~X)?

Religion: "It is warranted to believe that a god exists."

Science: "It is not warranted to believe that a god exists."

> A definition you have assumed? Don't get me wrong, I'm not saying anything is wrong with that assumption, it is a self-evident one, but call it like it is.

WTF? Yes, I am assuming a shared definition of every single word that I am using. Are you expecting me to spell that out, as if it could possibly be any different? Yes, I am assuming that you share the definition of "to be", and the definition of "different", and the definition of "yes", and the definition of "definition", and the definition of "to assume", ... seriously?

> 1 ) If X can't be explained, then X is unintelligible. [...]

Did you change anything? This is again treating the explainability as a property of X, which is incoherent nonsense. What we are talking about is that some particular subject/class of subjects possibly won't ever gain certain knowledge. So, a sensible way to express that is something along the lines of "If X will never be understood by humans, then ...". Maybe you could rewrite your argument in those terms?

> To exist and be non-physical is to exist and be incapable of changing state, to exist and be incapable of changing state is to exist and be non-physical.

So, how does that distinguish the physical from the non-physical, when the physical isn't even mentioned?

> Wow have I done a terrible job of separating the conscience act from the external act. To be abundantly clear, it is immoral to violate your conscience. There can be two actions that occur when you perform an action: Choosing an action is itself an action, and performing the chosen action is separate from the choosing of that action. So if I where to correct my comments along these lines I would properly state: "It is immoral to [choose to] do what you think is immoral even if [what you choose to do] is moral, so you'll be better off doing [an action] you think is moral even if [that action] is immoral [because choosing to do otherwise would be immoral].

So, how exactly are you adding anything of substance here? All of those additional words don't do anything about the brokenness of the argument, unless you are saying that it is possible to act in a way that is not in accordance with how you choose to act ... which is just gibberish. The subjective idea of what is moral still fully determines the choice, and unless you can choose to act differently that you choose to act (WTF?), any independent claims about the morality of the action still are as vacuous as they were before.

> You are better off this way because you are not as/(at all) culpable for your actions if you didn't know they were wrong. That being said we are obligated to correct our neighbors' incorrect moral beliefs and to be open to being corrected."

What does that have to do with anything? I thought we were talking about morality, not culpability, nor obligations to neighbors?!

> Do you expect all true claims to sound rational before you've heard their justification? What did you expect given that I haven't been taking any steps to establish them?

No, but I expect that anyone who is serious about a discussion doesn't just suddenly dump on me some outlandish claims with the expectation that I will accept them for the purposes of building arguments on them. It should hardly be a surprise to you that I don't share the assumption that those claims that you were making are true, so it is obviously completely pointless to even mention them if you don't intend to justify them. You might as well just be saying "I am right" ... might be true, but it's obviously guaranteed to be unconvincing.

> "Ad Hominem"

Nope. That simply wasn't an argument at all, just an observation.

> That might be what you'd expect, but if you claim that's the kind of person I am then you'll need to substantiate that claim.

Correct. Which is why I am not making that claim. I am simply telling you that you maybe should check extra carefully whether that is what you are doing. Because I, ultimately, can't.

> 1)... 2)... 3)...

How do you determine that a claim is not falsifiable? How do you determine that a claim is unreliable?

When you say "Science says", do you mean "Science is defined as such ..." or "Science has arrived at the conclusion ..."? When you say "Religion says", do you mean "All religions assert ..."?

> Because they are indistinguishable from stuff someone just made up. Do you agree that making shit up is not a reliable way to determine facts about reality?

While I agree that making shit up is not reliable, some claims that are "indistinguishable from stuff someone just made up" aren't necessarily untrue. Given that claims "indistinguishable from stuff someone just made up" could be true, one might think that there may be claims which, though are non-testable, are reliable for use. If that is not the case, then you have to establish the claim "non-testable claims are unreliable" in order to support what you're saying sciences asserts ("that untestable claims about reality are unreliable").

Also, when you say a claim is reliable, what is it reliable for?

===

s> Is it possible that a testable claim could be true and imply another claim that is not testable?

z> No.

s> Why?

===

> ... testability ... is about whether the claim could be shown to be false. ... The requirement is that you could potentially demonstrate it to be false if it were false.

You may need to elaborate for me, because true claims can't potentially be shown to be false in principle. So, are we calling claims falsifiable because we don't know beyond inductive reasoning that they are true and can out of ignorance come up with test that potentially demonstrates they are false?

===

z> Doing science is to use whatever methods that deliver demonstrably reliable results and reject whatever methods that don't. There is no fixed method, because that in itself would be unreliable.

s> Is "use whatever methods that deliver demonstrably reliable results and reject whatever methods that don't" a fixed method?

===

> Religion: "It is warranted to believe that a god exists."

> Science: "It is not warranted to believe that a god exists."

Assuming your saying "It is not warranted" because the claim "God exists" is not falsifiable, how has it been shown that the claim "God exists" is not a falsifiable claim?

===

> WTF? Yes... ... seriously?

Oh, so you agree that science relies upon the reliability of the senses and that the claim "our senses are reliable" is not falsifiable in principle?

===

z> More precisely, because a statement about math is not a statement about reality, other than that math is part of (human) reality.

s> When you apply the name "John" to one person and the name "Jack" to another, there are physical criterion to distinguish between John and Jack allowing us to verify via testing that a claim only about John is not a claim about Jack. Unless there are physical criterion that allows us to distinguish between math and reality, you've made a false analogy.

===

z> The answer is simply: They didn't.

s> The conclusion I'm looking for is "They couldn't" and in particular "They couldn't intelligibly mean 'claims only about math are claims about reality'" and I want to know why. Only saying "they didn't" leaves the door open for someone else who could.

===

s> Under this axiomatic context: Do distances, spaces, cardinalities, and sets symbolically or conceptually exist absent of any physical representation?

z> I don't know. I certainly don't see any reason to believe so.

s>Then you can't see any reason to believe '1 < 2' could make reference to anything other than the physical representations of distances of space, cardinalities of sets, and any other needed mathematical structures?

===

> Did you change anything?

Did you read it? The first argument contains 18 points and said "X has". The second argument contains 16 points and does not say "X has".

> This is again treating the explainability as a property of X, which is incoherent nonsense.

Could you quote something from the second argument that treated "explainability as a property of X"?

===

> So, how does that distinguish the physical from the non-physical, when the physical isn't even mentioned?

I guess the implication wasn't obvious enough. To exist and be physical is to exist and be capable of changing state, to exist and be capable of changing state is to exist and be physical.

===

> ... unless you are saying that it is possible to act in a way that is not in accordance with how you choose to act ... which is just gibberish.

"Intend" is probably a better word than "choose".

===

> No, but I expect that anyone who is serious about a discussion doesn't just suddenly dump on me some outlandish claims with the expectation that I will accept them for the purposes of building arguments on them.

Like 'claims only about math are not claims about reality'?

> While I agree that making shit up is not reliable, some claims that are "indistinguishable from stuff someone just made up" aren't necessarily untrue.

Correct. Which is why I am not saying that claims that are indistinguishable from stuff that someone just made up are false. Really, even stuff that someone in fact just made up is not necessarily untrue. It is possible to make shit up and end up with the truth. But most claims that you could make up are false (for any claim A that you could make up, you could also make up at the very least the claim that not A, and at most one of those two can be true), which is why just making things up is not a reliable way to determine truth.

