The problem is that security assumptions change. If you're looking at some code in 1995 that accesses an API, it seems reasonable that it disables validation for the SSL library it brings in to access an HTTPS URL. Handling that properly would have been a huge pain, faster is better.
But in 2019 you'd be appalled, how is this thing not depending on certifi and requests? As it is it's wide open to a MitM attack and you'd get blind sided.
A much older example: The C standard library includes a function that's very narrowly useful for copying strings into fixed width buffers with no terminator, called strncpy() and in 1970s Unix I'm sure this was invaluable. But obviously today "copying strings into fixed width buffers with no terminator" is essentially never what you wanted, but people assume based on the name that strncpy() will do some other thing they do want, and insert a security defect into their code.