I agree with the first line - with the proviso that there are (IMO) trustworthy third parties that have vetted some VPNs (for example, Mozilla's partnership). I also agree that E2E could resolve a number of issues, but I don't think it's practical or useful advice.
Your second line steps toward security absolutism, since it just pushes out the trust boundary one step further and requires even more technical expertise to be actionable, especially in contrast to using a VPN provider.
The advice to only trust E2E encryption is only useful if you trust both the E2E service provider and the implementation, especially where the service provider owns the only compatible implementations, and the implementation is closed source.
The recent observations that FB could, either willfully, or under coercion, completely undermine their E2E implementation illustrates that, in general, solutions that are user friendly, readily accessible, and operating at scale, are subject to manipulation for economic, law enforcement, or political reasons.