> Given that claims "indistinguishable from stuff someone just made up" could be true, one might think that there may be claims which, though are non-testable, are reliable for use.

"reliability of a claim" means the probability that the claim is true, based on what you know. The fact that some of the claims might be true does not mean that the probability of any particular claim being true is high.

> Also, when you say a claim is reliable, what is it reliable for?

It's not reliable _for_ anything, it is simply likely to be a correct description of reality.

> You may need to elaborate for me, because true claims can't potentially be shown to be false in principle.

Yes, they can, and that is the most important part of it that you have to wrap your head around.

The claim "water boils at 100 °C (at standard pressure ...)" is probably true, I suppose you would agree?

Here is an observation that could potentially be made that would count as falsification of the claim: Water in liquid form at 200 °C (at standard pressure ...).

Testability is not about actual demonstration, it is about potential demonstration. There has to be some demonstration that, if it were done, would be accepted as demonstrating that the claim is false.

The whole point is that for actually true claims, those demonstrations will never be actualized. But for actually false claims, they might, and often are. And that is how we weed out false claims, thus increasing the concentration of actually true claims in what we consider "state of the art human knowledge".

It is important to remember that "water boils at 100 °C" is not something we know for absolutely certain to be true. All attempts to falsify it so far have failed, that is all: All experiments so far have not produced any result that contradicts that claim. But for all we know, someone could demonstrate liquid water at 200 °C tomorrow (or water steam at 50 °C, or whatever--there are tons of demonstrations that would be accepted as falsification of that claim), and that would establish that this claim is false, after all.

> Assuming your saying "It is not warranted" because the claim "God exists" is not falsifiable, how has it been shown that the claim "God exists" is not a falsifiable claim?

What would you accept as falsification of the claim of the existence of the god that you believe in?

> Oh, so you agree that science relies upon the reliability of the senses and that the claim "our senses are reliable" is not falsifiable in principle?

All you are really saying here is "What if reality isn't real?" That is just a pointless objection. Whatever "ultimate reality" looks like, we still have to deal with the reality that we experience, and we most certainly experience what we experience, and the possibility that we might not be experiencing "ultimate reality" does not change that we are experiencing a reality, and that it is meaningful to make statements about that reality.

> Did you read it?

Yes, but it didn't seem like you changed anything of substance, in particular with regards to my criticism.

> Could you quote something from the second argument that treated "explainability as a property of X"?

The problem is that you are writing so massively ambiguous statements that it is very hard to nail down what you actually mean, and thus where exactly you treat explainability as a property of X. Even the first half of a sentence, "If X can't be explained", certainly sounds like "can't be explained" is a property of X. To avoid some of that ambiguity, I would very much prefer if you were to explicitly write down your argument completely avoiding "can be explained" or "has an explanation", instead using only "is known to humans" or "will be known to humans", and show that way that humans will at some point in time know everything.

And yes, I am aware that I am skipping a lot of stuff. I am getting the impression that we aren't getting anywhere with those due to way more fundamental misunderstanding, and I suspect a lot of it boils down to testability one way or another, so I think we are better off concentrating on that for now, instead of wasting a lot of time with going in circles.

> ... which is why just making things up is not a reliable way to determine truth.

Your argument states "Science says that untestable claims about reality are unreliable" and not "Science says that making things up is not a reliable way to determine truth". Your argument also states "Religion says that certain untestable claims about reality are reliable" and not "Religion says that making things up is a reliable way to determine truth". There is a difference between the reliability of finding the truth by making up a claim and the reliability of the claim itself.

Your argument (from what I can tell as it is written) is not about the reliability of making up a claim but about the reliability of a claim itself. Even if your argument were referring to the reliability of making up a claim, I don't know of any religion that says or concludes that making up claims is reliable. Even if one did, that wouldn't lend itself to making the blanket statement "Religion says ...".

> "reliability of a claim" means the probability that the claim is true, based on what you know. The fact that some of the claims might be true does not mean that the probability of any particular claim being true is high.

Defining, conversely, the "unreliability of a claim" as the probability that the claim is false, your argument becomes the following:

> 1) Science says that untestable claims about reality have a probability of being false.

> 2) Religion says that certain untestable claims about reality have a probability of being true.

> 3) Therefore, religion's claims as to the probability of being true of some claims about reality contradicts science's claims as to the probability of being true of those claims.

Given that your argument makes no reference to what is more or less probable, no contradiction has been established (pending whether you mean unreliable to mean less likely and reliable to mean more likely (but then you'd need to establish how those probabilities were derived)). I don't want to put words in your mouth, so you may want to rephrase your argument because I doubt this is what you meant given that it does not establish your point.

> It's not reliable _for_ anything, it is simply likely to be a correct description of reality.

You can't/don't rely on scientific claims "_for_" anything? As in, the claims of science are not reliable for things like putting satellites into orbit or pursuing further truths, they are just likely a correct description of reality?

>> Assuming your saying "It is not warranted" because the claim "God exists" is not falsifiable, how has it been shown that the claim "God exists" is not a falsifiable claim?

> What would you accept as falsification of the claim of the existence of the god that you believe in?

You're shifting the burden of proof. I have at least five independent criterion, but you don't need to know them. Not having something to accept as falsification for the claim "water only boils at 100°C or greater (under 1 atm)" doesn't mean that there can't be one. So unless you have some solid demonstration of your claim, because lack of evidence doesn't seal the deal, then you have no convincing basis for claiming "'God exists' is not a falsifiable claim".

> All you are really saying here is "What if reality isn't real?" ...

Hahaha, what?? Not at all! I'm saying that, given what seems to be your want of disregarding all non-falsifiable claims as "indistinguishable from stuff someone just made up", you'd also be disregarding the claim "our senses our reliable" as "indistinguishable from stuff someone just made up" because that claim is not falsifiable in principle (it being non-falsifiable something we seem to agree on since we think it is self-evident).

If you think the claim "our senses are reliable" is falsifiable, then YOU would be the one likely to assert the question "What if reality isn't real?".

> And yes, I am aware that I am skipping a lot of stuff. ...

Thank you for mentioning it. I couldn't tell if stuff was being missed or ignored. It can be easy to miss things in walls of text.

> ... so I think we are better off concentrating on that for now ...

Sure, I've done more skimming myself.

> There is a difference between the reliability of finding the truth by making up a claim and the reliability of the claim itself.

What is "the reliability of the claim itself", if it is not the reliability of the method that is used to estalish that claim?

> Given that your argument makes no reference to what is more or less probable

Yes, it does. Reliability (of a claim) is a scale expressing a probability of being true. "reliable" is the high probability end of that scale, "unreliable" is the low probability end of that scale.

> (but then you'd need to establish how those probabilities were derived)

Yes, I have, over, and over, and over, even in my last post.

> You can't/don't rely on scientific claims "_for_" anything?

That wasn't the question. Obviously, the more likely a claim is true, the more you are justified to rely on it as the basis for making decisions about the future. But the phrase "claim A is reliable" makes perfect sense without a "for X", simply as an expression of how likely the claim is to be true.

