except it's a lie. SNI isn't "more secure", it leaks information to a possible MITM.
BTW - if this site did not use SNI, and only served one website at https://www.mnot.net, then connecting to www.mnot.net's IP address at port 443 would be plenty good evidence that you're accessing https://www.mnot.net. The SNI privacy leak only really comes into play when you're accessing something behind a CDN or a shared hosting provider, which put enough sites behind each IP that simply accessing that IP isn't a privacy leak in itself.
Not using SNI isn't a more secure option. By definition you can't be doing standards compliant TLS 1.3 - which would be the most secure option - since sending SNI for host names is mandatory in TLS 1.3.
Also, in assuming that multiple hosts can instead be distinguished down in/ up in the HTTP layer you actually do make some things less secure. The TLS session binding doesn't apply to the application layer, so when you write Host: www.example.com in HTTP that does not bind your TLS session to the name www.example.com, whereas if you send SNI for www.example.com then the remote server needs to actively decide by policy if it's safe not to bind that. Are you actually going to get exploited this way? Probably not, but neither are bad guys anxious to find out somehow which of the services on Mark's server you wanted.
[nix-shell:~]$ nslookup redbot.org
Server: 127.0.0.1
Address: 127.0.0.1#53
Non-authoritative answer:
Name: redbot.org
Address: 45.79.113.165
Name: redbot.org
Address: 2600:3c01::f03c:92ff:fe89:3e33
[nix-shell:~]$ nslookup www.mnot.net
Server: 127.0.0.1
Address: 127.0.0.1#53
Non-authoritative answer:
www.mnot.net canonical name = cloud.mnot.net.
Name: cloud.mnot.net
Address: 45.79.113.165
Name: cloud.mnot.net
Address: 2600:3c01::f03c:92ff:fe89:3e33ESNI-enabled lighttpd, nginx or apache: https://185.24.233.103
ESNI-enabled CDN: https://www.cloudflare.com/ssl/encrypted-sni/
This would in theory ensure that any attacker could only assume the client is accessing at least one service on the target machine.
Setting aside the obvious risk that one of the services could claim to be one of the others, this obviously comes with some other technical limitations.
Again, it's not like the site is doing anything wrong, it just shouldn't be blaming the user for something that's obviously just a technical limitation of the technology being used.
Not much additional risk there when both site's TLS connections are already handled by the same process.
RFC 8446, page 7:
"All handshake messages after the ServerHello are now encrypted. The newly introduced EncryptedExtensions message allows various extensions previously sent in the clear in the ServerHello to also enjoy confidentiality protection."