I feel that this downplays the justification for theories of expected utility too much? But I still want to keep reading to see where they're going with this. Ok, like, it says that modeling people as trying to maximize expected utility, is like assuming something as if one is interacting with paralell universe copies of onseself. But, surely the author must be familiar with the Von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem?

It complains that when people fail to act according to the theories, that the people are considered to be irrational, rather than amending the theories. While it is of course true that theories need to be made to account for how people actually behave, it seems to me that people failing to satisfy the vNM axioms, really is a way in which people fail to live up to the correct ideal of a rational agent. Well, maybe for it to make sense, instead there should be a formalization of like, a compute-limited approximation of following the vNM axioms, maybe throw in a dash of sub-agent stuff, and a few things along those lines.

Hmm.

Ok, well, if this makes better predictions of how people behave, that is valuable. Though, it would raise the question of "why?".