> As in, the claims of science are not reliable for things like putting satellites into orbit or pursuing further truths, they are just likely a correct description of reality?

Being a correct description of reality is what makes a claim useful for making predictions about the future behavior of that reality, and thus for influencing reality in such a way that a satellite does behave as intended/predicted.

> You're shifting the burden of proof.

No, I am not, I am simply performing the empirical observation that is required to establish whether the claim is testable.

> Not having something to accept as falsification for the claim "water only boils at 100°C or greater (under 1 atm)" doesn't mean that there can't be one.

Actually, that is all that testability is about: Whether there is something that would convince you that you are wrong if it were demonstrated to you. For "water only boils at 100°C or greater (under 1 atm)" that should be the case, because that statement under standard English language rules has semantics that imply a contradiction with certain potential observations. But ultimately, what counts is whether whoever is making the claim would accept those demonstrations as contradicting their claim.

> (it being non-falsifiable something we seem to agree on since we think it is self-evident).

No, not at all.

The problem is that that whole question is massively ambiguous, and the answer is completely different depending on the interpretation, or possibly some interpretations are just nonsensical questions.

If you mean whether our senses correctly reflect "ultimate reality": That would indeed be unfalsifiable, and for that exact reason it is indistinguishable from shit someone made up, and thus a highly unreliable claim.

If you mean whether our senses generally produce a coherent picture of an outside world: That is falsifiable, in that we can cross-correlate different senses, between perceptions of the same sense over time, as well as between our own and others' perceptions. I am guessing that that is maybe why you say that this is self-evident, but really, it's way more than just self-evident. Actually, that is exactly how we do know in how many ways our senses indeed are not reliable. There is a lot of redundancy in our senses (and indirect methods of perceiving the world) that allows us to test the reliability of each sense, with no sense in particular being one that we just have to trust blindly.

But mind you that all those tests of our senses do not in any way demonstrate that we can sense "ultimate reality". Possibly, we can't, but that is not a problem for our ability to navigate the (perceptual) reality we find outselves in, or for the testability of that fact.

> What is "the reliability of the claim itself", if it is not the reliability of the method that is used to estalish that claim?

Wut?? If you can't see that "the reliability of the claim itself" =/= "the reliability of the method that is used to establish that claim", then I think we are done here because this would make for an insuperable disagreement. In the first phrase 'reliability' refers to the claim, and in the second it refers to the method. The claim and the method that is used to establish that claim are two different things.

> Yes, I have, over, and over, and over, even in my last post.

No you haven't. The method 'making-things-up' we already agree is unreliable, but you have not established that non-testable claims have a greater probability of being untrue rather than true. If I missed it, perhaps you could quote what you think has been so obviously stated that you needn't bother repeating it? I'll ask you to include an inequality proof and/or the percentages that have been calculated to reach/assert this conclusion.

> But the phrase "claim A is reliable" makes perfect sense without a "for X", simply as an expression of how likely the claim is to be true.

So you think these phrases are equal?: "claim A is reliable" = "it is likely claim A is true" = "the method that is used to establish claim A is reliable"

> Being a correct description of reality is what makes a claim useful for making predictions about the future behavior of that reality, and thus for influencing reality in such a way that a satellite does behave as intended/predicted.

And claims that are correct descriptions of reality are not reliable "_for_" such use?

> No, I am not, I am simply performing the empirical observation that is required to establish whether the claim is testable.

If you are performing said observation now to form a basis for your claim, did your claim not have a basis before?

> But ultimately, what counts is whether whoever is making the claim would accept those demonstrations as contradicting their claim.

So, whether a claim is falsifiable is subjective?

Also, are claims of the form "X is not falsifiable" falsifiable? If so, how might they be falsified?

> If you mean whether our senses generally produce a coherent picture of an outside world: That is falsifiable, in that we can cross-correlate different senses, between perceptions of the same sense over time, as well as between our own and others' perceptions.

Is the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" falsifiable?

> The claim and the method that is used to establish that claim are two different things.

Yes, of course they are! But there simply is no such thing as "the reliability of the claim" that is distinct from "the reliability of the method used to arrive at the claim", because reliability as an attribute of the claim itself is a category error. The way "the reliability of the claim" is commonly used is simply as a short-hand to refer to what more precisely would be called "the reliability of the method used to arrive at the claim".

If you take the claim "this bridge can bear 1632 tons", then what determines the "reliability of that claim" is how it was derived, there is no inherent reliability to just the claim itself. If someone rolled some dice to create that number, then that is a completely unreliable claim. If someone put 1632 tons of steel blocks on the bridge and it didn't fail, then that is at the very least a lot more reliable than rolling some dice. The fact that the exact same claim has completely different reliability, depending on how it was arrived at, should tell you that the reliability is actually a property of the process used to derive it, and not of the claim itself, even if that is how it is commonly phrased.

> The method 'making-things-up' we already agree is unreliable, but you have not established that non-testable claims have a greater probability of being untrue rather than true.

Do you agree that made-up claims have a greater probability of being untrue rather than true?

Do you agree that non-testable claims are indistinguishable from claims arrived at by making them up?

> So you think these phrases are equal?: "claim A is reliable" = "it is likely claim A is true" = "the method that is used to establish claim A is reliable"

Seems sensible to me!

> And claims that are correct descriptions of reality are not reliable "_for_" such use?

Oh, sure, of course they are! I had understood your question to mean that you thought that the specification of a particular application was missing, or something along those lines. But yes, that they are reliable for such use is the implication, of course.

> If you are performing said observation now to form a basis for your claim, did your claim not have a basis before?

Really, I have implicitly switched the claim, simply to enable a productive discussion.

The problem is that "god" is a word that is used to refer to so many different and mutually contradictory concepts that demonstrating any claim for all of those concepts can be a lot of work, and often is even impossible because someone will come along and claim that god is the sun or something (and under that definition, obviously, god does exist, but probably isn't Jesus, say). So, before, I made a claim that is generally true for the vast majority of the god concepts that people have, just for a wide variety of reasons, depending on the specific concept.

But explaining how the claim is true for most/all god concepts is a lot of work--and also probably not the most useful thing to do, when you, presumably, have a specific god concept in mind, so focusing on that seems more productive than getting lost in ideas that you may not agree with anyway. Which is why I switched from the general claim to a more specific claim that's presumably more relevant to you.

> So, whether a claim is falsifiable is subjective?

No, it's not that the falsifiability is subjective, but rather that what ultimately matters is the falsifiability of what you actually think, not of what someone else interprets your statements to mean. If someone says "water boils at 100 °C", you would presumably agree that that is a statement that implies certain possibilities to falsify it, and as such the statement would qualify as a falsifiable claim, based on how the English language is generally understood to work. But if you were to demonstrate liquid water at 200 °C to whoever is uttering that sentence and they would still keep making the same statement, then their internal model that they try to express as "water boils at 100 °C" is still untestable, and that is still a problem.

> Also, are claims of the form "X is not falsifiable" falsifiable? If so, how might they be falsified?

By showing that whoever is holding the supposedly unfalsifiable position would actually accept some demonstrations as reasons to reject the claim?

> Is the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" falsifiable?

Are we talking about "reliable for detecting ultimate reality" or "reliable for detecting the reality that they are detecting"?

