> The claim was never that using obscurity is bad and should be avoided.
Yet. All of these are from HN.
> 3. Since when is obscurity a valid security measure?
> Security through obscurity, not a valid security plan.
> The problem with these "obscurity as a valid security layer" arguments is that there's already obscurity built into these protocols.
> Especially since most people believe "Obscurity" to still be a valid security technique.
> You're just reciting the same tired old rhetoric that security through obscurity is a valid defense mechanism. It's just not.
> I thought the general consensus here is that security by obscurity is bad.
> Obscurity is bad because it makes you _think_ it adds security.
> To maybe give some perspective _why_ security people say that security by obscurity is bad - and especially serving ssh via port 64323: [...]
> I dismissed it as security through (bad) obscurity but is there a valid security reason to do this?
> Compression is not encryption and security by obscurity is bad practice.
> it's understood that security by obscurity is bad.
> Security by obscurity is bad, of course, but in that model it's such a minor factor.
And countless many more. Some of these reference "security by obscurity", which, if you're kind, you can interpret as "security only through obscurity" (though reading in context this mostly doesn't seem to be what is meant), while others dismiss obscurity entirely. You will also regularly find commenters lament this point of view as the "mainstream idiocy".