cmmc is not in effect, v1.02 is like 2 months old, and v2 is rumored to come out in a month or two.
nist 800-171, which is where the majority of cmmc comes from, didnt even require formal external attestation until like 6 months ago when dfars 252.204-7019 required posting in SPRS to continue doing business with the DoD.
ive never seen, nor heard of, anything actually marked as CUI.
You might have seen documents marked 'Controlled' in the past.
800-171 has been required since 2017.
Edited to add link to DoD CUI Training https://www.dodcui.mil/Portals/109/Documents/Training%20Docs...
That’s because CUI is a recent label. Per DoDI 5200.48, effective March 6, 2020, CUI is is replacing legacy labels such as For Official Use Only (FOUO), Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU), and Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES). [0]
It's been around for more than 10 years. See CFR 2018 Title 32 Vol 6 Part 2002 (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2018-title32-vol6/pd...) if you want details. DoD implementation ramped up about a year ago.
I actually received documents marked CUI last week.
I do not like perception management, and for the definition of a set of public services, the Federal government sure does seem to do a hell of a lot of it. Nat Sec be damned, it isn't a blank check.
Furthermore, once you start doing things like creating mew classifications to ease up the logistics of getting people who can actually work with it, that sure sounds like you're abusing classification (using the word in the "bucketing info for special treatment" sense) far beyond the realm of what you should be.
Nevermind that it makes questions about the current state of DoD classification minutiae the best Fed bait on the planet.
And in return should you be able to get the name and contact information of the confidential informant in your case? All the witnesses against you and their CLEOC reports? Vehicle registrations, license plates, home phone numbers, home addresses?
I think your position is untenable.
If you don't think this is the kind of information that "Law Enforcement Sensitive" applies to, you are incorrect. If you do think this information should be released unfettered to the public, you should justify that position.
Being in physical possession of a turbine blade doesn’t give you the secrets of how to manufacture it, which are extremely tightly controlled.
Look into the Soviet konkordski tire counter-intel effort. If I recall correctly, NATO found out the Soviets were trying to get their hands on the rubber formulation for the tires of the landing gear, and counterintelligence worked with manufacturers to leak the formula for the "worst rubber for the job ever". Keep trying to find where I stumbled on that, but it seems to be lost to the all seeing eye of the Internet now. Closest I get is references to Pavlov smuggling the plans for the landing gear assembly out of France.
Give me two copies of something that you don't want to tell me how to make, one for destructive analysis, and one to compare against as a finished product, and I can at least filter out some false starts from the get-go.
Turbine blades are like ICs in the sense that the secret sauce is in the materials and the manufacturing processes. You can imitate the exterior shape perfectly and it still be completely useless.