You > "But there simply is no such thing as "the reliability of the claim" that is distinct from "the reliability of the method used to arrive at the claim...".

Also you (in response to my question "And claims that are correct descriptions of reality are not reliable "_for_" such use?")> "Oh, sure, of course they are!"

> The way "the reliability of the claim" is commonly used is simply as a short-hand to refer to what more precisely would be called "the reliability of the method used to arrive at the claim".

Would you provide a source on this being the common usage?

> Do you agree that made-up claims have a greater probability of being untrue rather than true?

If that is the case, it is not obvious, because for every claim "X" there is also the claim "not X", meaning that exactly half all claims are true. So you'll need to establish what would tip that balance.

> Seems sensible to me!

Let A be the true claim "this bridge can bear 1632 tons", and the method that produced it is "making the claim A up on the spot".

Would you still say these phrases are equal?: "the claim A is reliable" = "it is likely the claim A is true" = "making the claim A up on the spot to establish claim A is reliable"?

=====================

> By showing that whoever is holding the supposedly unfalsifiable position would actually accept some demonstrations as reasons to reject the claim?

Are you asking me?

=======

0) According to you: If X is falsifiable, then X "is not something we know for absolutely certain to be true, [but that] all attempts to falsify it so far have failed, that is all".

===

1) If the claim "X is not falsifiable" is falsifiable, then "X is not falsifiable" "is not something we know for absolutely certain to be true, [but that] all attempts to falsify it so far have failed, that is all". (Substitution 0)

2) According to you: The claim "X is not falsifiable" is falsifiable"?". (ASSUMPTION)

3) Therefore: The "X is not falsifiable" "is not something we know for absolutely certain to be true, [but that] all attempts to falsify it so far have failed, that is all". (Conditional Elimination from 1, 2)

=======

In other words, by your definitions, there is no way to establish with certainty that a claim is not falsifiable, if its not being falsifiable can be falsified.

=====================

>> Is the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" falsifiable?

> Are we talking about "reliable for detecting ultimate reality" or "reliable for detecting the reality that they are detecting"?

Reliable for detecting the reality that they are detecting.

> You > "But there simply is no such thing as "the reliability of the claim" that is distinct from "the reliability of the method used to arrive at the claim...".

> Also you (in response to my question "And claims that are correct descriptions of reality are not reliable "_for_" such use?")> "Oh, sure, of course they are!"

I'm not sure what you are getting at?! If you think I should be objecting to you using the word "correct", because that is a property of the claim itself and not dependent on the method used to arrive at it: Sure, assume that I object to that. But it seemed to me that that wasn't relevant to what you were actually asking about, namely, whether reliability of a claim implies potential usefulness of that claim _for_ some further purpose.

> Would you provide a source on this being the common usage?

I really don't understand why you are asking this. I already explained why the notion of reliability of the claim itself doesn't make any sense/is a category error. And I suppose that you would agree that people do use phrases like "claim X is reliable", and that it is usually perfectly understandable what they mean by that. Also, under the interpretation that I suggested, you generally do understand what people are trying to tell you when they use such a phrase, while avoiding the obvious logical nonsense that follows if you assume that reliability is a property of the claim itself.

Now, it may well be true that many people who use such a phrase have never really thought through what exactly they mean by that, and thus have never made a conscious decision of whether they are using one definition or the other. But that isn't a reason to think that they likely intend to use a definition that leads to contradictions.

It seems like you are asking me to provide a source for the claim that people are not generally intending to talk nonsense. It's not that that isn't a thing that can be investigated empirically, but I doubt that you actually disagree on this.

> If that is the case, it is not obvious, because for every claim "X" there is also the claim "not X", meaning that exactly half all claims are true. So you'll need to establish what would tip that balance.

Well, while that is kinda true, it's also not really particularly relevant in this context? Even if there were a 50/50 chance, that would not be a useful source of information, would it?

The other problem with that perspective is that it counts redundant claims more than once. Like, if some measurement of X could give the result 0, 1, or 2, then "X is not 0" is the same claim as "X is 1 or 2", just phrased differently. So, if you want to get a useful result, you have to rather compare non-redundant claims of the same structure and at the same resolution. If you do that, you notice that there in particular are tons of claims about numerical values, and that there is an infinite number of either discrete values of or equal-sized intervals that you could plug into any such claim to make up new claims--but for any particular measurement, only one of those infinitely many possible values or ranges will correspond to reality, and almost all claims that you could make up this way will be wrong.

If you don't find that convincing, I guess we might also replace "made-up claims are almost all false" with "made-up claims are no more likely to be true than chance", as you seem to already be agreeing with that? I don't think I drew any conclusions that require the stronger claim, so we might as well go with a lower lower bound instead.

> Let A be the true claim "this bridge can bear 1632 tons", and the method that produced it is "making the claim A up on the spot".

> Would you still say these phrases are equal?: "the claim A is reliable" = "it is likely the claim A is true" = "making the claim A up on the spot to establish claim A is reliable"?

Well, they all evaluate to false, so yes? Though I don't understand why you mention that the claim is true, as that makes no difference!? In the scenario you are describing, there is no reason for anyone to believe that it is true, because all they know is that someone made it up.

> Are you asking me?

No, I am telling you--though I wondered why you asked the original question, as the possibility to falsify that claim seems kinda ovious!?

> In other words, by your definitions, there is no way to establish with certainty that a claim is not falsifiable, if its not being falsifiable can be falsified.

So?

> Reliable for detecting the reality that they are detecting.

Then I don't even understand what the point of that question is. Like, what else would our senses detect, if not what they detect?

Could we maybe transfer this to a different scenario where it isn't as easy to get confused by intuitions? Like, assume there exists a robot with a bunch of sensors. And let's assume you can remote-control this robot, and remotely read what its sensor inputs measure. Now, with this robot you could do what I described above: You could check all those sensors for consistency. And maybe you could somehow communicate with other robots and check for consistency with the readings of their sensors. None of that guarantees that the robot (and thus you through it) sees "real reality", for all you know, it was built with all sensor connectors linked up to a computer that generates fake sensor signals from a simulation running on that computer, including a simulation of the stimuli from interacting with other (actually simulated) robots. But you said that that wasn't what we were talking about. So, if we aren't talking about that, then we are talking about actual sensors!? Is your question whether this guarantees that the sensors are free of any defects? (Well, no?) Or whether it is guaranteed that the robot itself can not be defective? (No?)

Or ... what else? I really don't understand what you are asking here.

Anything you've said with > ... reliability is a property of the claim itself ...

I have never stated that I thought this. You may have thought my wording implied that, but that has never been what I was getting at. You've incorrectly inferred this on your own, so I never addressed any statement you made regarding it as it was getting away from the point. But clearly since you've struggled to wrap your head around that, I've now spelled it out for you.

> It seems like you are asking me to provide a source for the claim that people are not generally intending to talk nonsense. It's not that that isn't a thing that can be investigated empirically, but I doubt that you actually disagree on this.

No, I've been getting at asking why you think people mean "the method used to arrive at claim X is reliable" rather than something like "claim X can be trusted for use", when "claim X is reliable" is stated.

