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Comment by Quekid5 | Hacker News Reader

> GnuPG is more of a CLI "library" to interface with it

It abjectly fails at that. It's just awful to interface with.

Agreed. It has been long overdue that alternative OpenPGP implementations exist that try to address some of the peculiarities of GnuPG -- most of which are [still] there because its founder wants to preserve compatibility at all costs to support some of its long-term institutional users. And, yes, dealing with these peculiarities should not the responsibility of end users, but of further abstraction layers built on top of it (of which there are only a few, and all of them focused on the email use case).

The constant confusion between OpenPGP (the standard) and GnuPG (one implementation) has led many users to look elsewhere, which is unfortunate, but has also led many developers to look elsewhere, which is just sad.

Yes, trying to work within the existing standardization bodies can be very painful and disheartening, but the few people who try and survive in that space can use every good soul willing to assist.

The OpenPGP community has done hundred times more than Signal for the state of security on the Internet, and I'm sure it will continue to do so. Signal is great, and pushed the limits quite far (and still does), and I'm very grateful that it exists and use it every day.

The OpenPGP community would do more for security if they listened to serious cryptographers and began recommending better solutions.

See https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html for more on that. And it isn't hard to find lots and lots of cryptographers agreeing with the thesis.

People in this industry use OpenPGP because it's flexible and amendable to almost any usecase you can think of. "Better solutions" are usually indeed better but are also so specialized for their purpose to the point that they can't be easily used for any other purpose.

OpenPGP is used to secure everything from simple messages and email to authenticating OS updates for most servers today.

Should they use something more specialized now that it exists? Sure, but that an argument for PGP not against it; PGP is useful in situations where no specialized solutions exist or are inadequate.

Until something comes along that can cover every situation where OpenPGP is useful, I can't see people stop using it (much to the dismay of the 5 vocal crptologists that keep arguing against it).

It's telling that the most common example of a widespread use of PGP (modern messaging applications exchange more messages in a day than OpenPGP has ever exchanged) is software update schemes, because software update cryptography is both a solved problem (just use signify) and doesn't have network effects; it's a "trust anchor" application.

At least with PGP email, you can make the argument that PGP sticks around because people don't want to recreate contact lists. But even that argument doesn't apply to update.

Backup, archivization, password managers, the list is long. Duplicity has many users: http://duplicity.nongnu.org Pass is also pretty popular on HN: https://www.passwordstore.org Both use GPG.

I use pass and I would switch in a heartbeat to a fork of it that used ssh keys or something similar instead of gpg. For something so amazingly simple and useful, its dependence on the klunky mess that is gpg key management is an anchor that weighs it down.

Key management is a burden in every cryptosystem. I'm using KeePass and can recommend it, it works well.

Would you know if it failed?

If it would "fail" and there would be no consequences so I could't tell if it failed or not - would it make a difference?

If the failure were discovered by you a year later, realizing that all you thought was protected was in an adversary's hands.

I'm suggesting that "seems fine so far" is not effective at evaluating solidity of cryptographical usage.

> software update cryptography is both a solved problem (just use signify)

Well, just use TUF [1] and in-toto [2] ;)

[1] https://theupdateframework.io/

[2] https://in-toto.io/

Note that TUF is great for things with multiple contributiors (think npm or pypa).

For the simple case of "a single publisher publishes update for a single product", TUF is an overkill. Something like signify or seccure will be way easier to set up and use.

signify is nice when key distribution, revocation, and rotation is handled for you... but how do you do that securely for many different publishers on a single repo?

OpenPGP is used to secure everything from simple messages and email to authenticating OS updates for most servers today.

And for MOST of the places that it is used, it gets screwed up in some way that makes it not as secure as the people using it thought that it was.

Stop and think carefully about that statement. And repeat it to every person you meet who thinks that they are solving their problems with OpenPGP.

What do you mean by PGP "not [being] as secure as the people using it thought that it was"? Can you mention something specific?

Here is something specific.

Due to the complexity of the PGP system, there are a plethora of downgrade attacks. Where something that was supposed to be at one level of security can be tricked into doing something much less secure. See https://twitter.com/xmppwocky/status/1291144278953955328, https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/openpgp/JLn7sL6TqikUf-..., and https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/05/pgp-and-efail-frequent... for three different examples of such attacks against PGP in recent years.

The first one appears to be some sort of joke.

The second one is just yet another person discovering that the MDC check can be stripped off a message.

The third one seems to be just EFAIL which is not a downgrade or any attack really against PGP.

What industry do you mean by "this industry"? Just... computing?

I didn't know OpenPGP was used to authenticate OS updates for most servers today. Can you give me a place to find out more about that; are you talking about a specific OS?

Packet managers on pretty much every Linux distribution use GPG for verifying packages.

It's used to digitally sign software, not encrypting.

What is a good non-email use case for the PGP format?

Any usecase forwhich no specialized solution already exists. Source code signatures and Apt/RPM packages are good examples of this.

What does OpenPGP bring there? At least GnuPG has the benefit of being a tool that's present on many system and which is capable of verifying signatures.

If you're not using GnuPG, you can pick any format you want! What does OpenPGP add? Everything I can think of is a negative.

OpenPGP is the standard, gnupg is a implementation.

Right, so why talk about the standard when you mean, specifically, GnuPG?

If you want an explanation of why GnuPG is dangerous for anything besides email, let me know. But parent post was very specifically NOT about GnuPG- it was about OpenPGP.

because gnupg is not the only implementation.

Yes, that's what I said, and why I was asking!

What does the OpenPGP format bring to the table, BESIDES HAVING A COMMONLY AVAILABLE IMPLEMENTATION IN GNUPG?

It's the generic term.

It is used routinely on the dark nets by pasting encrypted messages into web forms.

Who said that it's for a user to interface with directly? mutt interfaces with it perfectly fine, and mutt's PGP UX is also fine.

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