SSH's trust-on-first-use system is only secure under the assumption that you "usually" aren't being MitMed; this ought to be improved. For the typical server administration use case, I'd prefer a design that doesn't involve PKI – like encoding a hash of the key into the SSH command – but domain validation based on Web PKI could still be better than nothing. (Perhaps using some subdomain owned by the hosting provider, as opposed to the public-facing domain(s) for the server.) Domain validation would also be ideal for use cases where you're connecting not to your own server but to some known entity's, such as SSHing to GitHub. As for SSH CAs... I've never heard of them before. :) Looking it up, I see that some organizations use them, but I'm not sure their design is a good fit for the kind of non-organization-internal use cases I'm thinking of.
As it stands today, Signal's public key system is largely security theater since nobody bothers to check authentication codes. Even when people do check them, you always have an excuse for changing your code out of the blue (got a new phone, had to reset my phone, etc.), which an attacker can take advantage of. The latter could be fixed by having a better way to transfer trust between devices, but Signal could still have a better story for initial authentication than trusting the phone system. Now, I don't think a traditional PKI would help. But I do like what Keybase is doing here, bootstrapping trust off of a collection of signed attestations on social media accounts. I'd argue this amounts to a PKI in its own right, one where social media providers (unknowingly) play the role of CAs.
Estonia's national system and its e-services are a local example of a single central PKI. Provided services and systems seem to be far ahead of basically all other countries.
Identity theft, identification, authentication, signing etc. have been solved for nearly two decades now and I have to say the way the rest of the world does stuff looks stone-age to me.
For example I loathe how I've been asked to do identity verification by foreign companies "send us a picture of your ID", WTF. Sentences like "Use SMS 2FA to protect your account", "e-mail us the bill" and "come to our office to sign {x}" make me shudder, it's absolutely dogs*.
Someone else thread mentioned S/MIME. S/MIME might be a failure, but S/MIME is a thin wrapper around CMS (Content Messaging Syntax), which is widely deployed standard for signing, authenticating, and encrypting content. It's based on the same ASN.1 standards as PKIX. And like PKIX, the root authorities are whatever you want them to be; the standards just provide the syntax and semantics for building the PKI and providing interoperable messaging.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but AFAIU CMS is the basis for various European digital identity systems. See, e.g., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAdES_(computing)
Your point about S/MIME and CMS kind of makes my overall point for me. Sure. A global PKI is super useful for making things like CMS happen.
What PKI does usually imply is some sort of top-down tree of trust and mechanisms and policy for managing and verifying that tree. But the roots of that tree of trust don't have to be global, and with the exception of Web PKI aren't.
You're creating the straw man. You keep saying that new protocols don't need PKI. Well, if we accept your criteria for what PKI means, and considering that the only example that meets your criteria, past, present, or future, is Web PKI, then what exactly is the point of your argument?
If you have a beef against PKIX, CMS, X.509, ASN.1 etc--i.e. the mechanisms--then just say so. There's a ton of reasonable criticism to be made there. But those things are not equivalent to "PKI". There are plenty of PKI systems out there that make use of alternative mechanisms, though mostly proprietary and hidden as interoperability usually demands making use of pre-existing standards. But, to reiterate, using those standards to build a PKI system absolutely does not require relying on the same global roots of trusts. Nothing in those standards even identifies such a root or the shape of the tree at all.
Primarily because very few e-mail clients support it and no web client seems to.
> Correct me if I'm wrong, but AFAIU CMS is the basis for various European digital identity systems
Yes, they're in theory trying to legislate the same thing across EU what Estonia has done.
I think the point is more that even the (massive) concentrated effort it takes to patch the IDs will be less than the collective impact of not having those IDs at all (in terms of the convenience it would add to peoples’ lives) OR having the IDs without the patches at all.
It would also be very easy to detect any misrepresentation. Email contains a link to a domain that isn't on your cert? Alarms / no clickable links / etc.
No cross domain links would disrupt a lot of current emails, but most senders would likely setup in-domain redirectors to carry on their current mailing patterns. Unfortunately, some of those would probably be open redirectors (because it's easy to make an open redirector and it "solves" the immediate problem), leading to some amount of security issues.
The Nine Planes of the Internet would be connected. Níðhöggr, Dáinn, Dvalinn, Duneyrr and Duraþrór would be in their ordained places, no longer roaming lost in endless Violation of the Layers.