Your stance is also noticeably less coherent when it is considered that "claim X" can't be replaced by "this wrench" or "this car" and not lack significant ambiguity ("the method used to arrive at this car is reliable"). Where as if you were to replace "claim X" in "claim X can be trusted for use" for "this car", you'd get "this car can be trusted for use".

What you've done is equivocate, using "reliability" differently for claims versus how it is used in all other areas. In particular using it in reference to X on one hand and in reference to the method that derived X on the other, which has nothing like a mechanical analog to help indicate that your usage is one that matches the usage of anyone else outside of your own head.

> Even if there were a 50/50 chance, that would not be a useful source of information, would it?

Then perhaps what you mean is: Made-up claims have a greater probability of being untrue than claims that are not made up. If that is the case are you asserting that "Any method that doesn't make up claims has a greater probability of being true than any methods that do make up claims"?

> Well, they all evaluate to false, so yes?

So, you think it is possible for some claim to be true and it not be likely that said claim is true?

> So?

According to you: The assertion of any claim that is not falsifiable is not warranted.

This has no certain basis, by your definitions. As a result this means that no claim should be ignored just because it is currently considered to not be falsifiable.

Another question comes to mind. Say you claim "water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm". You then perform a test on water at "1 atm", and it boils at 100°C. Having falsified the original claim, according to you, you can now say "it is not the case that water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm".

After falsifying the claim "water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm", is the claim "it is not the case that water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm" falsifiable, and if so how might it be falsified?

> Then I don't even understand what the point of that question is. Like, what else would our senses detect, if not what they detect?

That's partly my point, they wouldn't, and the other part is to have you recognize that there is a self-evidently true claim that is not falsifiable. You can't falsify the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable". To say that you could would be to say you have the potential to reliably, with your senses, demonstrate that the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" is false.

> So, you think it is possible for some claim to be true and it not be likely that said claim is true?

Imagine I came to you and told you that I had determined that some bridge could bear 1632 tons, and that I had determined that by rolling dice, one for each digit. You don't know anything else about this bridge. Would you say that my claim is

(a) likely to be true

(b) likely to be false

> This has no certain basis, by your definitions.

So? I didn't claim I had a certain basis. Do you have a certain basis for any belief? And if not, why are you bringing this up?

> After falsifying the claim "water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm", is the claim "it is not the case that water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm" falsifiable, and if so how might it be falsified?

By demonstrating water that boils only at 150°C+ at 1 atm?!

> That's partly my point, they wouldn't, and the other part is to have you recognize that there is a self-evidently true claim that is not falsifiable. You can't falsify the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable".

But that isn't self-evidently true, it's simply tautologically true. "What we perceive is what we perceive". Duh?

As far as we know, everything we perceive could be illusion/simulation/whatever WRT "ultimate reality", so making that claim in the sense that our senses are in any way reliable for detecting "ultimate reality" (i.e., "the programmer that wrote the simulation") is unwarranted, and there certainly is no evidence supporting such a claim.

And far as "the reality we perceive" is concerned, it's a trivial, tautological statement, not some insight about the world. That statement would even be true if we didn't perceive anything.

> To say that you could would be to say you have the potential to reliably, with your senses, demonstrate that the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" is false.

Which you can't because it's a logical contradiction to show that a tautological claim is false.

> Would you say that my claim is... ?

And by asking a question, you have no answer for mine? You seem to think that claims aren't true or false if we don't know whether they are true or false. What your doing is equivocating the likelihood of the method to produce true claims with whether a stated claim is likely to be true.

> I didn't claim I had a certain basis.

So you are not certain if religion is incompatible with science?

> By demonstrating water that boils only at 150°C+ at 1 atm?!

So, by your words, every falsifiable claim is not falsifiable with certainty, because any claim X that states the falsification of some falsifiable claim Y can be falsified.

> As far as we know, everything we perceive could be illusion/simulation/whatever WRT "ultimate reality", so making that claim in the sense that our senses are in any way reliable for detecting "ultimate reality" (i.e., "the programmer that wrote the simulation") is unwarranted, and there certainly is no evidence supporting such a claim.

How do you know this with certainty?

As far as you know everything you perceive could be illusion/simulation/whatever WRT "ultimate reality", so making that claim in the sense that our senses are not in any way reliable for detecting "ultimate reality" (i.e., "the programmer that wrote the simulation") is unwarranted, and there certainly is no evidence supporting such a claim.

> And by asking a question, you have no answer for mine?

Your line of questions seemed to be missing the point, which is why I tried to make things easier by asking you how you would understand language in this context.

> You seem to think that claims aren't true or false if we don't know whether they are true or false.

Nope.

> What your doing is equivocating the likelihood of the method to produce true claims with whether a stated claim is likely to be true.

No, I am not equivocating those, those just are the same thing, and I am almost certain that you also use language in this way, even though it seems like maybe you aren't aware of it. Which is why I asked you that one simple question, to see whether you actually do.

> So you are not certain if religion is incompatible with science?

I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about. Demanding a burden of proof that you don't apply to anything else is simply destructive behaviour, not something that could possibly lead to any insight.

> How do you know this with certainty?

Just remove "certainly". The point is: I haven't seen any, I doubt you have seen any, I doubt anyone has seen any. If you have some, feel free to share it.

> As far as you know everything you perceive could be illusion/simulation/whatever WRT "ultimate reality", so making that claim in the sense that our senses are not in any way reliable for detecting "ultimate reality" (i.e., "the programmer that wrote the simulation") is unwarranted, and there certainly is no evidence supporting such a claim.

Correct. Which is why I am not making that claim.

> I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about.

So apparently you are uncertain that you've just stated "I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about"... lol, wow.

Haha, are you certain you won't answer any further questions about whether you are certain about something until I show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about? If not, are you certain that you are not certain? If so, well then now you know there is something you can possibly be certain about. If not, are you certain?

> Demanding a burden of proof that you don't apply to anything else is simply destructive behaviour, not something that could possibly lead to any insight.

Smh, tsk tsk. I do apply it to other things. At the moment, however, we are dealing with your "uncertain" claims, a burden which is evermore appearing to be too much for you, especially now, given that you have now revealed that you've not intended to say anything with certainty. Perhaps, for all future claims you make, it would serve us well if you included wording that indicates your uncertainty.

> Just remove "certainly".

If you're going to remove certainty from all of your claims, then we have reached the end of our discussion. I'm content with you not being certain of the claim "Religion is incompatible with science". You may feel that one can't be certain of anything, but it is certain that you can't be certain of that.

> The point is: I haven't seen any, I doubt you have seen any, I doubt anyone has seen any.

Well according to you, you are not certain that you doubt it. In addition, by your own expectations of uncertainty, you are not certain that (you are not certain that you doubt it), and, to continue, you are not certain that (you are not certain that (you are not certain that you doubt it)), and you are not certain that (you are not certain that (you are not certain that (you are not certain that you doubt it))), and so on...

Oh, and if you want to replace all certainty with likelihood, as in stating that "It is likely that religion is incompatible with science" to highlight your uncertainty of the claim "Religion is compatible with science", then the claim "It is likely that religion is incompatible with science" would also be uncertain. This would result in the same infinite hierarchically regressive death spiral as above. So... have fun with that.

