If there is any finger to point, it's at KPN for hiring an untrusted contractor and giving them sensitive access.
If there is any finger to point, it's at KPN for hiring an untrusted contractor and giving them sensitive access.
That's incorrect. The report made by Capgemini stated that there were clear boundaries as to what Huawei was allowed to access but they violated those boundaries. Apparently also a list of numbers under surveillance by Dutch intelligence was found in possession of Huawei. Which was clearly well beyond those boundaries.
Just like a sysadmin can read the mail of the boss doesn't mean your allowed to.
>Apparently also a list of numbers under surveillance by Dutch intelligence was found in possession of Huawei. Which was clearly well beyond those boundaries
Wouldn't the ones running the network need to know which numbers were under surveillance to provide the intelligence agency access?
"Ongecontroleerde en ongeautoriseerde toegang vanuit China heeft na 28 oktober 2009 daadwerkelijk plaatsgevonden"
which translates to
"Uncontrolled and unauthorized access from China actually took place after October 28, 2009"
> Wouldn't the ones running the network need to know which numbers were under surveillance to provide the intelligence agency access?
No. That data should only be on a server within the KPN network. Huawei employees had an office in a KPN building. There is no need for that data to ever leave that network.
[0]: https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/huawei-kon-alle...
That does not state Huawei is responsible for that event, it could be the security testing team.
If that would have been the case, it would have been the first thing they'd mention though.
Note: i'm a native dutch speaker. So no translation required.
>The Capgemini report stated that Huawei staff, both from within KPN buildings and from China, could eavesdrop on unauthorized, uncontrolled, and unlimited KPN mobile numbers.
That quote clearly comes from the security testing team's report. It's not clear from the quote provided to me who is responsible for the "Uncontrolled and unauthorized access," but we know there was an ongoing security audit at the time mentioned.
It should be clear that unauthorized access is not from those doing the audit, but from Huawei. Why is that so hard to understand? Lol
Instead you're acting like I'm being dumb for not making baseless assumptions. The articles aren't titled "Huawei eavesdropped on KPN" for a reason.
With that access they could have done anything ( eg. eavesdropping ).
Follow up requests are currently happening by the Dutch government ( other related news from today).
KPN also mentioned: currently they have no access. While the report states: they had access.
KPN mentioned that Huawei's employees with access were employed by KPN. Wick could be correct, but it didn't explain access from China since those employees are employed in the netherlands.
A bit of wordplay going around. That's true.
--
Capgemini:
Huawei blijkt zich buiten de procedure om vanuit China toegang tot de kern van het netwerk te verschaffen. Veiligheidsmensen van KPN weten dat dit gebeurt, maar doen niets. ‘Ongecontroleerde en ongeautoriseerde toegang vanuit China heeft na 28 oktober 2009 daadwerkelijk plaatsgevonden’, vermeldt het rapport in april 2010. [...] De onderzoekers [van Capgemini] vragen het Chinese bedrijf daarom wie bij de gegevens kan en hoe de versleuteling is geregeld. ‘Pas na lang aandringen’ is Huawei bereid ‘duidelijkheid te verschaffen’. Huawei blijkt een uiterst zwakke versleuteling toe te passen en zelf het sleutelbeheer te doen. Capgemini: ‘Daarmee zijn nummers die onder de tap staan bekend bij Huawei’.
Edit: couldn't respond below. Source is the origin of all foreign news articles, it's the original newspaper that is in possession of the Capgemini report: https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/huawei-kon-alle...
( Google cache is possible as a workaround fyi)
Overall, it says the same "Huawei could have done something" as the other sources I've seen.
> The company gained unauthorized access to the heart of the mobile network from China.
... but then, in the very next sentence:
> How often that happened is not clear because it was not recorded anywhere.
This wording is a bit unclear. The first sentence states as a matter of fact that there was unauthorized access, while the second states that there are no records.
c.f. the Murray Gell-Mann Amnesia Effect.
From my perspective it does not make a lot of sense for Huawei or China to engage in overt spying at this stage of the game, even if (assuming the worst intentions) that is something they plan to do. Right now all of the incentives for that company are to gain the trust of customers during these early stages when everyone is looking for a reason to throw up protectionist barriers. A decade from now when Huawei systems are ubiquitous and the competition has largely been put out of business, then maybe the situation will be different. But why kill the golden goose by doing something stupid now?
That doesn’t mean there wasn’t bad behavior. Maybe people are behaving irrationally. But I tend to see sloppiness behind these stories rather than actual malice.
What makes you think these are "early stages"? AFAIK many telcos already use Huawei 4G equipment, though I can't find actual numbers for that. I'd say Huawei/China is already well positioned to abuse any backdoor access they have. The move to 5G could only expand this.
