Until then it's extra time, effort and cost to offer something that most users do not understand and do not care about.
Until then it's extra time, effort and cost to offer something that most users do not understand and do not care about.
This means that all the traffic in $coffeeshop is now being routed through my machine.
Now whenever I see someone logging into facebook, I'm just pretending to be facebook, using my very own self-signed certificate.
The user on the other end wouldn't notice at all if they didn't warn about self-signed certificates.
Now the user thinks they log into facebook while they are actually logging in at my proxy.
Browsers that blindly accept self-signed certificates would make for a much worse attack than firesheep (Firesheep allows hijacking of active sessions, man-in-the-middle-ing SSL connections gives you the password for offline use.
You could of course try and work around this by having browsers "blow up" if the certificate changes at all. But what if facebook has to renew their self-signed certificate? Ok. Then let's just blow up if the signer authority changes? How do you make sure that the facebook who has signed the current certificate is actually the real facebook and not me impersonating as facebook?
Accepting self-signed certificates might work with some kind of web of trust. Imagine the browser showing a message like:
"Do your trust this site? 99.992% of our users have seen the same certificate, so it's pretty certain that this is really the right site"
This, again, works until Facebook has to change that certificate:
"Do you trust this site? 0.00001% of our users have seen this certificate. This is probably a phishing attempt"
Don't get me wrong. I think that the current CAs overcharge for their services. I do think that there are way too many CAs already listed in your browsers. I do think that the whole process is too complicated.
But over the years, I really came to an understanding that this, for the moment, is a necessary evil.
If browsers do not throw big warnings at self-signed certs it is trivial to impersonate even sites that do have real certificates. The user sees a lock icon and thinks they are secure, but they are sending their credit card to someone other than Amazon.com. This is slightly fixed by EV certs, but there is still a large user training issue.
From the other end.
I had this debate with someone in person, and they tried to tell me that since you cannot trust the other end with a self-signed there is no point in protecting your traffic from eavesdroppers on the open AP. That makes no sense to me, but he was passionate enough about it that I let it go. He never could tell me why, so I invite a more learned HNer to complete his argument for him and persuade me.
My take:
There's a difference between identity and encryption, and I think warning users about a site that wants encryption but doesn't necessarily want or need identity is a bigger user-training mistake than anything else browsers have ever done.
Perhaps the lock was the problem there; in that case, if I offer a self-signed certificate, perhaps the better UI experience would be to inform the user in that "Page Info" that their connection is encrypted, but they have no idea if the other end is who they say they are -- and don't bless the page with a lock, bar, anything. The entire construction of https:// needing to imply both encryption and identity doesn't make sense to me, as I see them as distinct concepts. One does not necessarily imply the other, but browsers make it so.
Maybe this is inherent to SSL/TLS itself and I'm the off-base one, but logically it makes sense to me.
All you need to do is generate your own cert for the site and the user will encrypt their traffic to you. This is why the lack authentication means that no confidentiality is provided.
It works fine this way for ssh.
There are loads of ways this could go wrong (the phishing website earnestly telling the user that they "changed" their SSL key and that you need to follow these simple steps to "fix" your browser; the initial contact being the bogus website; the huge loss of traffic if your SSL key legitimately changes and you're not prepared; you need to deal with revocation).
It works for ssh because you generally know the parties you are trying to connect to ahead of time and have ways to communicate with them (to confirm keys etc).
You do not have the same relationship with 99.99% of the servers you will be connecting to over https. It does not work.
On the other hand, the whole top-down certificate authority model is pretty weak anyway, especially since browsers don't provide any warning when a certificate for a site you've visited before has changed before its expiration date.
If I had to implement "automatic" HTTPS, I would probably ask browsers to automatically accept self-signed certificates on the first transaction. Thus, with no user-interaction in the good case, an attacker must manage to MiTM the user on the very first time they access a site, and this is considerably harder to do and less likely to result in interesting information. So I do believe encryption without MiTM protection is a security increase. But there are usability trade-offs and obvious costs for rolling something out like this, and I don't think this particular proposal makes the cut, unfortunately.
In the real world, self-signed certs provide neither identity verification nor security.
Firesheep does not perform MITM attacks (the media made this mistake too). It catches sessions out of the air and impersonates them, which is session hijacking.
As you wrote yourself, a man in the middle attack makes the victim think he is communicating with the far end; Firesheep doesn't involve the victim except to catch his packets.