Just to avoid that confusion: "certain" is not the same as "so incredibly sure that it would be world-shattering to discover otherwise", even though the former often is used colloquially to mean the latter. I'm pretty sure that that is some equivocation that's going on here.

> I do apply it to other things.

So, you are saying that there is a claim that you are absolutely certain about?

> This would result in the same infinite hierarchically regressive death spiral as above.

Except there is no such thing. There is nothing in not being absolutely certain about anything that prevents you from still coming to conclusions and acting on them, and in many cases at least locally successfully so. There is nothing in reality, as far as I am aware, that guarantees that you can be certain about anything. And as such, you are simply demanding that I make an unjustified claim because that claim is an assumption that you want to make, and you maybe will refuse to engage unless I make that claim.

But that is not a problem that I can solve. I hold the position that absolute certainty is unjustified, and I am willing to help you understand that perspective if you are interested. You can either drop your assumption for the sake of the discussion, so you can maybe understand how my perspective makes sense, or you can insist that I should be sharing your assumption, which certainly will not allow you to understand my perspective.

In particular, you may want to take another close look at the examples that you used, apparently to try and construct contradictions from my statements. What you maybe want to pay attention to is whether those are actually contradictions (that is, self-inconsistent). It seems to me that many really just demonstrate that what I said contradicts the assumption of (the need for) absolute certainty. Which I'll readily admit they do. But that is not inconsistent, because that is not an assumption that I share. As such, they are expressions of how hard you find to accept what I said, which is fair--but they do not show a problem in my argument or reasoning.

> Just to avoid that confusion: "certain" is not the same as "so incredibly sure that it would be world-shattering to discover otherwise", even though the former often is used colloquially to mean the latter. I'm pretty sure that that is some equivocation that's going on here.

I don't mean "so incredibly sure that it would be world-shattering to discover otherwise" when I say certain. I mean "Known for sure; established beyond doubt".

> So, you are saying that there is a claim that you are absolutely certain about?

Yes. I've already said so. Consider re-reading my previous comment in light of my response "to avoid that confusion".

> There is nothing in not being absolutely certain about anything that prevents you from still coming to conclusions and acting on them, and in many cases at least locally successfully so.

Agreed. Those conclusions have less basis, but our knowledge can wind up aligned with the truth without us being certain.

> There is nothing in reality, as far as I am aware, that guarantees that you can be certain about anything.

Then we are done with our conversation. If you can't be certain of anything, then all of logic is suspect.

This flies in the face of a comment you've made previously in two ways, both regarding logic and your awareness: "Which you can't [with your senses, demonstrate that the claim "our senses have at least one way in which they are reliable" is false] because it's a logical contradiction to show that a tautological claim is false."

> I mean "Known for sure; established beyond doubt".

OK!

> Yes. I've already said so. Consider re-reading my previous comment in light of my response "to avoid that confusion".

Well, possibly you have, just trying to avoid confusion.

Could you give one example of such a claim? (Yes, I understand you might already have mentioned one, I just want to be sure I am not misrepresenting you.)

> Agreed. Those conclusions have less basis, but our knowledge can wind up aligned with the truth without us being certain.

Exactly! But note: "less basis" does not mean "no basis". Also, just asserting certainty doesn't give you any more basis, only actually having justified certainty does. The fact that you might prefer absolute certainty for the basis of (some of) your beliefs does not mean it's something you can actually have.

> Then we are done with our conversation. If you can't be certain of anything, then all of logic is suspect.

Well, yes, of course it is!? Are you saying that you have never made what you now consider errors in your logical thinking, where you were convinced that you came to a conclusion through correct logical reasoning and later came to the conclusion that you were wrong about that?! And if that has happened to you (I mean, it happened in this thread, so I assume you will agree that it has happened to you?), then how would you distinguish logical conclusions or methods of logical reasoning that you are certain are correct from those that you currently are mistakenly convinced are correct? And if you you can't distinguish those, how would not all of logic be suspect, at least just enough to not justify labeling it as absolutely certain?

And maybe more importantly: How is that relevant to our conversation? Either we agree on some claim or argument or we don't, how does it make any difference whether either one of us is certain about it?!

> This flies in the face of a comment you've made previously in two ways, both regarding logic and your awareness:

I don't see how, could you explain?

> Could you give one example of such a claim?

It is certain that you can't be certain of the claim "there is no thing anyone could possibly be certain about". You can't be certain "there is no thing anyone could possibly be certain about" without contradicting that claim, thus it is not possible to truthfully assert that claim in any way. Where there are no other possibilities, you have certainty.

> Also, just asserting certainty doesn't give you any more basis, only actually having justified certainty does.

Agreed. If you lack certainty about that though, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that just asserting certainty does give you more basis.

> The fact that you might prefer absolute certainty for the basis of (some of) your beliefs does not mean it's something you can actually have.

It ought to be sought out where possible, because it can actually be had. Also, if you lack certainty about that, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that the fact one might prefer absolute certainty for the basis of (some of) their beliefs does mean it's something they can actually have.

> How would you distinguish logical conclusions or methods of logical reasoning that you are certain are correct from those that you currently are mistakenly convinced are correct?

By distinguishing what possibilities have/haven't been ruled out.

> How is that relevant to our conversation?

Not knowing of any reason to think anything could be known with certainty is a non-starter for most conversation. Resisting all reasons to think anything could be known with certainty is a non-starter for any conversation.

> I don't see how, could you explain?

Your statement "There is nothing in reality, as far as I am aware, that guarantees that you can be certain about anything", expresses a lack of certainty in all claims, which includes tautological claims and claims of awareness, "awareness" being comparable to "senses".

If you lack certainty regarding tautological claims, then you think there is a chance, however small, that tautological claims could be shown to be false. You are open to the idea, however unlikely you take it to be, of logical contradictions being true, and thus are open, even if only a little, to asserting the illogical.

If you lack certainty regarding your awareness, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that there are things in reality, as far as you are aware, that guarantees that one can be certain about something.

> It is certain that you can't be certain of the claim "there is no thing anyone could possibly be certain about". You can't be certain "there is no thing anyone could possibly be certain about" without contradicting that claim, thus it is not possible to truthfully assert that claim in any way.

Hu?

1. People at least constantly claim that they are certain about self-contradictory things (that they themselves don't realize are/don't see as self-contradictory), so ... evidently, it is possible to be certain about that!?

2. What does truthfulness have to do with any of this? How does me being uncertain of a claim make it impossible for either the claim to be true or for me to assert it!?

> Where there are no other possibilities, you have certainty.

So, how did you exclude the possibility that there is a flaw in the logical reasoning that we both haven't realized yet?

> Agreed. If you lack certainty about that though, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that just asserting certainty does give you more basis.

So? All you seem to be saying here is "but then you can't be certain!". Yeah, duh? The fact that some reasoning conflicts with an assumption that you want to make does not invalidate the reasoning, it just means that it conflicts with that assumption.

> It ought to be sought out where possible, because it can actually be had.

Well, that is the claim that you are making.

> Also, if you lack certainty about that, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that the fact one might prefer absolute certainty for the basis of (some of) their beliefs does mean it's something they can actually have.

So? (see above)

> By distinguishing what possibilities have/haven't been ruled out.

And how would you distinguish those cases where you have correctly ruled out a possibility from those cases where you have mistakenly ruled out a possibility?

