The real-world practice of security is in large part the deployment of risky systems with mitigations in place for the likely attacks that will target them. So, for instance, getting everyone to talk to the admin console on a purpose-built Chromebook with no Internet access is probably not a realistic option, but getting every system with admin console access MDM'd and requiring access to admin consoles to route through an IdP like Okta to enforce 2FA is much more realistic, and thus likely to happen.
The patterns in here that aren't unrealistic are pretty banal. I don't doubt that UK NCSC sees systems designed to be unpatchable, but modern engineering norms (Docker, blue/green, staging/cert environments) --- norms that have really nothing to do with security and are common to pretty much every serious engineering shop --- address that directly anyways.
Other patterns don't really make sense; for instance: you should design to make your systems patchable (sure, that's again a basic engineering requirement anyways), but also make sure your dev and staging environments aren't continuously available. Why? Those are conflicting requirements.