How do you determine that a claim is not falsifiable? How do you determine that a claim is unreliable?
When you say "Science says", do you mean "Science is defined as such ..." or "Science has arrived at the conclusion ..."? When you say "Religion says", do you mean "All religions assert ..."?
> Because they are indistinguishable from stuff someone just made up. Do you agree that making shit up is not a reliable way to determine facts about reality?
While I agree that making shit up is not reliable, some claims that are "indistinguishable from stuff someone just made up" aren't necessarily untrue. Given that claims "indistinguishable from stuff someone just made up" could be true, one might think that there may be claims which, though are non-testable, are reliable for use. If that is not the case, then you have to establish the claim "non-testable claims are unreliable" in order to support what you're saying sciences asserts ("that untestable claims about reality are unreliable").
Also, when you say a claim is reliable, what is it reliable for?
===
s> Is it possible that a testable claim could be true and imply another claim that is not testable?
z> No.
s> Why?
?
===
> ... testability ... is about whether the claim could be shown to be false. ... The requirement is that you could potentially demonstrate it to be false if it were false.
You may need to elaborate for me, because true claims can't potentially be shown to be false in principle. So, are we calling claims falsifiable because we don't know beyond inductive reasoning that they are true and can out of ignorance come up with test that potentially demonstrates they are false?
===
z> Doing science is to use whatever methods that deliver demonstrably reliable results and reject whatever methods that don't. There is no fixed method, because that in itself would be unreliable.
s> Is "use whatever methods that deliver demonstrably reliable results and reject whatever methods that don't" a fixed method?
?
===
> Religion: "It is warranted to believe that a god exists."
> Science: "It is not warranted to believe that a god exists."
Assuming your saying "It is not warranted" because the claim "God exists" is not falsifiable, how has it been shown that the claim "God exists" is not a falsifiable claim?
===
> WTF? Yes... ... seriously?
Oh, so you agree that science relies upon the reliability of the senses and that the claim "our senses are reliable" is not falsifiable in principle?
===
z> More precisely, because a statement about math is not a statement about reality, other than that math is part of (human) reality.
s> When you apply the name "John" to one person and the name "Jack" to another, there are physical criterion to distinguish between John and Jack allowing us to verify via testing that a claim only about John is not a claim about Jack. Unless there are physical criterion that allows us to distinguish between math and reality, you've made a false analogy.
??
===
z> The answer is simply: They didn't.
s> The conclusion I'm looking for is "They couldn't" and in particular "They couldn't intelligibly mean 'claims only about math are claims about reality'" and I want to know why. Only saying "they didn't" leaves the door open for someone else who could.
??
===
s> Under this axiomatic context: Do distances, spaces, cardinalities, and sets symbolically or conceptually exist absent of any physical representation?
z> I don't know. I certainly don't see any reason to believe so.
s>Then you can't see any reason to believe '1 < 2' could make reference to anything other than the physical representations of distances of space, cardinalities of sets, and any other needed mathematical structures?
?
===
> Did you change anything?
Did you read it? The first argument contains 18 points and said "X has". The second argument contains 16 points and does not say "X has".
> This is again treating the explainability as a property of X, which is incoherent nonsense.
Could you quote something from the second argument that treated "explainability as a property of X"?
===
> So, how does that distinguish the physical from the non-physical, when the physical isn't even mentioned?
I guess the implication wasn't obvious enough. To exist and be physical is to exist and be capable of changing state, to exist and be capable of changing state is to exist and be physical.
===
> ... unless you are saying that it is possible to act in a way that is not in accordance with how you choose to act ... which is just gibberish.
"Intend" is probably a better word than "choose".
===
> No, but I expect that anyone who is serious about a discussion doesn't just suddenly dump on me some outlandish claims with the expectation that I will accept them for the purposes of building arguments on them.
Like 'claims only about math are not claims about reality'?