KPN is obviously in the wrong here since they can't prove whether there was unauthorized access or not, and speculation articles like this don't help. In any case, it doesn't seem like a good idea to give untethered access to a company accused of IP theft time and time again[1]. Whether all those are PR smear campaigns or there's a real cause for concern is difficult to judge as an outsider, but given China's track record, I'm inclined to believe there's some truth in them.
[1]: https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/05/25/huawei-ac...
We're at the peak of a massive international debate regarding the role of Huawei in Western communications networks. This is a debate that has already led to bans and restrictions on the deployment of Huawei equipment in 5G networks [0-3]. 5G buildouts are happening right now, and hence the political purchasing decisions (with a multi-decade impact) are happening now. I suspect that's why we're seeing things like TFA.
It seems to me that this would be the worst possible time for Huawei to get caught doing something unambiguously malicious. Right now Western networks could remove Huawei if they wanted to, or if politicians ban it. Ten years from now -- assuming Huawei "wins" in most Western nations -- it will be vastly more difficult to replace that equipment. If we imagine a 2035 where Huawei has dominated the US/European 5G market, I suspect that their European competitors will also be much weaker (or will have abandoned the field entirely), meaning that there really isn't much of an alternative.
So TL;DR I can't say that there is a good time to get caught spying, but there definitely is a bad time: and it's right now.
[0] https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-47041341 [1] https://www.telecompaper.com/news/dutch-mps-call-for-more-cl... [2] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-huawei-5g-security... [3-N] Just search on "<European country> 5g Huawei debate"
There are a lot of unsubstantiated claims here. First of all, the stealing of IP. Next, that this is how Huawei got their break.
As far as I understand it, Huawei grew by developing cheap telephone switches in the 1980s and early 1990s, long before it had anything to do with Nortel. Huawei focused on relatively simple components that it could manufacture more cheaply than Western competitors, and it gained market share inside China. It only moved up the value chain as its revenue increased and it had more ability to spend on R&D. By the time Huawei was beginning to move into more advanced markets, Nortel was already a basket case.
The strange thing to me is that all these claims that Huawei made it because they supposedly stole from Nortel seem to have appeared in the 2010s, long after Nortel's demise, and they're incredibly vague. By contrast, analyses of Huawei's early history that I've seen barely mention Nortel: [1].
1. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legac...
https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/did-a-chinese-hack-kill-canada-s...
And then here's the key line:
> No one knows who managed to hack Nortel or where that data went in China.
This is all so vague, whereas the reasons for Huawei's growth and Nortel's demise are so much more concrete. For Huawei, the ability to capture a sizeable chunk of the market in China for cheap telephone switches, aided by its lower labor costs, better knowledge of the local market, and some level of protectionism. For Nortel, serious mismanagement and a financial scandal.
The thesis of the article, that economic espionage in the 2000s did in Nortel, is not plausible. It just looks like blame-shifting from a former Nortel employee, which Bloomberg decided to trumpet during a time (2000) when the US government was waging was a major anti-Huawei campaign.
And yes most state sponsored hacks are difficult to figure out exactly the source and end use of the data. Look at what’s happening right now with the solar winds back for instance.
Is the expectation that businesses are supposed to simply ignore the authority of the sovereign states they operate in? There seems to be a bit of circular logic going on here.
Perhaps not, but I try not to believe things just because they confirm my existing biases.
So you agree Huawei cannot be trusted. I think that is the whole point of the discussion.
Also, innocent until proven guilty should only apply to regular people, not state actors. Many historical events are only declassified after 50, 60 years, or never at all. Believe a story or not is your judgement, but asking for proofs are either naive, or just looking for excuses.
I did not said that Huawei is not spying, mayb ethey do but I am still waiting for the evidence. Similar on how I wait for evidence that Google is reading our politicians emails and blackmailing them - is not enough to hear some conspiracy and then upvote it like a tool because I hate Huawei or Google.
Not sure why Huawei is unique here.
Of course. But, security posture is an important thing to consider. This may be an obvious thing to many people on this forum, but it is not obvious to much of the general public.
First of all, it's not a spinoff. KPN his the report because it was afraid for it's existence.
Second is that Huawei could listen to KPN'S internal communications ( = their network) that includes a lot of government calls.
As far as I'm aware, practically every European telco hires Huawei engineers to maintain their infrastructure in this way. It's therefore not reasonable to call them an untrusted contractor, as they are evidently very trusted.
"Huawei also knew which numbers were tapped by police and intelligence services."
massive boon to the CCP IC to have access on a foreign's country ongoing investigation etc. (the in Canada detained CFO comes to mind but the potential is much bigger than this)
If someone gets pickpocketed on the subway, saying "You should have protected yourself better" is victim blaming, sure. But if someone doesn't get pickpocketed and then points out how there was a foreigner sitting right next to them who could, theoretically, have pickpocketed them, should they have chosen, and while the foreigner didn't pickpocket them this time, you know how those foreigners are... then "Why didn't you just get up and sit somewhere else if he bothered you" is a particularly polite form of what you perhaps ought to tell them.