> Not knowing of any reason to think anything could be known with certainty is a non-starter for most conversation.

Why?

How do claims of certainty possibly add anything to a conversation? One side makes a claim/argument, the other either agrees or doesn't. If both sides agree, that claim can be used for building further arguments on it, which, again, the other side either agrees to or doesn't. If the other side doesn't agree, you have to explain your position based on things they previously agreed to, to work out whether you can get them to agree, or to possibly revise their positions on stuff they previously agreed upon, or to possibly revise your own position to get to an agreement on a different claim.

How does certainty play any role in this? Does asserting "but I am certain" ever help with convincing anyone (who obviously isn't certain of the same thing, or they wouldn't be disagreeing)? Does it add anything when you agree with someone, and then you also both say "and we are also both certain of this!"? Does it have any use if someone agrees with you on a claim, but you insist that they also agree to the claim that they are certain about that claim, or else you will act as if they didn't agree with you on the first claim either?

As far as I can see, knowing anything for certain isn't just not necessary for most conversation, it's also completely useless. Like, even if you were justified in being absolutely certain on some claim, I don't see how that is of any use whatsoever for a conversation.

> Resisting all reasons to think anything could be known with certainty is a non-starter for any conversation.

So, if there are in fact no reasons to think otherwise, then that is a non-starter for any conversation?!

> If you lack certainty regarding tautological claims, then you think there is a chance, however small, that tautological claims could be shown to be false.

No, that is just you assuming certainty to demonstrate certainty, i.e., circular reasoning. Yes, if I assume that I can determine with absolute certainty that a given claim is tautological, and that I can determine with absolute certainty the correct result of all my thoughts, then ... I could determine with absolute certainty the correct result of all my thoughts. But that's just a very convoluted way to express an assumption, not a demonstration of anything.

Tautologies are, by definition, true, and I agree with you on that. So what is the point of demanding that I also agree that I could not possibly be mistaken in my understanding of the definition of "tautology", that I could not possibly ever end up considering a false statement to be a tautology, that I could not possibly ever be wrongly convinced that a statement that is in fact tautological could be demonstrated to be false? Why do you require that I declare that I will not change my mind on what the common definition of "tautology" is, no matter what evidence you show me (that is: that I declare that this is "beyond doubt")? What good could possibly come from that, even if we ignore all the problems that could come from such a stance?

> You are open to the idea, however unlikely you take it to be, of logical contradictions being true, and thus are open, even if only a little, to asserting the illogical.

No, I am simply open to the idea that what I think are logical contradictions are in fact not.

> If you lack certainty regarding your awareness, then you think that there is a chance, however small, that there are things in reality, as far as you are aware, that guarantees that one can be certain about something.

So? Again and again, you make these statements that lead to contradictions with the assumption of absolute certainty ... but why would you do that if you want to convince someone who doesn't share that assumption?

> Like, even if you were justified in being absolutely certain on some claim, I don't see how that is of any use whatsoever for a conversation.

Then what was the purpose of your demanding, "I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about", if being certain about some claim is of no use, even if it could be justified?

===

To set things in order:

You claim that "Religion is incompatible with science" because, as you've claimed, they contradict in stating what is or is not warranted regarding the assertion of falsifiable claims.

Your argument fails on the grounds that it has not established that religion makes non-falsifiable claims. Moreover, when I pushed you on this regarding a specific claim you provided, asking "Assuming your saying "It is not warranted" because the claim "God exists" is not falsifiable, how has it been shown that the claim "God exists" is not a falsifiable claim?", you asked: "What would you accept as falsification of the claim of the existence of the god that you believe in?", leaving it to me to establish your position.

The issues with that aside, if I where to answer that question similar to the way you answered one of mine...

s> "After falsifying the claim "water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm", is the claim "it is not the case that water only boils at 150°C+ at 1 atm" falsifiable, and if so how might it be falsified?"

z> By demonstrating water that boils only at 150°C+ at 1 atm?!

... then I could say, "By demonstrating that God doesn't exist?!", and I could apply the same format to all questions asking how I might falsify some religions claim, which is absurd.

Your argument also fails on the grounds of not having a coherent use of the term "falsifiable":

You've stated that making non-falsifiable claims is unwarranted, and have also stated "it's a logical contradiction to show that a tautological claim is false". Either tautological statements contradict your claim that non-falsifiable claims are unwarranted to make or you'll need to establish that they are indistinguishable from shit just made up (this distinguishing presumably being the reason you think making non-falsifiable claims is unwarranted).

By your own words, every claim asserting the falsification of a falsifiable claim is falsifiable, which defeats the purpose of calling claims falsifiable to begin with. By your words, you can't falsify a claim without any doubt that the falsification can't be falsified, effectively making all falsifiable claims non-falsifiable, a contradiction.

Regarding Certainty: Without certainty, you can't potentially show that a claim is false, only that it is likely to be false, thus another collapse of your notion of "falsifiable". If there is no potential to show that a claim is false, then it is not falsifiable.

===

You have less basis for your claim "Religion is incompatible with science" than you have of the the claim "Some claims can be known with certainty".

Are you uncertain of your own existence? Maybe uncertain in mode, but that you exist in any way at all? Do you think that the certainty of ones existence is an unwarranted assumption? To think as such is self defeating.

> Then what was the purpose of your demanding, "I won't answer any further questions about whether I am certain about something until you show that there is anything anyone could possibly be certain about", if being certain about some claim is of no use, even if it could be justified?

I didn't ask you to be justified in being certain, I asked you to demonstrate that you are (or anyone else is) justified in being certain. Being justified seems to be useless, demonstrating that you are justified is not.

> Your argument fails on the grounds that it has not established that religion makes non-falsifiable claims.

Seriously? You are seriously contesting that a defining characteristic of religion is that it makes non-falsifiable claims?

> [...] you asked: "What would you accept as falsification of the claim of the existence of the god that you believe in?", leaving it to me to establish your position.

The fact that I am measuring the falsifiability of your position does not mean that you are establishing my position.

Would you prefer if I argued against a randomly selected religious position of other people that you probably don't agree with, and will you accept me demonstrating that that position is not falsifiable as demonstration that your position is not falsifiable?

> ... then I could say, "By demonstrating that God doesn't exist?!", and I could apply the same format to all questions asking how I might falsify some religions claim, which is absurd.

Which just demonstrates that you don't understand what falsifiability is?

What I describe is a very specific observation: A container with liquid water in it that is measured to be at a pressure of 1 atm and at a temperature of 149.9999 °C, and the temperature of the water vapor coming off of it measuring as 150 °C (or in short: water boiling only at 150 °C). That observation would falsify the claim that water does not boil only at 150 °C.

What you desribe is ... nothing of the sort? You give zero criteria by which to decide whether the experiment has failed.

> You've stated that making non-falsifiable claims is unwarranted, and have also stated "it's a logical contradiction to show that a tautological claim is false". Either tautological statements contradict your claim that non-falsifiable claims are unwarranted to make or you'll need to establish that they are indistinguishable from shit just made up (this distinguishing presumably being the reason you think making non-falsifiable claims is unwarranted).

You are confusing "formal truths" and "real truths".

