Citation needed.
>there is a counter factual for which empirical data exists
And yet you provide none.
Citation needed.
>there is a counter factual for which empirical data exists
And yet you provide none.
A telco could never be overburdened by the rev-share in the same way as a upfront payment. If the rev share is too high so using the spectrum isn't economical, the telco could simply not build out (and probably lose their license, which is OK for them, it wasn't economical). If the prepaid price was too high, they still have to pay it from spectrum activities and other activities; but they probably can't sell the spectrum to retire the debt, because the price was too high.
Of course, some of that requires a competetent regulator with clear authority, as well as not too much corruption and reasonably swift court systems to handle disputes. But a point in time, single payment auction works better with those things too.
It's also easier to bid higher in rev-share, because you don't need to finance that net present value; it's just going to be built into the price of service, and your competitors will likely have similar rev-shares (depending on the auction process), so it's going to be built into everyone's prices.
I think there's also some value in a stream of payments rather than a one time payment. Although you can exchange one for the other with financial tools, a government may find a stream of payments to it matches well with the stream of payments it's making.
There's also an argument that the government doesn't actually realise any advantage from selling off the risk: if the telecom companies fail, it's still the government's problem. So the government ends up paying extra for something it can't actually use.