People have all these fancy high-tech Hollywood-style theories about how they imagine things being attacked, but the reality is almost always far more boring.
People have all these fancy high-tech Hollywood-style theories about how they imagine things being attacked, but the reality is almost always far more boring.
It's unfortunate that this very simple attack remains extremely successful even a decade later. I'm surprised Tor Browser didn't enforce HTTPS Everywhere for all domains by default years ago. HTTPS Everywhere was released in 2010, before sslstrip, even. HSTS and HSTS preloading helps, but individual site owners still have to explicitly submit their site to be added to the preload list.
So if you own example.foo or example.dev you don't need to do anything and indeed can't choose, because Google (owners of the foo and dev top level domains) preloaded the entire TLD.
http://some.example.dev/ can still exist, but you can't go there in a typical modern web browser, it will take you to https://some.example.dev/ regardless. So software that knows it actually wants the plaintext protocol can use it, but your ordinary users can't get SSL stripped.
i highly doubt that. in fact i knew about ssl striping before i knew moxie or even sslstrip and this attack was probably already well known when someone came up with a seperate url scheme for https...
For anyone who remembers it, "Firesheep" also had a big impact, too. It didn't do anything special or novel whatsoever, but it was a really easy-to-use tool that drove home to the average person just how dangerous plaintext HTTP was. Lots of people immediately started using it in school classes and logging into everyone else's Facebook and Twitter accounts. I'm not sure if it was the direct cause, but I know not long after that, all the big services began switching to HTTPS for everything rather than just login and payment pages.
There's probably some startup lesson buried in there...