> By your own words, every claim asserting the falsification of a falsifiable claim is falsifiable, which defeats the purpose of calling claims falsifiable to begin with. By your words, you can't falsify a claim without any doubt that the falsification can't be falsified, effectively making all falsifiable claims non-falsifiable, a contradiction.

Is there some negation or some quantifier wrong in this? I have a hard time figuring out what that second sentence means ...

> Regarding Certainty: Without certainty, you can't potentially show that a claim is false, only that it is likely to be false, thus another collapse of your notion of "falsifiable". If there is no potential to show that a claim is false, then it is not falsifiable.

That's, again, only a problem resulting from your demand for certainty. Certainty is not a requirement for falsification. Falsification is not about making certain that a claim is false. Seriously, just stop assuming that anyone but you is demanding certainty for anything. All these arguments of yours boil down to "but then you can't be certain!". Yes, DUH! I have told you again and again that I do not share this assumption of yours, so, please, stop making that assumption. Either justify the claim, or work without it. If your argument only makes sense under the assumption that someone demands certainty, it is not a relevant argument for this discussion. If your argument shows that my position is inconsistent with absolute certainty, that only shows that my position is consistent in that regard.

> Are you uncertain of your own existence? Maybe uncertain in mode, but that you exist in any way at all? Do you think that the certainty of ones existence is an unwarranted assumption? To think as such is self defeating.

That smells like essentialism?

I mean, you are aware that there are delusional people, right? Like, people who have an almost completely wrong idea about their identity? Are these people justified in being certain that they exist?

"Yes, DUH!" he said as though he were certain, contradicting his own position, a position he's not completely sure exists.

No, that is purely your invention. There is no contradiction with my own position, and there is no certainty involved, nor is certainty needed.

All you are doing is that you are refusing to agree with claim A in the context of this discussion unless I agree to unrelated claim B, even though you otherwise do agree with claim A.

You are simply refusing to agree that logic works unless I agree to making the assumption that I am certain of some other claims, even though you otherwise would agree that logic does work.

The fact that you can willfully claim that you don't agree with something you actually do agree with unless I give in to some demand of yours is not an argument, that is just destructive behaviour. If you are unwilling to follow a logical argument for the only reason that the person making the argument does not claim certainty, that is willfully undermining the conversation, and is exclusively your responsibility to address.

The Final nail:

You agree with the following claim: The specific observation of water boiling at 125°C in 1 atm falsifies the claim "water only boils at 150°C+ in 1 atm".

Since being falsifiable is your requirement for making warranted claims about reality, then, in order to be warranted, you'd need to have a specific observation that would falsify the claim "The specific observation of water boiling at 125°C in 1 atm falsifies the claim 'water only boils at 150°C+ in 1 atm'". But now the claim, that whatever observation you may describe would falsify the aforementioned, would also need to have an observation that would falsify it.

Any claim that some claim is falsified by some observation will also have to have a observation that falsifies that claim. Thus leading to an infinite regression (have fun showing your position is warranted when you have to detail an unending list of observations), circular regression (we both agree circular reasoning is not reasonable), or a first claim that is not falsifiable.

> There is no contradiction with my own position, and there is no certainty involved, nor is certainty needed.

How do you know there is no certainty involved? How do you know certainty is not needed? If you are not certain, why not say "is likely" instead of "is"? ("There is likely no contradiction with my own position", "there is likely no certainty involved", "Religion is likely incompatible with science", etc.)

> You are simply refusing to agree that logic works unless I agree to making the assumption that I am certain of some other claims, even though you otherwise would agree that logic does work.

Logic works, your's doesn't, particularly because you are framing your conclusion using terms of certainty while also refusing to think that anything can be known with certainty.

Do you have a reason for not assuming something, even your own existence, can be known with certainty? What I've gathered from your previous replies would indicate that your main reason could be phrased as "there is no way to verify that my perception matches up with any sort of 'ultimate reality'".

More nails for your argument's proverbial coffin... ;)

===

> Seriously? You are seriously contesting that a defining characteristic of religion is that it makes non-falsifiable claims?

"Yes, DUH!", hence the question. What indicates to you that making non-falsifiable claims is a defining characteristic of religion?

> The fact that I am measuring the falsifiability of your position does not mean that you are establishing my position.

So you are not relying on me to describe to you a very specific observation that I would "accept as falsification of the claim of the existence of the god that [I] believe in", in order to answer my question "How has it been shown that the claim "God exists" is not a falsifiable claim"?

> Would you prefer if I argued against a randomly selected religious position of other people that you probably don't agree with, and will you accept me demonstrating that that position is not falsifiable as demonstration that your position is not falsifiable?

We already selected the position "God exists". You've yet to demonstrate that it is not falsifiable. You are merely dodging the question with "It just is!"/"Because I said so!" like responses.

> A container with liquid water in it that is measured to be at a pressure of 1 atm and at a temperature of 149.9999 °C, and the temperature of the water vapor coming off of it measuring as 150 °C (or in short: water boiling only at 150 °C). That observation would falsify the claim that water does not boil only at 150 °C.

Measuring the temperature of the water vapor at 150 °C coming off of liquid water at 149.9999 °C doesn't falsify that claim if you haven't checked lower temperatures. If you haven't checked every temperature from -273.15 °C to 150 °C at every possible precision, then you may have missed some other temperature at which it boils. More over, if the claim was "water does not boil only at 150 °C in 1 atm" vs "150 °C+ in 1 atm", then you'd also have to check every temperature at every possible precision above 150 °C to falsify that claim.

> You are confusing "formal truths" and "real truths".

Is it possible to make a tautological claim about reality?

> I have a hard time figuring out what that second sentence means ...

If you can always potentially falsify claim A which is the falsification of claim B, then claim B always has the potential of having not actually been falsified. If a claim always has the potential of having not actually been falsified, then it is not actually falsifiable, because if it were actually falsified then there would no longer be any potential for it to be not actually falsified. For a claim to not actually be falsifiable, when it is said to be falsifiable, is a contradiction.

In other words:

If you can always have the potential to show that claim A is false, which is a claim that states claim B is false, then claim B always has the potential of having not actually been shown to be false. If a claim always has the potential of having not actually been shown to be false, then it cannot actually be shown to be false, because if it were actually shown to be false then there would no longer be any potential for it to have not actually been shown to be false. For a claim to not have the potential to actually be show as false, when it is said to have the potential to be show as false, is a contradiction.

> That's, again, only a problem resulting from your demand for certainty. ...

No, it is a problem resulting from your use of the word "is".

> I mean, you are aware that there are delusional people, right? Like, people who have an almost completely wrong idea about their identity? Are these people justified in being certain that they exist?

In what context could some existing person be certain that they exist and be wrong?

===

Since being falsifiable is your requirement for making warranted claims about reality:

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the first premise of your argument?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the second premise of your argument?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the conclusion of your argument?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "making non-falsifiable claims is a defining characteristic of religion"?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "the claim 'water only boils at 100 °C+ in 1 atm' is falsifiable"?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "'formal truths' are not about reality"?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "claims about reality must be falsifiable to be warranted"?

What specific observation can you describe that would falsify the claim "there is no way to verify that perception matches up with any sort of 'ultimate reality'"?

===

Have fun!

Reply on news.ycombinator.com