Of course the prices are going to increase. If the supply is the same and the demand increases, the price increases. There is nothing anybody can do about that.
Of course the prices are going to increase. If the supply is the same and the demand increases, the price increases. There is nothing anybody can do about that.
I don't want to be unfair to the guy, he seems to be understanding the problem and it's not an easy decision, but that sentence is a bit of a platitude.
The PAX organisers are "artificially" keeping down the price of tickets by controlling supply and fighting scalpers. If instead the auction allowed potential attendees to pay more for their tickets, then those tickets would end up going to attendees that pay far above the original price - as is already true for scalped tickets.
The percentage of tickets which are scalped is not a direct function of the demand on tickets.
PAX is effectively offloading the additional cost to the excluded audience, by either denying a ticket they would be willing to buy, or by making them pay more than they would have.
If the fraction of the scalped tickets is low, then it means that the fraction of people who are willing to buy a ticket at a price much higher than the going price can't be that large. If tickets were sold at $1, you'd certainly see A LOT more scalping going on, wouldn't you?
This would in turn imply that the global outcome wouldn't be that different. People who really want a ticket get one either way, and people who kinda want a ticket benefit from the more fair allocation system.
Not necessarily - you're discounting the effectiveness of anti-scalping measures. (And moreover, scalpers are always incentivised to scalp as many tickets as possible, because they are then put in the situation of controlling the market price with reduced supply, so that they can jack up prices).
If in fact anti-scalping works effectively, then the market price of the ticket in a fair auction can be completely independent of the original price it was sold at.
If demand is high enough, you can even have people who can only buy tickets because of the fixed price - if even 20% of customers are willing and able to pay far above the retail price for a ticket, they would in an auction snap up all the tickets, because PAX is oversubscribed by 5-to-1.
The advantages of VCG over that would be:
- it's easier to implement. Dutch is admittedly easier to understand, but with VCG your average buyer would only need to fill a box in a form.
- there is provable dominance of truthful bidding
There are also downsides, admittedly:
- it doesn't maximize seller revenues
- it doesn't work if all bidders collude (unlikely in this scenario)
- a dishonest seller could use shill/fake bids to increase the going price
The profit over the targeted ticket price could be returned uniformly to ticket holders. I guess this would be hard to do in practice and may complicate bidding strategies but it would avoid price increases.
I believe to reach your intended goal (i.e. the seller doesn't want to profit from the auction), you would have to redistribute the price increase among all participants. A way to do this would be as follows (needless to say, completely unpractical fantasy land experiment, I'm only doing this for the sake of argument):
- Have people freely register. Let's say you have M tickets, N people registered, the interesting case is when N >> M.
- Assign to each registered participant M/N of a ticket (assume tickets are infinitely divisible), and collect from them M/N * P where P is the intended price of a single ticket.
- Have people trade fractions of tickets.
The seller collects exactly M * P, and under usual assumptions the price of a ticket would converge to its 'true' value.
People who are bidding more will still pay more. The main weirdness introduced by that approach is that low bidders that win a ticket may get more money back than they paid.