Tell me this. How does my browser know if I've agreed with your server for a key, or with the man-in-the-middle proxy I've transparently been redirected to?
> to save $15, uses a self-signed certificate.
Valid SSL can be had from StartSSL for no charge. Money is not the issue, it's browsers completely flipping their shit at a self-signed.
> How does my browser know if I've agreed with your server for a key, or with the man-in-the-middle proxy I've transparently been redirected to?
It doesn't. Which is why, quoting myself and adding emphasis:
> if I offer a self-signed certificate, perhaps the better UI experience would be to inform the user in that "Page Info" that their connection is encrypted, but they have no idea if the other end is who they say they are
This is the function of the big red warning, but it's the implementation of that very warning that I disagree with. However, the traffic in between you and the other end (the other end that you cannot verify, remember) is still encrypted from completely unrelated third parties, so there is still a negligible benefit.
It limits "opened Wireshark and watched you work" to "need to know specifically what I'm after and generate a certificate and poison DNS and ..." A self-signed alone raises the barrier to entry at Starbucks significantly from "really, really easy" to "need to reconnoiter the target and have significant control over the network".
The distinction you're trying to draw between "attacks that can be carried out with Wireshark" and "attacks that can be carried out with Wireshark and a Perl script" aren't meaningful to me, so I'm obviously the wrong person to try to persuade you about this. Sorry for wasting your time.
I don't see why it's a meaningless distinction. To pull off a MITM, you need quite a bit more than a Perl script, and you're pretty much not going to do it on a network that you do not control. I'm speaking from a basic knowledge of networking theory (I've unintentionally avoided dark arts), so I'm willing to be corrected if I'm wrong.
That's the value I see: I don't think I'm going to walk into Starbucks with Perl and successfully MITM even my theoretical browser that doesn't care about self-signed certificates. The value is that in that scenario, even a self-signed makes reading traffic that doesn't belong to you harder.
I'm here to discuss, though, and I'm willing to learn; don't give up so easily.
These are not theoretical attacks. Any 16 year old with a $300 netbook can download software written by others and perform these attacks at your local Starbucks in a few hours. They would be able to see all traffic (even https) and without self-signed warnings the only outward sign would be the lack of the green url bar associated with EV certs.
Meanwhile, the proxy attack is the gold standard on the actual Internet we all use. Sniffers are obsolete.
The way around this is for there to be fee SSL signing CAs that have their root trust certificate commonly installed. It is getting to the point now startssl's root key used for their free certificates is trusted by most browsers (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/StartCom), so you can probably use those for your needs. I don't think any other of the free providers (like cacert.org) have this level of acceptance yet.
The difference between using a free cert from startssl or similar and using a self-signed certificate is that startssl will only issue a certificate to someone who has somehow verified they are in control of the name being certified (i.e. their contact details are in the whois records or such - I'm not sure what validation method they use as I've not used their service yet myself but they must do something adequate enough to get their root cert trusted by the big name browsers/OSs), whereas I can self-sign a certificate for any domain name, as could you, as could that nefarious transparent proxy.
TL;DR: For personal use on your own machines, use a self signed cert and install your CA cert as trusted on your machines. For more general access (i.e. a public facing service) you'll have to try startssl or pay your dues (otherwise even "encryption only" does not work because of the proxy problem).
I agree completely with this and would love a way to encrypt all the sites I look after without jumping through all the hoops needed to confirm identity to get an SSL cert that doens't make the site appear less secure than an unsecured HTTP site.
It is pretty standard to view these as separate concepts, see:
It means you can't trust sites if you're out of the house and you haven't been there before, but every site I care about trusting gets visited from in my house.
And how big are certs? Not that big. It's conceivable you could download a bundle of them beforehand. We're getting almost back to CA land, though, so I'm going to cut this idea short, but you can imagine a service that collects certs and verifies nothing except that they are the same as they were last week.
Though at least when you're using some public wifi AP, you're unlikely to be upgrading your browser.
Yes, on any sort of small network, you can be instantly MITM'd with basically no protection.
No, in that on any sort of large scale traffic it becomes impractical to filter, ie. with modest hardware you can trawl through http at say 10Gbps, it's basically impossible to MITM at that sort of speed without much greater hardware requirements.
Imo, having a self signed certificate simply appear to be http, ie. no "secure" icon, no locks, etc. would be a good middle ground.